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The Relationship Between Nationalism and Human Rights: A Macedonian Case Study 
Director: Paul G. Lauren
A broad survey of the history of Macedonia, from the era of the Ottoman domination of 
the region to the more recent history of the modem Republic of Macedonia, demonstrates 
the tension between the forces of nationalism and the protection of human rights. While 
nationalism tends to focus on the particular traits that differentiate groups of people, those 
interested in protecting human rights emphasize the universal nature of those rights. At 
the same time and particularly in the Balkans, determining one’s national identity 
involves an element of subjectivity. Those who promote human rights, however, focus 
on the objective definition of those rights. Although the concepts of human rights and 
nationalism have evolved considerably throughout the long time span of Macedonian 
history, the forces of particular nationalism have consistently served as a major obstacle 
to the promotion of universal human rights.
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Introduction 
Human Rights, Nationalism, and Alexander the Great
In 1910 a girl named Agnes Gonxha Bojaxhiu was bom to Catholic parents living 
in the town of Skopje on the Balkan Peninsula. In the course of her life Agnes became a 
nun, adopted the name Teresa and eventually moved to Calcutta, India where she worked 
to promote the human rights of the poorest of the poor. The world mourned the death of 
Mother Teresa in 1997, and currently the Catholic Church is moving towards declaring 
her a saint. In discussions about her remarkable life, however, sources as diverse as 
parish priests, English language textbooks, and Time almanacs cannot seem to agree on 
the place of her birth. While all agree that she was bom in Skopje, some say her birth 
occurred in Albania, some Serbia, others Yugoslavia, and still others Macedonia. The 
ethnic and national contours of the Balkans have created such an enormous amount of 
confusion that scholars living in the modem era of nation-states still labor to reconstmct 
the early twentieth century history of Skopje, currently the capital of the modem state of 
Macedonia.
Given these confusions, where then should a history of modem Macedonia and 
the relationship between the forces of ethnic nationalism and the protection of human 
rights begin? Many people immediately associate the beginning of Macedonian history 
with the accessible, familiar, and very human figure of Alexander the Great. Hearing his 
name conjures up images of the wars and conquests of a long-ago era. But it does more 
than that, for his own life and legend serve as a vehicle to begin the exploration of the on-
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going tension between the struggle to promote human rights and the strength of ethnic 
nationalism.
Alexander the Great was bom in 356 B.C. in a geographical area loosely known 
as Macedon. Significantly, for a later discussion of Macedonian nationalism, his 
birthplace, the city of Pella, is currently located in the modem state of Greece. In 337 
B.C., in the name of all the Greeks of the peninsula, Alexander’s father, Philip of 
Macedon, declared war on the Persians who had mled over the Greek city-states in Asia 
Minor for some time. One year later, however, Philip was assassinated, which meant that 
his twenty-year-old son Alexander suddenly assumed power and attempted to fulfill the 
mission his father had begun. In the fourteen short years of his reign Alexander would 
march his armies across the world in an unbroken string of victories. By the time of his 
death his empire stretched from the Greek peninsula, across Asia, and all the way to the 
Indus River. Records of Alexander’s travels and battles prove him an undisputed 
military genius who never suffered a defeat. Although strongly committed to his own 
people, he is also seen as at least a fair and just king who fought in part to destroy the 
tyranny of Persian mle over the Greeks and subsequently spread the ideas of Greek 
civilization, including those of human rights, to the world.
Alexander the Great and Human Rights
In the spring of 334 B.C., after consolidating his power on the Greek Peninsula, 
Alexander crossed over into Asia for the first time. He proclaimed the ostensibly noble 
goal of liberating the Greek cities and restoring to them the freedoms they had enjoyed 
through democratic governments before their conquest by the Persians.1 Out of stories
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such as this a legend has developed that Alexander acted as a beneficent ruler who 
brought the advanced ideas of Greek culture and government to Asia. Regarding the 
nature of human rights, the legend at least suggests an important element of the struggle 
to promote those human rights. People everywhere, whether they live in Greece or Asia 
or anywhere else, deserve the right to self-government and freedom from despotic rule by 
a foreign empire.
In The Evolution o f International Human Rights, historian Paul Lauren explores 
more concrete evidence regarding the ancient Greeks’ understanding of the universal 
nature of human rights. Living on the peninsula some years before Alexander, the Greek 
philosophers Plato and Aristotle recognized a universal law of God or nature. Lauren 
explains:
This law, they claimed, governed every element in the universe and 
provided the basis for an egalitarian framework of rights.. ..It was 
eternal and universal, and thus placed well above the narrow and self- 
serving dictates of a particular state, the rules of a specific society, or 
the will of a single lawmaker.. ..In his Republic for example, Plato 
argued that a universal justice exists that transcends immediate 
circumstance and allows people in different political systems to 
recognize that some actions are clearly just and others unjust.2
According to Plato and Aristotle, then, regardless of the particular ruler of a people, those
people deserved the same basic freedoms and rights as any other. Similarly, the ruler
does not make absolute laws, but some truths about the nature of justice exist above and
independent of the ruler. The legends that have grown up regarding Alexander’s actions
in Asia reflect this universal understanding of human rights.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to see in Alexander the embodiment of the
ideals of Plato and Alexander. Although the philosopher Aristotle had lived at the
Macedonian court for a time and had served as Alexander’s tutor, from the sources it
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appears in fact that Alexander did not often act out of respect for ideas about the 
universal nature of rights and justice. For example, in the process of chasing the Persians 
across Asia, Alexander reached the Greek city of Aspendus. Aspendian negotiators went 
out to meet Alexander and attempted to reach a mutual understanding. Upon the 
negotiators’ return to the city, the citizens disliked the proposed agreement so much that 
they reneged on the entire agreement. With complete disregard for the principles of 
freedom and independence, in anger Alexander imposed extremely harsh terms on the 
city. Specifically he placed the city under direct satrapal control, instead of allowing 
them a democracy, and probably imposed a Macedonian garrison to ensure their 
continued loyalty.3 We see in Alexander, then, a leader who talked about freedom but 
acted out of concern only for his own power and ambition. It seems that rather than 
acting to provide freedom for Greeks living under Persian tyranny, Alexander used their 
position as an excuse to further his own power in Asia. We will return to the idea of 
using human rights violations as a smokescreen for naked military or political ambition 
later in the history of modem Macedonia.
Other evidence from Alexander’s many military campaigns also undermines the 
legend of the justice of his reign. After Alexander had defeated the Persians in a battle at 
the river Granicus, the Greek mercenaries who had been fighting for the Persians offered 
to surrender. Alexander refused the offer, slaughtered most of the men and sent the rest 
back to Macedonia to serve as slaves in the mines. In his attack on the Persian-controlled 
Greek city of Miletus, however, Alexander followed a different path than he had at 
Granicus. After he had defeated the city and it had surrendered, he treated all the 
Milesian citizens respectfully, and also spared the Greek mercenaries on the condition
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that they entered his service. Historian Peter Green explains Alexander’s actions by 
writing that he was “moved to pity by their courage and loyalty.”4 According to Green, 
then, the actions of the Greek mercenaries allowed Alexander to look past their particular 
task as serving in the forces of his enemy and view them as part of universal humanity 
capable of courage and loyalty just like his own soldiers. Rather than detracting from the 
legend, this story of his behavior at Miletus has contributed to the image of Alexander as 
a just and fair leader.
Some historians, however, discount the legend and attribute different motives to 
Alexander’s change in policy. R. D. Milns feels that Alexander had learned an important 
lesson from his harsh treatment of the Greek mercenaries on the Granicus. Although 
Alexander had hoped his actions would deter other Greeks from serving as mercenaries 
to the Persians, Milns explains that his actions had the opposite effect and “the 
mercenaries realized that here was an opponent from whom they could expect no mercy 
and with whom it must be a fight to the bitter end.”5 As a result Alexander had learned 
that “it was a big mistake to leave these tough and skilful fighters with only the 
expectation of slavery if they surrendered. Hence he offered them a pardon if they would 
join up with his forces; and all took the opportunity.”6 Milns suggests that rather than a 
concern for the universal nature of human rights, strategic and tactical considerations 
prompted Alexander to show clemency.
Milns’ explanation for Alexander’s motivation thus suggests a connection 
between the protection of universal human rights and practical benefits. The Executive 
Director of Amnesty International USA, William F. Schulz, echoes Milns’ conclusions.
In his book, In Our Own Best Interest: How Defending Human Rights Benefits Us All, he
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argues that fighting against human rights abuses in different ways will directly benefit the 
United States. Schulz thus makes the argument for our modem world that Alexander 
discovered in the course of ancient war: protecting human rights often has practical 
benefits. Later chapters that deal with the protection of human rights in modem 
Macedonia will return to this issue of the connection between human rights and 
expediency.
The story of Alexander’s first encounter with the Persian Great King Darius 
likewise has contributed to Alexander’s legend. After defeating numerous Persian forces 
throughout the Greek city-states of Asia Minor, he finally caught up with King Darius. 
They fought a major battle at Issus in 333 B.C. during which Darius’ army was defeated 
and the Great King fled with the bulk of the remaining forces, leaving his shield, armor, 
chariot, and even his family behind. While captives in Alexander’s camp, the Persian 
royal family heard about the Macedonians’ acquisition of Darius’ accouterments and 
assumed that the Great King had died in battle. Alexander learned of their mourning 
and, according to many of the earliest historical sources, immediately sent an envoy to 
reassure the family. The envoy “gave the message about Darius, and added that 
Alexander wished them to retain all the marks, ceremonies, and titles of royalty, as he 
had not fought Darius with any personal bitterness, but had made legitimate war for the 
sovereignty of Asia.”7
On the one hand, Alexander’s actions suggest a universal understanding of human 
rights. In his treatment of Darius’ royal family he demonstrated his respect for the rights 
of people who not only belonged to the Persian Empire, but also belonged to the family 
of the very man he was fighting. In other words, he respected their right to life and
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liberty regardless of their ethnicity or political affiliation. On the other hand, the message 
he sent reflects Alexander’s real aims in Asia. He fought his wars not for freedom or 
democracy for the Greeks but for the “sovereignty of Asia.” Furthermore, Alexander 
certainly did not exhibit such tolerance and respect in all, or even most, of his actions, 
and not until many years had passed would a universal understanding of human rights 
find a global voice, a topic that we will return to in Chapter 2.
In general, then, Alexander’s recorded deeds at least point, in some degree, to the 
universal nature of human rights. Independent of his actions, however, philosophers such 
as Plato and Aristotle would continue to articulate a vision of the universality of human 
rights, a vision that Mother Teresa would share many centuries later. In addition, and of 
great importance for the study of the modem state of Macedonia, a legend of Alexander 
as a fair and just mler who spread the fruits of Greek civilization to the four comers of 
the known world has developed out of the now murky facts of Alexander’s life.
Alexander the Great and Nationalism
Several stories from Alexander’s governance of Asia, which read like legends but 
appear to have some basis in historical fact, reveal important aspects of the force of 
nationalism and its inherent conflict with a universal understanding of human rights.
With Alexander’s eventual defeat of Darius, he assumed the mantle of the Great King 
and found himself with a whole new host of problems to confront. Previously, he had 
defeated and become the mler over Greek-city states located on the Asian continent. As 
he continued to move inland he found himself with a growing number of “foreign” 
peoples, particularly Persians, under his command. The various groups of people in the
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growing empire, including the Macedonians and Persians, each hoped to maintain their 
established traditions of culture, governance, and daily life, as well as their group’s 
position of primacy within Alexander’s realm.
To combat friction between the different groups, Alexander decided on a policy 
of mass marriages between Persian ladies and high-ranking Macedonian soldiers. In 324 
B.C. after Alexander had returned from his eastward march to the Indus, at the city of 
Susa he organized the marriages of approximately one hundred interracial couples while
o
he himself married two Persian ladies including the daughter of Darius. In similar 
fashion, Alexander also adopted the Persian style of dress and began to include some 
Persian troops among his own Macedonian regiments.9 These stories suggest how hard 
and creatively Alexander worked to ameliorate the problems of cultural rivalry that 
existed within the borders of his realm. In spite of his intentions, his governing decisions 
reflected the very real differences that existed between the groups. The tension between 
the different segments of the population suggests a mentality that emphasized loyalty to 
one particular group of people in opposition to all others. This process of finding identity 
within a certain cultural group necessarily embraces the particular, in sharp contrast to the 
universal understanding of human rights reflected in the legend of Alexander. In 
addition, as Alexander increasingly adopted many aspects of the Persian culture, he alone 
decided to redefine his identity, thus suggesting that a subjective decision-making process 
plays a role in the determination of an ethnic identity.
In general, the process of determining individual identity necessitates an 
exploration of one of the fundamental questions of human existence. Every person is 
some how different from the rest of humanity and particularly unique. At the same time,
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simply by virtue of being human, all people are in some ways the same and share 
fundamental commonalities with one another. This philosophical tension between 
differences and similarities, which underlies the process of forming one’s identity, will 
serve as the backdrop for an examination of the relationship between an ethnic or national 
identity, which emphasizes the particular and the unique, and the pursuit of universal, 
international human rights, which emphasizes the sameness of all humanity.
Currently, particularly in the modem states of Macedonia and Greece, the topics 
of nationality and Alexander the Great continue to serve as the focus for heated debates. 
Both sides try to claim the legacy of Alexander as uniquely and exclusively belonging to 
their group in an effort to provide legitimacy for their modem state. Some modem 
Greeks, therefore, claim that Alexander and all other Macedonians were actually Greek. 
According to these Greek nationalists, the Slavs on the Balkan Peninsula living within the 
modem state of Macedonia have no right to either the name or the legend of Alexander. 
Nationalist Macedonians respond in similar vein, arguing that Alexander was actually 
Slavic so the modem Greeks have no inherent connection with the man and instead only 
the Slavs can claim his legacy.10
Although modem nationalism differs considerably from the cultural identity of 
the time of Alexander the Great, the tension between the particular and the universal 
remains the same. The feud between the modem Greeks and Macedonians demonstrates 
each side’s loyalty to the particular aspects of their group, as opposed to a universal 
loyalty to all of humanity that might allow a more nuanced and complex view of 
Alexander’s history. The debate between the two groups also reveals that the actual facts 
of the history of Alexander the Great have less to do with the development of modem
9
Macedonian history than people’s perception and interpretation of the events of 
Alexander’s reign. We will address more fully the friction between modem Greeks and 
modem Macedonians in Chapter 3.
In general, then, as in the specific case of Macedonia, the oppositional, particular, 
and subjective nature of nationalism directly contradicts a universal understanding of 
human rights. Although the concepts of nationalism and ethnic or cultural identity, as 
well as people’s understanding of human rights, would evolve considerably over the 
many centuries of Macedonian history, the tension between the two has remained 
constant. Overcoming nationalism thus provides one of the most significant challenges 
to those who seek to promote the protection of universal international human rights. An 
exploration of modem Macedonian history will, in addition to answering the question of 
the birthplace of Mother Teresa, further clarify the nature of the relationship between the 
struggle for human rights and the forces of nationalism, as well as highlight the 
importance of the relationship between the two for our modem world.
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Chapter I
Historical Background and “Ancient Ethnic Hatreds,” 14th to 19th 
Centuries
It is, or was, a gay peninsula filled with sprightly people who ate peppered foods, drank 
strong liquors, wore flamboyant clothes, loved and murdered easily and had a splendid 
talent for starting wars. Less imaginative westerners looked down on them with secret 
envy, sniffing at their royalty, scoffing at their pretensions, and fearing their savage 
terrorists. Karl Marx called them "ethnic trash. ” I, as a footloose youngster in my 
twenties, adored them.
-C. L. Sulzberger, A Long Row o f Candles
Many centuries separate the Balkans inhabited by Alexander the Great and the 
Balkans that witnessed the birth of Mother Teresa. Before turning to the events of the 
twentieth century, a brief exploration of the historical background of the region is 
essential for an understanding of modem Macedonia. In particular, in order to explain 
the violence and human rights abuses of the late twentieth century Balkans, many modem 
politicians have pointed to the existence of “ancient ethnic hatreds” between the various 
groups on the peninsula. Although we will return to the nature of those modem 
arguments regarding ancient hatreds in Chapters 2 and 3, an overview of the history of 
the centuries that preceded the twentieth demonstrates that economic and religious factors 
played a far greater role in defining the identities of the Balkan peoples than any concept 
of ethnicity or nationality.
Many historians and scholars have struggled to formulate an exact definition of 
either an ethnic or a national identity. In general, an ethnic identity involves defining 
one’s identity in terms of one’s ethnic group, while a national identity involves 
connecting individual identity with that of the nation. Over many centuries of history,
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however, the meanings of the words ethnic group and nation have changed significantly. 
In particular, before the nineteenth century, little differentiated an ethnic from a national 
identity, as the existence of the Ottoman Empire inhibited the formation of modem 
nations and nation-states. During the era when national identity meant little in the 
Balkans, the same Balkan peoples also enjoyed fairly significant protection of their 
human rights. Consequently, when those peoples began to experience the first stirrings 
of national consciousness during the nineteenth century, the newly developing mentality 
corresponded with important changes regarding the protection of their human rights.
In the centuries that followed the collapse of Alexander’s Empire upon his death 
in 323 B.C., several other empires enjoyed a time of prominence on the Balkan 
Peninsula. Both the Roman and the Byzantine empires conquered territory in the region 
at different times in the course of their long histories. In the seventh century, however, 
the ethnography of the region changed considerably with the influx of large numbers of 
Slavic peoples. These various Slavic tribes had established themselves on the peninsula 
as the Byzantine Empire began its decline. By the fourteenth century, a new group of 
conquerors, the Turks of Asia Minor, had begun to grow in strength and prepared for 
their invasion of the region. Importantly, the overview of pre-modem Balkan history that 
follows does not deal with the state of Macedonia, as no such state existed in actuality or 
even, in all likelihood, in imagination until the end of the nineteenth century. Instead, the 
historical background will focus primarily on the region in general, but with particular 
attention given to the areas and territory that played the greatest role in shaping what 
would eventually become the modem state of Macedonia.
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Ottoman Administration of the Balkans: Fourteenth to Sixteenth Centuries
In the fourteenth century, Turkish armies marched out of Anatolia into the 
Balkans. At that time, however, the Turks did not refer to the region as “the Balkans” 
since the word “Balkan” was simply the Turkish word for “wooded mountain.”
Historian Maria Todorova explains that over time, the term gradually “stuck as the 
permanent name for the mountain range that ran through Bulgaria. Later, although 
contending for primacy alongside such appellations as ‘Turkey in Europe,’ ‘Rumelia,’ 
‘Southeastern Europe,’ etc., it came to be applied to the whole peninsula.”1 While 
modern-day perceptions of the exact geographical area referred to by the word “Balkans” 
differ, the legacy of the term itself dates from the Turkish invasions.
In 1389, after a series of battles, in Kosovo Turkish troops soundly defeated the 
combined Slavic forces of Serbians, Bosnians, and Bulgarians. In 1453 the Ottoman 
Turks captured Constantinople, by 1463 they had subdued Bosnia, and in relatively short 
period of time they had managed to exert considerable control over a large amount of 
Balkan territory.2 Several factors account for the relative ease of this Ottoman conquest. 
During the slow disintegration of the Byzantine Empire, the independent kings, despots, 
and lords of the small Balkan principalities had been fragmented and locked in hostilities 
against one another. As a result of their own conflicts, they often sought help from the 
invading Ottoman forces to aid in the settling of their local disputes, thus bringing 
Ottoman troops into the Balkans.3 With the gradual consolidation of Ottoman control of 
the region, many of these local lords lost their autonomy.4 Although some Balkan 
leaders may have resented the loss of power, at same time the Ottomans allowed many
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members of the local military classes into their service, thus enabling them to retain some 
degree of their former status.5
In general, the Balkan peasants also viewed the Ottoman conquest in a favorable 
light. One prominent Balkan historian argues, “The Balkan peasants, who constituted the 
bulk of the people in that area, improved their lot during the initial period of Turkish rule; 
they were less abused, paid lower feudal taxes, and, as a result of the centralized Ottoman 
rule, had somewhat greater security.”6 According to Ottoman historian Perry Anderson, 
peasants in the Balkans enjoyed a “social condition that was.. .in most respects milder 
and freer than anywhere else in Eastern Europe at the time.”7 Following the Ottoman 
conquest, the Balkan peasants experienced an increased protection of certain human 
rights, such as the right to enjoy security and the freedom from exploitative taxes. The 
protection the Ottomans offered the peasants and the higher standard of living they 
enjoyed after the conquest helps to explain the ease of the Ottoman conquest of the 
region and the absence of peasant uprisings against their new overlords.
These descriptions of the Ottoman entrance into the Balkans not only explain the 
rapidity of their advances but also provide a broad idea of the society in which the local 
people lived. Reactions to the Ottomans varied, but depended primarily on whether one 
belonged to the class of the elite notables or formed part of the peasant class. 
Furthermore, although historians discuss the Ottoman conquest of regions such as 
Bosnia, it is important to qualify those statements to mean the conquest of the territory 
that today encompasses the modem state of Bosnia. No such state existed at the time of 
the conquest; instead the Ottomans encountered a region fragmented by the competing 
claims of small local lords and mlers. Already the information from the Ottoman
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conquest disputes the claim that the “ancient hatreds” in the Balkans have existed for 
centuries. Ethnic hostilities certainly did not affect the ways in which local people in the 
Balkans reacted to the coming of the Ottomans.
Another factor that plays a part in explaining both the ease of Ottoman conquest 
and the lack of ethnic hostilities arises from the Ottomans’ view towards religion. The 
Ottoman Turks, who served as the overlords of the Balkans, identified themselves as 
Muslims. In other words, “The new state was in the hands of the Muslims and the 
official language was Turkish....Islam.. .separated the rulers from the ruled.”8 The 
“ruled,” then identified themselves, for the most part in the Balkans, as Christians. Far 
from requiring the conversions of their new subject people, the Ottoman Empire came to 
view itself as the protector of the Orthodox Church. Furthermore, as long as Christians 
and Jews swore obedience to their Islamic rulers, the state allowed them to exercise their 
religion freely and live according to their own religious laws.9 From the outset then, one 
of the primary divisions within the empire occurred along religious, rather than national 
or ethnic lines.
The Ottomans then developed an administrative system that organized groups of 
people into various millets based on their religion, not their ethnicity. In other words, as 
Balkan historian Wayne Vucinich points out, “there was a Muslim millet, but no Turkish 
or Arab or Kurdish millet”10 Furthermore, as leading Balkan historian L. S. Stavrianos 
explains, the “Ottoman authorities divided their subjects not into Greeks or Bulgarians or 
Rumanians, but rather into the following millets: Orthodox, Gregorian, Armenian, Roman 
Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant.”11 Organizing people by religion combined groups that 
spoke different languages and fractured groups that spoke the same language. Albanian
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speaking people, for example, found themselves divided into three different millets', the 
Orthodox Christian, the Roman Catholic, and the Muslim.12 A Catholic family that spoke 
Albanian, such as the family of Mother Teresa, would belong to the Roman Catholic 
millet along with all the other Catholics of the vast empire. The very nature of the millet 
system thus worked against the development of an ethnic or national identity based on a 
common language or a shared territory.
Under the Ottoman system, the Orthodox Church fulfilled a number of different 
functions for Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. In the political realm, the Church 
represented its followers in disputes involving the Ottoman authorities.13 This particular 
role of the Church hampered the development of a national consciousness since, in the 
words of Stavrianos, “the leadership of the Church was unchallenged. National policies 
and national objectives were virtually nonexistent. The Balkan world during these early 
years was a non-national Orthodox world, and Balkan politics were conceived of and 
expressed in non-national Orthodox terms.”14 The Church similarly exerted influence 
outside the political arena as it played a vital role in formulating the region’s culture and 
served as the center of the people’s social life.15 Stavrianos explains that the Orthodox 
Church “naturally dominated education, written literature and general intellectual life.. .In 
place of several Balkan literatures there existed only one Orthodox ecclesiastical 
literature.”16 In every aspect of life, politics, administration, social life, and culture, the 
Orthodox Church served to unite the disparate members of the faith living in far-flung 
geographical regions of the empire, thus working against the development of culture or 
identity based on ethnicity. It is important to note that at this point only one Orthodox 
Church existed. The different national churches, such as the Greek Orthodox Church or
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the Serbian Orthodox Church, did not emerge until much later, and their evolution will he 
dealt with shortly.
An examination of the nature of specific religious practices among the peasants of 
the Balkans further demonstrates the lack of ancient hostilities among the different 
groups. In spite of the official designations for the religious groups, in daily life the
17people themselves considerably blurred the differences between their religions.
Historian Mark Mazower relates a string of vignettes that illustrate the lack of clear
boundaries between religious practices. For example, Balkan peasants practiced the
custom of obtaining an amulet to ward of evil. As a result, “Priests were kept busy
writing messages on amulets in response to their flock’s demands, and when Christians
1 8found their own amulets did not work, they would go and borrow Muslim ones.” He 
tells of a similar incident in which peasants living in Macedonia were asked to state their 
religion. In response, they “would cross themselves and reply, ‘we are Muslims, but of 
the Virgin Mary.’”19
Mazower then discusses the way in which religion affected the lives of women. 
Christian women could marry Muslim men, and the woman would not even have to 
convert, although the children had to be raised as Muslims. Christian women could also 
convert to Islam, which offered women a way out of unhappy marriages because, as 
Mazower explains, “by converting to Islam they automatically obtained an annulment of 
their marriage unless their Christian spouse converted too.”20 These accounts show a 
further problem with the “ancient ethnic hatreds” thesis. Not only did the Balkan peoples 
often identify themselves based on religion, rather than ethnicity, but also their blurred
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concept of their own religious identities in practical living led much more naturally to 
religious toleration rather than hatred.
What then were the practical consequences for th6 Ottoman policy of religious 
toleration and the lack of ethnic animosity on the human rights of the Balkan inhabitants? 
Stavrianos explains that even though they considered it, the Ottoman Sultans did not 
pursue a policy of mass extermination of Christians. The Ottomans did not force the 
Christians to convert and never persecuted them in the ways that Muslims and Jews 
experienced in Spain. Furthermore, “in a period when Catholics and Protestants were 
massacring each other and when Jews were being hounded from one Christian state to
another, the subjects of the Sultan were free to worship as they wished with
0 1comparatively minor disabilities.” At the same time, even though the Balkan 
Christians did enjoy a considerable degree of religious freedom, this did not necessarily 
translate into religious equality. Not only did Christian peasants have to pay higher 
taxes than Muslim peasants, but Vucinich also explains that “non-Muslims were never 
able to mix freely in Muslim society... [Christians] were socially castigated and deprived 
of rights belonging to the ruling Muslim elite.”23 Even so, these discriminations within 
the Ottoman system seem a far ways removed from the violent ethnic clashes of the 
current era. Only in the nineteenth century, after the Ottoman administrative structures 
had undergone significant changes, would people begin to seriously challenge the 
institutional inequality in the Ottoman system.
In addition to religion, economic class also played an important role in the lives of 
the Balkan peoples living under Ottoman rule. Ottoman authorities divided the 
population into two official groups: the rulers and the ruled. The ruling class comprised
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the sultan, the bureaucrats, and the military men. The class of the ruled then 
encompassed all other groups of people in the empire and was referred to as the ray a. 
Notably this distinction does not take into account religious differences. Regarding 
religion, historian Stanford Shaw states, “The Muslim rayas were no closer than the non- 
Muslim rayas to the Ottoman rulers; in language, customs, and mores the upper-class 
Ottomans were equally far from both and treated them, as a result, with equal scorn.”24 
In addition, Ottoman society divided the productive classes into three groups: farmers, 
merchants and craftsmen. According to historian Halil Inalcik, the sultan “ordered the 
members of each class to wear clothes indicative of their station in life, forbidding 
craftsmen and shop-keepers to wear the luxurious garments of the upper-classes.”25 The 
practice of assigning clothing to different groups in order to differentiate among people 
based on their livelihood serves as another example of the way in which class played an 
important role in the social structure of the empire. One’s profession, then, rather than 
one’s ethnicity or even one’s religion, served as an important factoring in determining 
particular identities.
In spite of these important distinctions based on economic status, as opposed to 
religion, the Ottoman cities in general retained a Muslim character. While significant 
exceptions existed, the urban merchants and craftsmen of the Balkans usually practiced 
the Muslim faith while the Christian peasants worked on the rural farms. As a result, a 
Serb, Rumanian, or Bulgarian peasant would feel like a foreigner in the towns of his 
native land. The discussion of the rural-urban divide presents an opportunity to 
examine the role that ethnicity did play during the Ottoman rule of the region.
Explaining that a Serb, Bulgarian, or Rumanian felt like a foreigner in the cities of the
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Balkans, alludes to the existence of the concept of ethnic identities. In fact, several 
Ottoman scholars agree that “the Balkan peninsula did not change radically in its ethnic 
composition during the Ottoman period.”27
American diplomat Richard Holbrooke supports the suggestion that the Balkan 
people living under Ottoman occupation did express some concept of ethnic identity. He 
writes, “The linguistic, racial, and religious diversity of the peoples inhabiting
• TOsoutheastern Europe dates back to the Slav invasions, if not earlier.” Thus from at least 
the seventh century until the Ottoman conquest, a period of over seven hundred years, 
people maintained some concept of their ethnic differences. Holbrooke then goes on to 
explain, “Politically, however, this counted for little.”29 While some concept of ethnic 
identity existed, it did not play a very meaningful role in the people’s political, social, or 
economic lives, and was certainly not associated with the idea of a state based on national 
or ethnic divisions.
If, in general, the local inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula found their lives 
governed more by religious and economic aspects of their identity rather than their 
ethnicity, a question then arises regarding the exact nature of the Balkan people’s 
relationship to their land. The Ottomans’ organized the day-to-day administration of the 
lands of their empire in a fairly different fashion than the modem nation-state. In 
addition to the religious millet system, and the economic divisions between the mlers and 
the mled, or the raya, a third system, called the timar-sipahi system, regulated the way in 
which the Ottomans administered the productive farmlands in the Empire.30 According 
to Stavrianos, Ottoman sipahis were “meritorious Moslem* soldiers to whom the Sultan
+ Throughout the body of this thesis the modem spelling “Muslim” will be used, except for when 
it occurs in direct quotations.
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granted the right to collect certain taxes from specified villages.”31 These villages were 
grouped together into a timar. The Ottoman state then owned the land and fixed an 
amount for the sipahis to collect. The state also determined the portion to be sent back to 
the capital, and the sipahi could keep for himself whatever remained. The collection of 
taxes thus served as a settled income for the sipahi, and the ability of a single sipahi to 
collect taxes from a number of villages limited the extent of the lands encompassed 
within a timar.
In return for this income, the Sultan required the sipahi to live on the timar and 
also to be ready to go to war at the Sultan’s command. The sipahis were required to 
provide aimed service for as long as they were needed and, during military campaigns,
T9they paid allegiance only to the sultan. To the peasants who lived in the villages of the 
timar, the sultan granted the right to make use of a definite tract of land as hereditary
TTtenants. In return the peasants paid taxes, determined by the state, to the sipahi. The 
timar-sipahi system played a crucial role in the structure of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkans, and in fact, Vucinich argues, “it was the keystone of the politico-military and 
socio-economic structure of the Ottoman empire. To a very large degree, the timar- 
sipahi system governed social relations in the empire.”34
Although a discussion of the intricacies of Ottoman administration of the Balkans 
may seem far removed from the problems of the current era, a crucial factor emerges 
from an understanding of the timar-sipahi system. The Ottomans instituted 
administrative arrangements that did not involve the division of the Balkans into distinct 
states, republics, or provinces based on geographical borders or ethnic makeup. The 
millet system served to govern one aspect of the people’s lives, and the people within a
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millet found themselves spread out over a large geographical area. Conversely, the 
timar-sipahi system dictated important aspects of the socio-economic situation of the 
peasants. Although larger administrative divisions did exist, the evidence suggests that 
the primary focus of daily life for the peasants revolved around the timar and the millet. 
This Ottoman system then translated into a society in which the people enjoyed a fair 
amount local political autonomy, and religious minorities enjoyed substantial protection 
under the imperial law. The evidence does not support the argument that groups of 
people living on the Balkan Peninsula during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries nursed 
“ethnic hatreds” for one another, as they did not even define their identities primarily in 
terms of ethnicity, and the Ottoman system proved generally tolerant of those differences 
that did divide groups of people.
The Ottoman method of administration described thus far generally functioned 
best during the time between the conquest of the Balkans and the beginning of the 
Ottoman decline in the seventeenth century. Before turning to the factors that led to that 
decline, it is necessary to explore one final Ottoman system that profoundly impacted the 
governance of the Balkans. In the fourteenth century Ottoman Sultan Murad I devised a 
new method, eventually called the Janissary system, to provide administrators and 
military leaders for the Empire. Ottoman officials would periodically travel to the 
Balkans to extract a levy of the male Christian children. The Ottomans brought these 
Christian boys back to the capital where they treated them kindly, gradually introduced 
them to Islam, and educated them in a way that would develop both their minds and 
bodies for service to the sultan as Janissaries. Those who showed merit could rise to the 
highest-ranking positions in the military and imperial administration, while the others
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served in lesser positions within the empire. Although considered the sultan’s slaves, 
according to historian Ferdinand Schevill, in the Ottoman Empire “there was nothing 
dishonorable about the slave status. Under the sultan, their master, and with his consent,
"5 C
his slaves.. .ruled the realm and shone in his reflected glory.” Importantly, according to 
the Koran, no one bom a Muslim could become a slave, so the children of the Janissaries 
could not enter the ranks of the Janissaries.
Needless to say, by today’s standards a child-levy would entail serious human 
rights violations; at the time the system provided a high degree of order and stability to 
the Ottoman Empire. The Janissary system served as a meritocracy and protected 
against corruption, as the slaves owed their loyalty only to the sultan and could not pass 
on their privileges to the next generation. Similarly, the sipahis answered only to the 
sultan and also did not serve as hereditary mlers of their timars. As these two systems 
began to degenerate and increasingly tolerated corruption and abuse, the consequences of 
the changes with in the Ottoman administration would profoundly impact the daily lives 
and the human rights of the Balkan populations.
Decline of the Ottoman Empire: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
Many different and complexly interconnected factors account for the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire following its zenith of power in the sixteenth century. For the 
purposes of this study, in the broad survey of Ottoman decline, particular attention will be 
paid to those factors that most directly impacted the development of new nation-states in 
the Balkans. The establishment of these new nation-states would have serious 
repercussions for the basic human rights of people in the Balkans, and particularly the
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people in the region of Macedonia. In addition to the decline of the Ottoman Empire, two 
other interrelated factors account for the vast changes within the Empire: the influence of 
the Western European powers and the growth of nationalism with the Balkans. Before 
turning to the second two factors, which developed primarily in the nineteenth century, it 
is necessary to trace the roots of the Ottoman decline, which began several centuries 
earlier.
As already noted, the Janissaries comprised a major portion of the administrative 
and military posts in the Empire. Since those bom Muslim could not enter the 
Janissaries, a paradox evolved in which slaves of Christian origin mled a huge Muslim 
empire. Those bom Muslim could only hold positions in the legal, religious, and 
educational institutions of their empire. By the seventeenth century, however, the system 
began to change. Instead of the sultan assigning posts on the basis of merit, he 
distributed those positions in return for large bribes. As a result, Muslims could now 
attain military and administrative positions if they could muster the necessary financial 
resources. At the same time, the timar system began to break down. The Janissaries 
began to displace the sipahis and accumulate their properties. In addition, instead of 
appointing loyal and deserving Muslims to administer the timars, the sultan began to sell 
the farms to the highest bidder. Whether the new bidders or members of the Janissaries 
governed the land, under the new system, known as the chiflik system, the administrators 
exploited the lands and the peasants as their own personal holdings. As a result, the 
tenants who worked the land retained less of their produce for themselves and began to 
experience restrictions on their freedom of movement. The corruption of the Ottoman
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Empire, then, resulted directly in decreasing protection of the human rights, such as the 
right to freedom from excessive taxation, of the Balkan peasant populations.
Even during this period of decline, however, it is important to point out that by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century the majority of the Ottoman subjects in the 
Balkans did not identify themselves primarily by their association with their ethnic 
community. Economic distinctions continued to play a major role as both Muslim and 
Christian peasants suffered exploitation under the new chiflik system. Similarly, the 
Christians suffered as much from the increasing corruption of their own religious leaders 
within the Orthodox millet, as from the extortion of the Ottomans. Their dissatisfaction 
would eventually result in the reform of the millet administration, a subject that will be 
dealt with shortly. In general, though, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the 
average Balkan person defined himself by his occupation and any broader feelings of 
association were directed at the head of the religious organization, rather than towards the
37sultan. The transition to the new chiflik system, however, helped to set in motion the
growth of Balkan nationalism.
The extortion and abuse of the Balkan peasants that arose from the disintegration
of law and order led the bolder peasants to leave their farms and flee into the mountains
and forests where, as Stavrianos explains,
they led perilous but free lives of outlaws.... They came to be 
regarded.. .not as ordinary brigands but rather as the champions of the 
lowly and the downtrodden.. ..Despite their limitations, these outlaws did 
create a tradition of resistance that profoundly influenced the popular 
mind. And they also provided a ready-made fighting force when various 
factors which they dimly comprehended culminated in the series of 
national uprisings in the nineteenth century.
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We will return to the nature of those “various factors” shortly, but for the moment it is 
important to point out that the exploitation of the peasants, and the resulting violations of 
some of their basic human rights through the corrupt chiflik system, directly created the 
conditions that allowed for the later development of nationalist uprisings.
In addition to the outlaws and brigands, the peasants themselves also began to 
revolt against their repressive overlords, and by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries the revolts had steadily spread across many parts of the peninsula.
Significantly, Stavrianos relates that these peasant revolts “provided the mass basis for 
the nationalist movements and insurrections that developed among all the Balkan peoples 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”39 In contrast with the peace, 
security, and relative autonomy that the Balkan peoples had enjoyed during the height of 
Ottoman rule, as the Ottoman Empire began to decline, many of the inhabitants of the 
Balkan Peninsula suffered from decreasing protection of their human rights. As they 
began to protest against their exploitation and the corruption of the officials who ruled 
over them, they provided support for the growing nationalist movements. In some ways, 
then, nationalism evolved in the Balkans as a vehicle to express dismay at the human 
rights violations instigated, or at least tolerated, by the Ottoman Empire.
Ottoman Reform Movement, or The Tanzimat: The Nineteenth Century
Officials within the Ottoman capital recognized the exploitation and abuse 
suffered by the peasants, and in the nineteenth century they attempted to address the 
myriad of problems and corruption within the empire’s administrative system. In the 
early part of the nineteenth century, Sultan Mahmud II eradicated the Janissary system,
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which, since the Janissaries had previously blocked all attempts at reform, paved the way 
for vast reform efforts within the empire. He also addressed the plight of his specifically 
Christian subjects and declared that “Turks and rayas be treated alike without 
distinction.”40 In this way the Ottoman reform efforts began to acknowledge that the 
protection of the human rights of the Ottoman subjects necessitated an appreciation that 
all people within the empire, regardless of religion or status, universally deserved the 
same treatment. Unfortunately, in spite of the decree emanating from Constantinople and 
the absence of the Janissaries, the Ottoman officials who continued to govern the Balkan 
provinces remained, in practice, inefficient and corrupt and the peasants continued to 
suffer.41
Mahmud’s successor, Sultan Abdulmejid, along with his Foreign Minister Reshid, 
followed the path of reform that Mahmud had begun. The Western European powers 
also periodically responded to the plight of the sultan’s Christian subjects, who suffered 
from the corruption of the Empire’s administrative system. Under pressure from the 
Western powers, in 1839 Abdulmejid issued a decree known as the Hatti-i Sherif of 
Gulhane. The decree guaranteed definite rights for “all our subjects, of whatever religion 
or sect they may be; they shall enjoy them without exception.”42 The Hatti-i Sherif 
marked the beginning of reform period, known in Turkish as the Tanzimat, which 
continued with varying degrees of effectiveness until Sultan Abdul Hamid came to power 
in 1880.43
In 1856, following the Crimean War and in part as a result once again of pressure 
from the West, the sultan issued another decree known as the Islahat Fermani. The 
decree read, “Every distinction or designation pending to make any class whatever of the
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subjects of my empire inferior to another class on account of their religion, language or 
race shall be forever effaced from administrative protocol.”44 Just as in Murad’s early 
declaration, both the Hatti-i Sherif and the Islahat Fermani spoke to the universalism 
inherent in the protection of human rights. In order to guarantee the legal, social and 
political rights of the sultan’s subjects, it was necessary to recognize that the state must 
view all subjects, regardless of their “religion, language, or race,” in the same way, 
regardless of that within their individual identities that served to divide them from one 
another.
In spite of these reform efforts, for the most part the position of the Christian 
peasants did not improve, at least in part because their own religious leaders within their 
millet had also become corrupt and exploited them as well. The sultan recognized that 
the Christian community’s abuse of the Christian peasants demanded a different kind of 
restructuring. Alongside the Islahat Fermani, in 1856 the Sultan also published the Hatti 
-  Humayun. The decree reorganized the millet system and provided for the protection of 
the basic rights of the Balkan Christians. In part, self-interest motivated the reform 
attempts of the Hatti -  Humayun. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman 
Empire was beginning to suffer military defeats with increasing frequency and the 
Ottoman leaders sought a way to strengthen the vast and heterogeneous empire. They 
hoped, in the words of Stavrianos, “that these reforms.. .might lower the barriers 
separating the groups and encourage them to think of themselves as fellow Ottoman 
citizens rather than as Jews or Christians of various denominations.”45 Once again the 
Ottoman reform efforts attempted to instill a spirit of universality, as opposed to more 
narrowly defined conceptions of religious identity. Significantly, the Ottomans did not
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succeed in creating larger bonds among their subjects because of the divisive nature of 
emerging nationalist ideologies that served to separate, rather than unify, the peoples of 
the empire.46
Influence of the Great Powers
Whence, then, did this spirit of Balkan nationalism arise? The evidence thus far 
suggests that from the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries the Balkan peoples 
defined their identity through reference to economic and religious factors far more than 
any concept of ethnicity. Even as the chiflik system replaced the timar system, at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century Christian and Muslims alike suffered the exploitation 
of the Ottoman officials. Similarly the Christian administrative system sanctioned 
through the millet system continued to exploit the Christians of the Balkans. As already 
noted, the bandits and revolting peasants of the Balkans would eventually voice their 
complaints against the corruption in the Ottoman system in the language of nationalism. 
The gradual and complex evolution to that point, however, occurred because of several 
factors in addition to the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The Western European powers 
also played a significant role in the development of the new Balkan nation-states and the 
growth of Balkan nationalism.
As already mentioned, the Ottoman reform efforts occurred in part because of 
agitation from reformers within the capital but also because of pressure from the 
powerful nations of Western Europe. Britain, France, and Russia had all objected to the 
Ottoman policy of discrimination against the religious minorities within the empire and 
had pressured the sultan to issue the decrees that guaranteed equality to all citizens 47
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Undoubtedly, many within the great power nations acted sincerely out of concern for the 
welfare of the Balkan Christians. At the same time, the actions the Great Powers took 
often also furthered the national foreign policy goals of the Great Powers themselves. As 
a result, according to historian and human rights expert Paul Lauren, “it became evident 
that international intervention in the name of ‘humanity’ might well be genuinely 
beneficent and justified, but at the same time always carried the dangerous potential of 
providing a convenient pretext for coercion as a guise for masking more suspicious
J O
motives of national self-interest and aggrandizement.’ When the Great Powers took 
actions in the Balkans both to protect human rights and to further their own self-interest, 
they also incidentally and somewhat ironically helped to establish nationalism in the 
region.
Before turning more directly to the relationship between the political actions of 
the Great Powers and the development of Balkan nationalism, it is necessary to briefly 
paint a picture of the larger context of the great power interactions in general, in order to 
explain why those states took such a great interest in the events of the Balkan Peninsula. 
For a variety of reasons, including economic and political factors, Britain was interested 
in preserving the status quo of the continent. Britain thus tended to formulate pro- 
Turkish policies, and sought to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, at the 
expense of the newly developing Balkan nation-states. The British thus disliked Russian 
expansion in the Balkans, which often took the form of the establishment of new Balkan 
states out of territories previously controlled by the Ottoman Empire. France joined 
Britain in deploring Russian expansion. The Russians, for their part, hoped to increase 
their influence in the Balkans as the Ottoman Empire declined in power and prestige.49
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In the nineteenth century, then, the decay of the Ottoman Empire was such that it was 
widely known as “The Sick Man of Europe,” which turned the Balkans into an arena for 
Great Power competition.
In addition to Western politics, Western ideas also affected the national 
development of the Balkans. As the Balkan elites traveled to Western Europe for their 
education, the ideas of the Enlightenment and those released by the French Revolution 
profoundly affected their thinking upon their return home. The Christian Orthodox 
Church had maintained a monopoly over Christian culture and knowledge, but by the 
eighteenth century it was so integrated into the Ottoman imperial structure that it 
increasingly suffered from corruption and demoralization, and had ceased to serve as an 
independent actor dedicated to promoting the rights of the Christian subjects of the 
sultan. As a result a rift began to develop between the Church and new elements in 
Balkan society which, armed with the secular learning of the Western European 
Enlightenment, were challenging the status quo of the Church’s power and authority.50 
The change in mentality would eventually contribute to a new form of organization in the 
Balkans: instead of the overarching dominance of one Christian Orthodox Church, new 
nation-states would begin to vie for the loyalty of the populations.
The economy of the Balkans also underwent significant changes. During the 
height of the timar system, most Christian Slavs lived in the countryside and worked on 
the land. Of course significant exceptions occurred, but in general the Ottoman cities 
retained a generally Muslim character. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, however, the Christian Slavs started drifting to cities. By the nineteenth 
century a class of Slavic urban shopkeepers and artisans had developed. The emergence
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of a Slavic middle class began to allow the various ethnic groups to begin to form an idea 
of national cohesion that encompassed both rural and urban areas.51 Thus, in the 
nineteenth century the breakdown of the traditional rural-urban distinctions allowed for 
the development of a more ethnically-oriented conception of identity. The economic 
changes began to allow for the possibility that people could and would see themselves as 
part of a larger society, rather than simply as members of their smaller, more localized, 
urban or rural community.
In addition to economic changes and the ideas of the Enlightenment, the ideology 
of the French Revolution, and consequently nationalism, spread to the Balkans in a 
variety of ways. As Balkan merchants traveled abroad to other parts of Europe, they 
began to encounter the ideology of the French Revolution. The idea thus slowly 
developed among some segments of Balkan society of reorganizing the society on a 
national basis. French ideology also spread to the Balkans in other ways as a 
considerable number of Balkan soldiers served under Napoleon and found themselves 
affected by his personality and career, as well as the ideology of the revolution. In 
addition, in the nineteenth century students went abroad for their education and returned 
home with revolutionary ideas.
Significantly, the French Revolution represented a secular Western movement. 
Historian Bernard Lewis explains that the movement was not only non-Christian, but 
even anti-Christian, and its leaders stressed the divorce between the new revolutionary, 
national ideology and Christianity. Just as the teaching of the Enlightenment created 
divisions between the educated Balkan elites and the Orthodox Church leaders, the 
secular nature of the ideology of the French Revolution also helped shift the emphasis
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away from the millet and religion as a primary means of defining one’s identity, and 
towards the concept of the national entity.54
Even as the transmission of ideas resulted from Balkan peoples’ travels, 
Europeans also made their way to the region itself. During the Napoleonic years the 
French invested in both the cultural and the economic development of the Balkans. 
Stavrianos explains that the French “built a network of secondary, commercial, and 
agricultural schools. The national language was used in these schools and in the 
newspapers that now appeared. The French also subsidized the publication of grammars 
and dictionaries and encouraged the organization of a national theater.”55 It is important 
to note that the French did not spread their propaganda to the region out of altruistic 
motives. Rather, as Lewis points out, “there was the systematic propaganda directed 
from Paris with the aim of undermining Ottoman authority... needless to say, this 
propaganda was designed to utilize the local populations as pawns of French 
diplomacy.”56
Decades before the French would join the British and Russians in pressuring the 
sultan for reforms, the French involvement in the Balkans helped to spark the 
development of an ethnically-based identity. While superficially these two kinds of 
actions do not seem contradictory, a closer evaluation reveals their inherent tension. As 
already noted, the reform movements proclaimed the equality of all citizens. Efforts to 
encourage the use of a specific local language for use in local schools and newspapers, on 
the other hand, emphasized the differences between groups of people. In general, then, 
the transmission of the ideologies of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution as 
well as the direct actions of the Western Powers themselves, helped to set the stage for
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the specific Balkan independence movements that emphasized the particulars and the 
distinctions among the Balkan peoples based on ethnicity or nationality, as opposed to 
their universal similarities.
Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian Independence
An overview of the Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian independence movements 
clearly demonstrates the relationship between the Great Powers, Ottoman decline, and the 
growth of Balkan nationalism. At the same time the history of these three states sheds 
light on the relationship between the nascent forces of nationalism and the protection of 
human rights. Finally, these three Balkan states would closely affect the development of 
twentieth-century Macedonian Jiistory. The era of Balkan independence movements 
opened in 1804 as Serbian peasants rebelled against the corruption of Ottoman rule. 
Ironically, far from calling for Serbia’s independence, they instead sought the return of 
the sultan’s authority over the corrupt provincial officials.57 Although initially 
successful, the Ottomans had defeated the Serbians by 1810 and the national 
consciousness of the Serbs themselves remained ill defined.58
How then did the Serbs manage to win significant concessions from the vast 
Ottoman Empire? Balkan historian Misha Glenny explains, “To compensate for their 
political and economic weakness, the Serbian elites sought support for their aspirations 
from the European powers.”59 As a result the Serbians appealed to the Austrians and, 
perhaps more importantly, to the Russians, with whom they shared the Orthodox religion 
and a similar language. Following Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the Russians 
turned their attention towards the problem of the relationship between the Ottoman Turks
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and the Serbians, and specifically the abuses the Christian peasants suffered at the hands 
of the corrupt Ottoman administrators. At the Vienna Congress in 1815, the Russian tsar 
declared himself the protector of the Orthodox Christians under Ottoman domination, and 
shortly thereafter the Russians forced the Turks to make concessions to the Serbs. 
Similarly, following the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829, the Russians insisted that the 
Turks grant complete internal autonomy to Serbia and formally recognize her monarch as 
a hereditary ruler. The Russians played such an important role in the development of 
Serbian independence that one historian writes, “it is doubtful that the Serbs could have 
won independence from the Ottoman Empire without the full support of one or more
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major powers.” In contrast to the role that Russia would play in demanding that the 
sultan recognize the universal rights of all Ottoman subjects, in their behavior towards the 
Serbs the Russians succeeded in fostering major differences between emerging ethnic 
groups, particularly the Serbs and Turks, as they argued for the creation of a new Serbian 
autonomous region. Furthermore, the extent to which the Serbian leaders relied on 
Russian influence to secure their new state suggests that the forces of Serbian nationalism 
in and of themselves would not have been strong enough to bring about the changes.
In 1821 the Greeks followed the Serbian example. Two Greek uprisings 
occurred simultaneously although the Ottomans quickly crushed the first movement that 
had taken place in the Danubian principalities. Fearing further rebellions, the Ottoman 
authorities jailed Greek nobles living at the southernmost end of the Balkan Peninsula in 
a preemptive move designed to forestall revolution. Their plan backfired because, as 
Mazower explains, “faced with the choice of arrest or rebellion, many Greeks chose the 
latter and began to attack Muslim settlements.”61 By violating the right of the Greek
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nobles not to suffer arbitrary arrest, the Ottoman authorities prompted a response that 
would quickly take on national tones. The Ottoman actions against the Greek leaders 
provide yet another example of human rights violations serving as the catalyst for 
national agitation.
As the Greeks attacked the Turks in response, they committed numerous human 
rights violations of their own, killing men, women, and children. The Ottomans 
responded in kind and Mazower relates that their massacre of Greeks on Chios “shocked
• fDthe liberal conscience of Europe.” The Great Powers responded to the situation by 
sending a fleet to the region. When the combined British, French, and Russian forces 
sank the Ottoman navy at the battle of Navarino, their actions effectively assured the 
establishment of an independent Greek state in 1830. It is doubtful whether the Greeks 
could have established an independent state on their own since they, like the Serbs before 
them, had lacked organization and their petty quarrels among themselves kept them from 
capitalizing on their earlier successes. After the Great Powers had ensured the success of 
the Greek movement, however, they continued their involvement when, two years later, 
they decided that the young Prince Otto of Bavaria, a seventeen-year-old Catholic would 
become the country’s new king. Rather than occurring as simply the result of a 
national or ethnic movement, Great Power politics played an important role in the 
formation of the Greek state.
Significantly, early on in Greek independence, in 1833 Greek leaders within the 
Orthodox Church declared their independence from the patriarch of Constantinople, thus 
establishing a Greek Orthodox Church. The Greeks thus set the precedent for later 
Balkan states as to the importance of establishing a national Church in the process of
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building a nation-state.64 While the Ottomans engaged in a process of proclaiming the 
same treatment for all people regardless of religion through their Tanzimat reforms, the 
establishment of national Churches emphasized the differences between people, even 
those who shared the same religion.
Unlike the Greeks, the Bulgarians did not wait for political independence to 
proclaim their religious independence. In 1870 they declared the existence of the 
Bulgarian Exarchate Church and affirmed its independence from Constantinople.65 Just 
as in Greece, however, in Bulgaria human rights abuses ultimately resulted in a war of 
national liberation. By the late 1870’s the Bulgarians increasingly engaged in struggles 
against Ottoman misrule, just as the Serbs and Greeks had done several decades earlier, 
and in 1876 a group of Bulgarian leaders instigated a series of struggles known as the 
April Uprising. In spite of the leaders’ nationalist feelings, however, according to 
historian Glenny, “the April Uprising highlighted above all the weakness of Bulgarian 
nationalism, and the revolutionary leadership’s dire misreading of Bulgarians’ 
willingness to confront the might of the imperial state.”66 At this point in Bulgarian 
history, nationalist ideology remained, for the most part, an elite ideology; lacking broad- 
based support, local movements alone could not rid the country of Ottoman rule.
The Ottomans perhaps made a fatal miscalculation in their response to the 
Bulgarian uprising. In 1876 when the sultan’s irregular troops in Bulgaria reacted to the 
rebellions, reports of killings, rapes, pillaging, the use of torture, and many other 
atrocities began to appear in the West. In Britain, news of the Bulgarian Horrors, a term
f%lcoined by William Gladstone, generated outrage and indignation. Reliable reports 
from foreigners living in the region, such as the American consul-general Eugene
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Schuyler, President George Washburn of Robert College, and several American 
missionaries, agreed on the nature of the violence. These reports confirmed “that well 
over ten thousand Bulgarians had been massacred and several dozen villages 
destroyed.”68
The public outcry against the Turkish behavior strongly influenced the policy of 
the Western European governments toward the Ottoman Empire and the situation of the 
Balkan Christians.69 For example, during a discussion in the British Parliament regarding 
the Turkish actions in Bulgaria, Mr. W. E. Forester referred to a letter in The Daily News 
that “described with much detail the total destruction of many villages and the massacre 
of their inhabitants, men, women, and children, by Turkish troops.”70 As newspapers 
such as The Daily News continued to report on the atrocities, public opinion increasingly 
demanded action from their governments.
Members of the British government then debated the appropriate response to the 
humanitarian crisis. One British cabinet member, Lord Salisbury, told British Prime 
Minister Benjamin Disraeli “that concessions would have to be made to public opinion.” 
He continued:
I should like to submit for your consideration whether the opportunity 
should not be taken to exact some security for the good government of the 
Christians generally throughout the Turkish Empire. The Govt, of 1856 
was satisfied with promises.. .we must have something more than 
promises.71
Ultimately Lord Salisbury would travel to Constantinople to negotiate, along with 
representatives from Russia and the other Great Powers, a political settlement to the 
violence.72 Before turning to the discussions at the conference, it is important to note the 
powerful role that public opinion played in convincing the governments of the Western
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European governments to respond to the human rights abuses in the distant land of 
Bulgaria. The interaction between public outcry against human rights abuses and 
governmental policy would continue to affect the modem history of the Balkans.
At Constantinople, the Great Powers together worked out a solution that called for 
further internal reform of the sultan’s government, but the Ottoman Turks refused to 
accept the plan, claiming, in Lauren’s words, “that how they treated their own subjects 
was a matter of exclusive domestic jurisdiction.” The Great Powers disagreed with the 
Ottomans and, in response, the Russians invaded the Balkans and quickly defeated the 
Ottomans. Had the Ottomans not employed such excessive violence against the 
Bulgarians’ revolt, it seems likely that the public opinion in Western Europe would not 
have demanded a military response from their governments, and it is possible to imagine 
a quite different resolution of the original conflict in Bulgaria. In reality, though, 
grievous human rights abuses played a pivotal role in determining an outcome ultimately 
unfavorable for the Ottoman Turks.
It is also important to point out that while not denying the existence of massive 
Turkish atrocities against the Bulgarian Christians, several historians call attention to the 
human rights abuses suffered by the Muslims in Bulgaria during this time period. Mark 
Mazower writes, “Tens of thousands of Muslim Tartars and Circassians fled Bulgaria 
when the Russian army invaded in 1877; others were massacred by Russian troops and 
Christian peasants.”74 Historian Stanford Shaw even disputes the number of Christian
7Sdeaths and points to the many Muslims who lost their lives during the conflict.
Regarding Shaw’s perspective, Misha Glenny explains:
Shaw also highlights the instrumentalization of massacres, so that external 
perceptions of the Balkans became polarized. For the bulk of European
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politicians and newspaper readers, there were no Muslim victims during 
the Bulgarian uprisings.. .[T]he reporting of the Bulgarian massacres 
triggered a pattern that persists to this day -  little sympathy is expressed 
for the victims of the conflicts if they belong to a national community
• I f swhich is considered the original aggressor.
Glenny’s observations demonstrate one of the dangers that excessive nationalist feelings 
pose for the protection of human rights. When people, either within the conflict or 
watching from the outside, become so caught up in the nationalist struggle of one side 
that they cannot even acknowledge the sufferings of the other side, they have lost the 
important perspective regarding the universal human rights that both sides in the conflict 
deserve.+ We will return in Chapter 4 to the idea of selective perceptions of 
victimization, particularly during the 1999 war in Kosovo.
In any event, the defeated Ottomans and the victorious Russians eventually met at 
San Stefano in 1878 to establish a settlement to conclude the war. The resulting Treaty 
created an extremely large Bulgarian state that stretched from the Black Sea to the 
Aegean (see Map 1 on page 42). The city of Skopje, Mother Teresa’s birthplace, 
changed hands for the first time since the Ottoman conquest in the fourteenth century as 
San Stefano promised the entire region to the Bulgarians. In addition to a host of other
77changes in the Balkans, the treaty also recognized a completely independent Serbia.
The other Great Powers, however, especially Britain, disliked the way in which San 
Stefano extended Russia’s power into the Balkans. Britain then sent warships into the 
Dardanelles to protest the provisions of the Treaty. When war between the two Great 
Powers began to seem likely, Otto von Bismarck, leader of a newly unified Germany,
+ Sissela Bok discusses this idea in some depth in her book, A Strategy fo r  Peace: Human Values 
and the Threat o f  War (New York: Pantheon books, 1989). In the opening o f the book she discusses the 
meaning of a “partisan” struggle and the dangers that occur when the partisans become so caught up with 
their own struggle that they cannot appreciate the legitimate suffering of the victims on the other side.
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Map 1
The Treaty of San Stefano, 1878
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offered to broker a new settlement.78 The resulting Congress of Berlin considerably 
revised the provisions of San Stefano. Although Serbia maintained her independence, the 
Great Powers whittled away the borders of Bulgaria by returning the territory loosely 
known as Macedonia to the Ottomans (see Map 2 on page 44). With a stroke of the pen, 
as they say, the city of Skopje quickly returned to Ottoman control.
The Congress of Berlin affected the development of the Balkans in a number of 
ways. In addition to the negotiations concerning borders and rulers, the Great Powers 
also addressed the issue of human rights during their discussions in Berlin. Concerned 
about the violations of human rights that had occurred based on differences of religion, 
the Treaty of Berlin also included language stipulating that within the Ottoman Empire 
“differences in religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against any person as 
a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights, admission to public employments, functions and honors, or the exercise 
of the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever.”79 The Great Powers 
thus inserted into the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin the language of universalism, or 
the idea that people deserved the right to work, and the right to participate in politics 
regardless of their religious confession.
The Great Powers’ concern with human rights at the Congress of Berlin also 
reflected another aspect of universalism. Echoing the ideas that Plato had expounded so 
long ago, the Great Powers refused to accept the Ottoman argument (the same one that 
they had sometimes argued for themselves) that the way in which they treated their own 
subjects should not concern any other outside actor. Instead, the Great Powers affirmed 
with Plato that some truths about the nature of justice exist above and independent of the
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The Berlin Treaty, 1878
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ruler. With their actions they argued that “certain basic and fundamental.. .laws of
humanity must be applied to behavior in the world, and that there were certain limits to
the freedom that states could enjoy under international law when it came to dealing with
how they treated their own nationals.”80 In other words, the Treaty of Berlin proclaimed
that the Ottomans did not have the final word regarding the treatment of Bulgarian
Christians within their territory. Instead, the Great Powers acted to guarantee the
protection of certain fundamental rights for all Balkan peoples, regardless of either their
religion or the government that ruled over them.
At the same time, as noted earlier the Great Powers also saw humanitarian
intervention as a way of providing a “convenient pretext for coercion as a guise for
masking more suspicious motives of national self-interest and aggrandizement,”81 and the
Treaty of Berlin clearly reflected the more self-centered ambitions of the Great Powers.
In addition to the language of universal protection of human rights, they also wrote into
the Treaty certain clauses “which assured Russian, Austrian, and British control of their
zones of influence.”82 Furthermore, according to historian Mazower, in the years that
both preceded and followed the conclusion of hostilities:
The Great Powers were heavily involved in the new states’ internal affairs.
They appointed their Kings from the unemployed scions of Europe’s 
princely houses, and drew up their constitutions and selected teams of 
military and civilian advisors -  from the Bavarians who ran Greece under 
King Otto in the 1840’s to the Russians who ran Bulgaria, including its 
army and Ministry of War, in the 1880s. They defined borders and 
adjusted territories at diplomatic conferences and imposed their wishes on 
all parties through gunboat diplomacy and economic arm-twisting.
By carving up the territory of the Balkans through the establishment of new borders and
new rulers, the Great Powers divided the lands and peoples of the Balkans. In contrast to
the language of universalism, other provisions in the treaty established important
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divisions between the peoples of the Balkans. Furthermore, following a precedent set by 
Alexander the Great, throughout the course of Balkan history outside actors would 
continue to wrestle with the tension between interventions motivated by genuine concern 
for human rights and human rights rhetoric as a smokescreen to disguise self-centered 
actions.
In addition, the boundaries the Great Powers finally established for the Balkans 
created resentment among the new states. As a result, one historian explains, “Balkan 
politics were driven by the dream of territorial expansion. All states could point to 
‘unredeemed’ brethren or historic lands that lay outside the boundaries appointed them by 
the powers.”84 For example, Bulgarian leaders pointed to the boundaries of San Stefano 
Bulgaria as the template for the correct territorial dimensions of their state. The Greek 
and Serbian states, however, also laid claim to the territory of Macedonia based on their 
determination of the ethnic make-up of the population. The tension surrounding the 
ownership of the loosely defined territory of Macedonia, still under the control of the 
Ottoman Empire in the decades following 1878, would eventually lead to several bloody 
wars in the region, which will be examined in the next chapter. In any event, the drawing 
of definitive boundaries that separated different groups of peoples created the setting for 
further tensions and eventually wars between those peoples.
Balkan Nationalism
Even in tracing the development of three new nation-states in the Balkans, Serbia, 
Greece, and Bulgaria, the historical analysis thus far still has not described either the 
development or the extent of feelings nationalism or national sentiment in the Balkans
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during the nineteenth century. In part, this task proves difficult because of the confusion 
surrounding the exact meaning of the term nationalism. At the same time, the evidence 
suggests that these states developed in large part because of Great Power politics and 
competition, rather than simply as a result of Balkan nationalism. Nevertheless, a 
discussion of the vast changes that occurred in the administration and governance of the 
Balkans during the nineteenth century, as compared to previous centuries, helps to shed 
light on the general nature of the nineteenth century development of nationalism, and its 
component factors.
In the nineteenth century, the establishment of new national churches, such as the 
Serbian Orthodox Church in 1830,+ the Greek Orthodox Church in 1833, and the 
Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, first existed along side and eventually replaced the one 
unified Orthodox Church. The new leaders of these national churches, did not, of 
course, play the same political role as religious leaders had within the Ottoman Empire, 
and the political structure of the region changed as well. Instead of the sultan in 
Constantinople serving as the highest political and military authority, following the 
independence movements, the Great Powers assisted the new states in establishing 
monarchies, based on the Western European dynastic model. As noted, both Greece and 
Serbia acquired monarchs through the intervention of the Great Powers.
The economic system changed dramatically as well. During the height of the 
Ottoman era the timar-sipahi system had governed the lives of the Balkan peasants. Each
+ An overview of the Serbian Orthodox Church proves much more complicated than that of either 
Bulgaria or Greece. Suffice it to say here that in 1831 the Ottomans recognized the autonomy of the 
Serbian Church. Several mutually independent units of the Serbian Church then continued to exist. 
Following the Congress o f Berlin the different branches all gained full independence, but they would not 
unite under the auspices of one unified Serbian Orthodox Church until 1920. See, for example, “History of 
the Church.” http:/7www.serbianorthodoxchurch.net/historvofchurch/book3/ accessed on December 11, 
2003.
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timar comprised a relatively small parcel of land and played an important role in 
regulating the daily lives of the peasants. The more corrupt and exploitative chiflik 
system gradually replaced the timar system and, as already mentioned, the abuses the 
peasants suffered contributed to their rebellions against the Ottomans. The economic 
organization of the region was already changing with the Slavic migrations to the cities 
and the development of a middle class, but after the region gained independence from the 
Ottomans, the system ended all together and the new independent states organized their 
territory in a different manner. The end of Ottoman administration of the region 
necessarily brought about new administrative and territorial divisions of the region. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, then, at the instigation of the Great Powers, the new 
nation-states established concrete and specifically-drawn boundary lines, and began to 
create the possibility that a large number of people could begin to define their identities 
based on their relationship to the state.
In his exploration of the development of modem nation-states, Peter Sahlins has 
examined the creation of boundary lines in modem France and Spain in Boundaries: The 
Making o f France and Spain in the Pyrenees. He traces the countries’ evolution from a 
concept of jurisdictional sovereignty to an understanding and expression of territorial 
sovereignty. Jurisdictional sovereignty refers to the ruler’s administration of the people, 
rather than the territory, of his realm. In the centuries before the nineteenth, the rulers of 
both France and Spain sought to ensure their jurisdictional sovereignty over their 
populations. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, France and Spain had 
together agreed on the necessity for a concrete boundary line to separate the territory of
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the two states. The agreement between them, reached in 1868, drew a definitive 
boundary line and marked the completion of the evolution to territorial sovereignty.85
Sahlins’ argument contains several aspects of importance for the Balkans, where 
clearly a similar process occurred. Under Ottoman domination, the religious leaders 
maintained jurisdictional sovereignty over their subjects through the millet system.
While slightly more complex, the timar-sipahi system combined elements of both 
jurisdictional and territorial sovereignty, as the sultan enjoyed jurisdictional sovereignty 
over the sipahis, but the sipahis enjoyed some measure of territorial sovereignty over 
their timars. As already noted, however, the timar comprised a fairly small portion of 
land. In the nineteenth century then, the Balkan Peninsula witnessed an administrative 
reorganization that resulted in the creation of new, territorially-based states. These states 
had fixed and definitive borders, although, in contrast to the situation in France and Spain 
where those two countries worked out their boundaries, at least in the Pyrenees, without 
outside intervention, in the nineteenth century the Great Powers actively participated in 
the drawing of all the boundaries in the Balkans. Finally, although Sahlins points out that 
his area of study in the Pyrenees served as one of the last places in which France and 
Spain established territorial boundaries, even these Western European nation-states did 
not complete their evolution to territorial sovereignty until the nineteenth century.
If we accept then, that modem nationalism implies some sort of loyalty to a 
territorially-bound state, only in the nineteenth century did the Balkans begin to 
experience the conditions that would allow for the development of modem nationalism. 
Modem nationalism also often implies a common, national language. The nineteenth 
century witnessed the rising importance of a national language, and the establishment of
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national churches. In contrast to the universalism of human rights, all of these changes, 
especially as they were contained within new and concrete borders, emphasized 
distinctions and differences among the people, and ultimately resulted in the possibility 
of a national enemy, or “other,” against whom the new leaders of the emerging nation­
states could rally popular support. An exploration of the growing feelings of national 
consciousness within Macedonia serves to clarify this process of the development of 
nationalism.
Before turning to the specific history of Macedonia, however, one further 
observation about the general nature of nationalism in the Balkans in the nineteenth 
century is needed. A comparison of the administrative structures of the Balkans under 
Ottoman rule and the governance of the new nation-states, demonstrates only the 
existence in the nineteenth century of the conditions necessary for the emergence of 
modem nationalism. This is not to imply that nationalism as a mass movement gained 
strength with large numbers of the population. In fact, it seems more likely that even in 
the nineteenth century, few people other than the emerging elites in the Balkans professed 
feelings of national consciousness. Instead of unified ethnic and national revolts against 
the Ottomans, according to Stavrianos, “a series of independent uprisings spread over the 
whole of the nineteenth century. And in place of common effort there was continued 
rivalry and occasional open conflict.” Furthermore, “the Balkan peoples were divided 
within themselves as well as among themselves.”86 Undeniably, the Balkans of the 
nineteenth century began to feel the impact of the forces of nationalism; those forces did 
not, however, take the shape of clearly defined, uniformly held beliefs among the 
majority of the people.
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Mark Mazower explains that even once the new Balkan states
enjoyed liberty from Muslim rule.. .their triumph did not mean that people 
in the Balkans immediately started thinking in terms of nation-states. On 
the contrary, ‘Romania’ and ‘Bulgaria’ were nations that as late as 1830 
animated only a handful of individuals and activists, ‘Albania’ and 
‘Macedonia’ in all likelihood next to none.. ..[Furthermore, in Bulgaria by 
1860] almost every educated person coming from that country called 
himself Greek as matter of course... .[Even after the establishment of the 
Bulgarian Church in 1870] there were many Bulgarian speaking 
peasants.. .who considered themselves Greeks -  by which they meant not 
that they supported the expansionist schemes of the Kingdom of Greece to 
the south, but that they worshiped in Churches run by the [Greek]07
patriarchate.
The lack of evidence for strong national mass movements within the nineteenth-century 
Balkans further calls into question the idea that “ancient ethnic hatreds” have animated 
the politics of the Balkans for centuries.
To conclude then, the nineteenth century began with revolts brought about by 
exploitation of both Christian and Muslim peasants that called for the reestablishment of 
Ottoman control. By the end of the century, a series of struggles and wars resulted in 
newly independent nation-states. This overview of the necessarily simplified history of 
emerging Balkan nationalism suggests that the transformation occurred in part as the 
Balkan elites learned and appropriated the ideology of the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution. They then made use of those ideologies as they tried to lead the masses of 
peasants and other segments of society in organized political struggles against the 
Ottomans. At the same time, as the Great Powers intervened in the region, in part 
because of humanitarian concerns, but also as a result of their own selfish, national 
foreign policy objectives, they seem to have encouraged the restructuring of the Balkans 
along broadly defined national divisions, contained within concrete territorial borders and 
ruled by hereditary monarchs.
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Macedonian Nationalism
In contrast to the new states of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria, no state of 
Macedonia emerged from the nineteenth century. In fact, no such creation of an 
independent state of Macedonia would exist until the very end of the twentieth century. 
Historians writing about the end of the nineteenth century, use the term “Macedonia” 
loosely to describe a vaguely-defined geographical region. In fact, not only did 
Macedonia lack any kind of established borders, but it also did not even exist as a single
OQ
Ottoman administrative entity. In 1864 as part of the reform movement, and, 
incidentally, as part of the transition towards territorial sovereignty, the Ottomans had 
changed the way they administered their outlying regions. They divided their territories 
into vilayets, or provinces, and, in theory, allowed for greater devolution of power and
• • Q Qlocal participation. Eventually three separate Ottoman vilayets, would divide the 
region of Macedonia. Each vilayet contained its own capital: Skopje provided the capital 
for the northernmost vilayet, the city of Thessalonica (Salonika) served as the capital of 
the western vilayet, and Monastir (Bitola) was the capital of the eastern vilayet90 (see 
Map 3 on page 53).
The nineteenth century population of Macedonia also provides challenges for 
objective study as most ethnographies and censuses of the region contained a serious 
political bias. That is to say, those making the maps created them with the intent of 
legitimizing certain political claims based on the ethnic make-up of the population, a 
process that would continue throughout the entire history of Macedonia and will be 
discussed in greater detail in later chapters. Nevertheless, although they differed in the
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size they reported for each group, “most accounts of the ‘ethnic structure’ of the 
population of Macedonia in this period [late nineteenth century] agree that the main 
groups of people living there were Slavic-speaking Christians, Greek-speaking 
Christians, Turkish-speaking Moslems, Albanian-speaking Moslems, Vlachs, Jews and 
Gypsies.”91 Of course exceptions to these major categories existed, such as the 
Albanian-speaking Catholic Christian family of Mother Teresa. In fact, “the diversity of 
the population of Macedonia in the nineteenth century was so well known that it inspired
Q9the French expression ‘Macedonie,’ meaning a salad of mixed fruits and vegetables.”
Following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Bulgaria and Greece, and to a lesser 
extent Serbia, all sought to claim for their new nation-states territory that comprised the 
area of Macedonia controlled by the Ottoman Turks. As a result, Orthodox Slavic 
communities in Macedonia could choose to affiliate “with either the Greek patriarch, the 
Bulgarian exarch, or the Serbian Orthodox Church.”93 One of the factors that affected a 
family or a village’s decision to proclaim their religious allegiance rested on whether they 
spoke Greek or a Slavic language. For the first time in Macedonia, then, the factors of 
religion and language began to take on “a nationalist interpretation by proponents of both 
Bulgarian and Greek nationalist ideologies.”94 In contrast to the earlier Ottoman reforms 
that proclaimed equality among all peoples regardless of their religious affiliation, in the 
struggle for the loyalties of nineteenth century Macedonian Orthodox peasants, religion 
and language began to reflect divisions among the people.
All three new Balkan nation-states tried various measure to ensure the support of 
various segments of the Macedonian population. Mazower explains that pro-Greek and 
pro-Bulgarian factions “founded schools to propagate their national ideas, established
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Churches loyal to ‘their’ bishops, [and] produced maps and ethnographies to justify their 
claims.”95 With Austrian support, the Serbs also turned their attention towards 
Macedonia. They established Serbian schools that distributed free textbooks and 
provided salaries for teachers. They also sent their own priests to the region and thus 
joined the religious fight for the peasantry’s affiliation.96 The Macedonian peasants’ 
response to these attempts demonstrates their general lack of national identity during the 
last decades of the nineteenth century.
The British journalist H. N. Brailsford traveled extensively in Macedonia and 
reported on the conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Macedonia. 
He explains that he once talked with a wealthy Macedonian peasant who spoke Greek. 
When questioned regarding his ethnicity, the peasant replied that his village had been 
Greek four years ago but had since then become Bulgarian because the Bulgarians had 
not only sent the village a teacher but also a priest, while the Greeks had merely 
dispatched a teacher. Brailsford then makes the humorous observation that “the legend 
that Alexander the Great was Greek goes out by one road and the rival myth that 
Alexander was Bulgarian comes in by the other.” He concludes his observations by 
noting that he had heard “a witty French consul declare that with a fund of a million 
francs he would undertake to make all Macedonia French.”97 Brailsford’s observations 
confirm the lack of strong nationalist identities among the Macedonian peasant 
population; the peasants cared much more about the concrete realities of daily life than 
the abstract principles of national identity.
Similar practical considerations helped redraw religious, as well as ethnic, 
identities. A modem policy analyst explains that before the reform efforts of the early
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nineteenth century, only Muslims could serve as gendarmes, and as such enjoyed a
considerable amount of power at the local level. Consequently, some Christian families
had one brother convert to Islam so that he could protect the entire family. Regarding
the practical ramifications of such a conversion, the analyst then notes:
Everyone ate a common table, and if, for example, pork were available 
and a zelnik (pie) was made, the women of the house would put pork only 
in half the pita and both the Christian and Muslim sides of the family 
would eat from the same pan.98
The episode thus illustrates yet another way in which people redefined their identity. At
the same time, it seems as though a significant amount of toleration existed between
members of the different religious groups during this period of Macedonian history.
The new Balkan states of Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria did not, however, limit
themselves to peaceful methods of propaganda designed to spark changes in identity.
When non-violent methods could not assure success, they “financed armed bands of
patriots -  some local, some supported by outside agents -  to gain peasant adherents to
their cause.” These “irregular bands of guerrilla fighters.. .attacked the Turks, fought
each other, and terrorized the local population.” For their part, the Turkish authorities,
the at least nominal rulers of the land, “sat back and watched the Christians fight among
themselves, occasionally sending in Albanian irregulars when matters threatened to boil
over.”99 The peasants bore the brunt of this agitation, as they cared more about regaining
some measure of stability in their lives than about dying for the principles of nationalism.
As a result of the fighting and chaos, many left Macedonia to live in one of the other
Balkan states, Central Europe, or even across the Atlantic in the new world. Those who
continued to live in Macedonia served as pawns in a political struggle among the states
that surrounded them, who increasingly used violence to secure their loyalty.100 For the
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peasants of Macedonia, then, the divisive nature of a nationalist fight that insisted that
people choose one side or another created serious problems and difficulties. At this
point in the history of Macedonia, the tension between the universalism of human rights
and the particularism of nationalism resulted in concrete human rights violations for the
Macedonian peasants.
Regarding the struggle for Macedonia, it is important to point out that the major
actors themselves did not always have a clear idea of their final goals. In fact, Glenny
notes, “[A]t the start of the Macedonian struggle, it seems its participants were sure of
only one thing -  that the Ottomans should leave. But beyond that, the conduct and aims
of the Macedonians, of whatever ilk, were changing according to the fluid political
conditions.”101 As a result people adapted their identities constantly in response to the
changing political conditions, and especially during times of chaos and violence. The
Macedonian elites’ response to the confusing situation brought about by the fighting,
violence, and propaganda efforts proves revealing regarding the nature of the
development of Macedonian nationalism. Anthropologist Loring Danforth reports that
before 1870 and the post-Congress of Berlin propaganda efforts with Macedonia,
the literate Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Macedonia and Bulgaria were 
engaged in a common struggle against Greek culture and linguistic 
domination in the Balkans. During this period the Slavs of Macedonia 
called their language Bulgarian. They hoped to create a single Macedo- 
Bulgarian literary language based on some kind of compromise among the
1 (V)various dialects of Macedonia and Bulgaria.
That the small group of literate elites, rather than the large numbers of peasants, sought to 
define a national language for themselves demonstrates the lack of broad-based support 
for any kind of feelings of national consciousness. In addition, during the years before 
the Congress of Berlin, the elites of Macedonia viewed their language as compatible with
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that of Bulgaria and did not yet seek to develop a separate and purely Macedonian 
language.
Following the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, however, Danforth
relates that the Bulgarian intelligentsia began “to impose an eastem-Bulgarian-based
standard language on the people of Macedonia.” The Macedonian elites resented this
approach and in reaction, “the first signs of Macedonian linguistic separatism appeared.
During this period, dictionaries, grammars, and textbooks began to be published in what
was specifically referred to as the ‘Slavo-Macedonian’ or ‘Macedonian’ language.”
One town, for example went so far that:
In 1892 the Kostur (Kosturia) parish school council adopted the proposal 
of a group of teachers ‘to eliminate both Bulgarian and Greek and 
introduce Macedonian as the language of instruction in the town school.’ 
However, the Greek bishop and the Turkish governor of the city prevented 
this from taking place.104
These examples continue to demonstrate the divisiveness of nationalism. In response to
pressure that Macedonian elites conform their language to a standard set by Bulgarians,
Macedonians responded with the opposite extreme and established their own, separate
language. In the course of this process, the Macedonian elites sought to create and make
use of a language that differed from either Bulgarian or Greek and so emphasize their
own divisions and distinctions as a people separate and different from the Bulgarians,
Greeks, and Serbians.
Furthermore, the course of events in Macedonia also demonstrates the continuing
tension between the universalism involved in the protection of human rights and the
divisive, particularistic nature of nationalism. In his discussion of the history of
58
Macedonia, Danforth provides insightful observations into the nature not only of this
period of Macedonian history but also the nature of nationalism in general. He writes,
The history of Macedonia shows that national identities are categories of 
ascription which are constantly subject to negotiation and change, that 
they often emerge in times of conflict, and that their construction involves 
a process of shared forgetting as well as shared remembering....
[Macedonian history] also confirms that national identities develop in 
opposition to categories of ‘others’ -  that people know who they are not 
before they know who they are. Finally, it suggests that nationalist 
policies of persecution and forced assimilation may actually create the 
very national minorities they are intended to eliminate.105
These observations suggest two important aspects of the relationship between the
protection of human rights and the forces of nationalism. First, the creation of a national
identity requires an ‘other,’ or an enemy against which to express oneself. The existence
and even necessity of an ‘other’ in order to define national identity will always be in
conflict with an understanding of universalism that calls on people to recognize their
similarities and sameness and thus their equal deservingness of the same basic human
rights. Second, human rights violations and persecutions often engender a national
consciousness that relies upon divisions between people. The protection of human rights
and the forces of nationalism cannot help but conflict with one another.
The nature of national consciousness and the events of Macedonian history led
Danforth to conclude that the history of Macedonian national consciousness, and thus the
history of the modem Macedonian national state, does not actually begin with Alexander
the Great. Instead, “it begins in the nineteenth century with the first expressions of
Macedonian ethnic nationalism on the part of a small number of intellectuals in places
like Thessaloniki, Belgrade, Sophia, and St. Petersburg. This period marks the beginning
of ‘imagining’ a Macedonian national community, the beginning of the construction of a
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Macedonian national identity and culture.”106 As we will see, however, given the 
importance of a national history for the process of creating a national identity, the figure 
of Alexander the Great will remain important for the development of Macedonia.
Before turning to the twentieth century and the disastrous results of the nationalist 
policies of the Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian states, Danforth’s analysis brings out one 
final point regarding the development of nationalism. He refers to the nineteenth century 
as the first moment when Macedonian elites began to “imagine” a Macedonian 
community. In his emphasis on the process of imagination, Danforth cites Benedict 
Anderson’s work on nationalism, Imagined Communities. Anderson argues that any 
single member of a nation will never know all, or even most, of the other members of the 
nation. Nevertheless, each individual person in the community holds in his or her mind 
an image of communion with the other members of the nation. As a result,
“Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in 
which they are imagined.”107 An important aspect of national identity involves a person’s 
own perception or imagination of their national identity and national community. The 
nineteenth-century Macedonian peasants’ ability to willfully manipulate their identities in 
order to receive practical benefits further supports the existence of this imagined element 
of nationalism.
In stark contrast, however, the human rights abuses and violence that those 
peasants suffered as a result of the process of national imagining contain no element of 
subjectivity. No amount of imagination could change the nature of the guerrilla 
incursions into Macedonia or the consequent loss of security, safety, and even loss of life 
experienced by the peasants. Those peasants emigrated from the region of Macedonia
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because of very real threats to their life and liberty that existed objectively and 
independently of whichever way they had imagined their national loyalty. While 
nationalism thus necessarily contains an important element of imagination and 
subjectivity, human rights violations can be objectively observed and experienced.
In addition to the objectivity of human rights violations, visionaries, such as Plato 
and Mother Teresa, have pointed to an element of objectivity in the protection of those 
rights. They believed that some laws and truths regarding the protection of human rights 
exist outside and independent of the rules or the culture of a specific society with specific 
leaders. In the nineteenth century, expressions of that objectivity remained limited 
primarily to the visions of human rights advocates, although the Ottoman reform decrees 
also in some ways acknowledged the objectivity of the protection of human rights. As 
the advocacy of human rights progressed, however, that objectivity would begin to find 
more concrete expressions in world history. The increasing expressions of the 
objectivity of the protection of universal human rights would continue to affect the course 
of Macedonian history, as well as the relationship between the forces of nationalism and 
the protection of human rights.
Conclusion
An exploration of Ottoman administration of the Balkans from the fourteenth 
through the eighteenth centuries demonstrates a remarkable absence of ethnic hatreds 
between the various groups of people that coexisted on the peninsula. Furthermore, until 
at least the end of the eighteenth century, few within Balkan society professed strong 
national identities since economic and religious distinctions played a greater role in
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defining peoples particular identities. In the nineteenth century, as ideas from the 
Western Enlightenment and the French Revolution spread to the Balkans, the elites, 
though not the masses of peasants, began to imagine their communities in a different 
way, which would gradually evolve into an expression of national consciousness. In part, 
the disintegration and corruption of Ottoman administration led to a system that abused 
the peasants and decreased the protection of their human rights. The exploitation allowed 
and encouraged the development of this national consciousness, underscoring the 
connection between human rights abuses and nationalism.
At the same time, the Great Powers of the nineteenth century became increasingly 
involved in Balkan politics. On one hand, concern for the human rights abuses of the 
Balkan Christians prompted their interventions and they pressured the Ottoman sultans to 
pass legislation recognizing the universal human rights of all Ottoman subjects regardless 
of religion or economic status. On the other hand, the Great Powers also acted in order to 
promote their own selfish foreign policy goals, which included rivalry with one another 
for dominance of the Balkans. They worked to establish zones of influence and in the 
process helped to create new and independent Balkan states. The Great Powers took the 
lead in drawing new and concrete boundary lines that would establish the territory of the 
new states and divide them from one another. The newly created territorial states would 
also help to provide the background for the Balkan elites to begin to imagine 
communities for themselves that did not depend on economic or religious affiliation but 
rather on territorially bounded and ethnically defined nation-states.
Within the amorphous region of Macedonia, a similar process of imagining began 
to occur among the elite population, even though no territorial state of Macedonia
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emerged during the nineteenth century. In response to both peaceful and violent 
propaganda efforts of the Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians, the Macedonian elites began 
to establish their own distinct identity. Once again human right violations prompted the 
emergence of a distinct nationalist consciousness. Several elements that defined that 
consciousness included a separate language, as well as the existence of an enemy against 
which to define a new national identity. The separatism and divisiveness implied in these 
elements of nationalism contrast starkly with the universalism of human rights 
proclaimed in the Ottoman reform efforts. Furthermore, the imaginative and subjective 
nature of nationalism differs from the objective nature of the human rights violations and 
the objectiveness appealed to in the visions regarding the protection of those human 
rights.
63
NOTES
1 Maria Todorova, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in L. Carl Brown, ed., 
Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), 45.
2Perry Anderson, Lineages o f the Absolutist State (London: NLB, 1974), 364.
Halil Inalcik, Norman Itzkowitz, and Colin Imber (trans.), The Ottoman Empire: 
The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 11.
4Anderson, Lineages o f the Absolutist State, 371.
5Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, 13.
6Wayne S. Vucinich, “The Nature of Balkan Society Under Ottoman Rule,” 
Slavic Review, 21 No. 4 (December 1962), 601.
Anderson, Lineages o f the Absolutist State, 371.
8Vucinich, “Balkan Society,” 606.
9Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, 7.
10Vucinich, “Balkan Society,” 605.
UL. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Rinehart & Company, 
Inc., 1958), 90.
12Ibid., 53.
13Vucinich, “Balkan Society,” 609.
14Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 222.
15Vucinich, “Balkan Society,” 609.
16Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 109.
17Ibid., 85.
18Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History (New York: Modem Library, 
2000), 56.
19Ibid., 59.
64
20Ibid., 61.
21Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 89, 107.
'J 'J
Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, 105.
23Vucinich, “Balkan Society,” 604, 606.
24Shaw, Stanford J., “The Aims and Achievements of Ottoman Rule in the 
Balkans,” Slavic Review, 21 No. 4 (December 1962), 619.
“2 S • m iInalcik, The Ottoman Empire, 150.
26Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 99.
2 7 Sir Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study o f 
the Impact o f Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East, Volume 1: 
Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 276.
28Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 40.
29Ibid.
30Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, 104.
31Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 86.
3 2 Ibid.; and Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, 108.
33Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 100.
34Vucinich, “Balkan Society,” 600.
3 5  • • r r r tFerdinand Schevill, The History o f the Balkan Peninsula: From the Earliest 
Times to the Present Day (New York: Hardcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), 231-232.
36Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 120, 140.
37Ibid, 130,383.
38Ibid., 144.
39Ibid., 144-145.
40Ibid., 300, 303; and Sultan Murad II, as quoted in ibid., 304.
65
41Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 304.
A2Hatti-i Sherif, as quoted in Lauren, International Human Rights, 65. 
43Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 315.
u Islahat Fermani, as quoted in Lauren, International Human Rights, 65. 
45Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 386-387.
46Ibid., 387.
47Lauren, International Human Rights, 65.
48Ibid., 69.
49Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 227-228.
50Ibid., 149-150.
51Vucinich, “Balkan Society,” 614.
52 •Stoianovich, Traian, “Factors in the Decline of Ottoman Society in the 
Balkans,” Slavic Review, 21 No. 4 (December 1962), 632.
53Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 199, 211.
54Bemard Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 2nd Ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), 54, 335.
55Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 212.
56Lewis, The Emergence o f Modern Turkey, 211.
57Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 245-246.
58Mazower, The Balkans, 87-88; and Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, 
War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 39.
59Glenny, The Balkans, 39.
60Mazower, The Balkans, 83, 88; and Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 227-
228.
61Mazower, The Balkans, 86.
66
62Ibid., 87.
63Ibid., 86-87.
64Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 58.
65Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 364.
66Glenny, The Balkans, 107.
Mazower, The Balkans, 94; and Lauren, International Human Rights, 66.
68Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 403.
69Ibid., 380.
7 0  • •_______________________________________________________________________ __Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Series: 
Commencing with the Accession o f William IV, Vol. CCXXX, 19 June 1876 -  27 July 
1876, Vol. 4. (London: Cornelius Buck, at the office for “Hansard’s Parliamentary 
Debates,” 1876), 424.
71Lord Salisbury, from W.F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, The Life o f Benjamin 
Disraeli (New York, 1920), VI, 70, as quoted in Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453,
404.
72Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 405.
7 3 Lauren, International Human Rights, 67.
74Mazower, The Balkans, 116.
n c
Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey, Vol. II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise o f Modern Turkey, 
1808-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 162.
76Glenny, The Balkans, 110.
7 7 Catherine Evtuhov and Richard Stites, A History o f Russia Since 1800: Peoples, 
Legends, Events, Forces (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 137.
78Mazower, The Balkans, 94-95; and Glenny, The Balkans, 143.
7 0  •Treaty Between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, 
and Turkey for the Settlement of the Affairs of the East, as quoted in Lauren, 
International Human Rights, 68.
67
80Lauren, International Human Rights, 69.
8lIbid.
82Glenny, The Balkans, 146.
83Mazower, The Balkans, 95.
84Ibid„ 96.
8 5 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making o f France and Spain in the Pyrenees 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
86Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 222, 224.
87Mazower, The Balkans, 89, 92, 94.
88Ibid., 98.
89Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 387.
90Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Thessalonica: 
Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964), 32.
91Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 57.
92Ibid.
93Ibid., 58-60.
94Ibid.
95Mazower, The Balkans, 99.
96Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, 29.
Q7 •H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future (London: Methuen & 
Co., 1906), 102-103.
98Victor A. Friedman, “Observing the Observers: Language, Ethnicity, and Power 
in the 1994 Macedonian Census and Beyond,” in Barnett R. Rubin, ed., Toward 
Comprehensive Peace in Southeast Europe: Conflict Prevention in the South Balkans, 
Report o f the South Balkans Working Group o f the Council on Foreign Relations Center 
for Preventative Action (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), 99.
"Mazower, The Balkans, 99; and Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 58.
68
100Mazower, The Balkans, 99.
101Glenny, The Balkans, 159.
1 Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 61-62.
,03ibid.
104Ibid., 62.
105Ibid., 56.
106Ibid.
I07Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1993),
69
Chapter II
Historical Background and “Ethnic Hatreds” Revisited, 1900 -1980
We are trying to separate inseparable strands, to divide this one from that one, because 
this one may be Macedonian and that one may be Bulgarian.... Here the men sit back... 
talking about nationalism and hate while the women do all the work.
-Zlatko Blajer, editor-in-chief of Vecher (Evening)
While the turn of the century witnessed the gradual evolution of feelings of 
national consciousness in Macedonia, major changes in the greater global context began 
to affect the way many individuals and organizations understood human rights and 
reacted to human rights violations. As a result, while the twentieth century brought much 
suffering, many wars, and further ethnic-national violence to the Balkans, during this 
same time period many people also experienced an evolution in their understanding of 
human rights and particularly the universality of those rights.
In the years between the turn of the century and the outbreak of World War I, the 
world experienced a degree of global shrinking as, in the words of one historian, 
“technology and economic interdependence made it easier to view events in distant 
places as being related to each other and to more fully consider people beyond national 
borders as being brothers and sisters.”1 In this context, officials from national 
governments as well as private individuals created thirteen intergovernmental bodies as 
well as three hundred and four non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) to deal with 
international events. Of particular significance for the protection of human rights, 
historian Paul Lauren explains, “when the NGO known as the Ligue de Droits de 
l’Homme emerged with its first publication in 1901.. .[it announced] that its vision to
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promote liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice applied not just to those in France -  but 
‘to all humanity.’”2 The twentieth century thus began with at least one organization 
calling for the recognition of the universality of human rights, or, in other words, an 
understanding that those rights did not depend on or change according to national 
borders.
The Ilinden Revolt
Within the Ottoman-dominated region of Macedonia, in 1903 a group dedicated
to the overthrow of their Turkish rulers also reflected an appreciation of the universalism
of human rights. On August 2, the Feast of St. Elijah, or Ilinden, the peasants of the
villages surrounding the town of Monastir witnessed haystacks set ablaze and beacons
burning throughout western Macedonia. These signs rallied the cetas, or armed bands of
peasants, to begin to drive out the Turks from their villages. In the uprising’s largest
operation, some three hundred guerillas attacked the small, isolated, mountain town of
Krusevo, defeated the Ottoman garrison, established their control over the town, and
declared the town a republic. The journalist H. N. Brailsford, who traveled in
Macedonia shortly after the event, explains that the new revolutionary leaders avoided
excessive violence and bloodshed after they had secured the town. In fact, he notes that
their behavior corresponded to their proclamation of the revolt, in which they had stated:
We are taking up arms against tyranny and barbarism; we are acting in the 
name of liberty and humanity; our work is above all prejudices of 
nationality or race. We ought therefore to treat as brothers all who suffer 
in the somber Empire of the Sultan.4
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The Macedonian insurgents thus reflected the same attitude towards human rights as that 
of the Ligue de Droits de l’Homme. All those who suffer human rights abuses deserve 
the same restitution of their rights, regardless of their “nationality or race.”
It is interesting to note that before the uprising began, the inhabitants of Krusevo 
did not trust the armed bands of insurgents and had become increasingly nervous about 
their activities. Just as the Serbian peasants who revolted in 1804 originally sought a 
return of the sultan’s authority, the townspeople of Krusevo sent representatives to 
Monastir, the regional capital, to request that the Ottomans strengthen the local army 
garrison, even though almost all of the town’s 10,000 inhabitants were Christians. By 
August 2, however, the authorities had not responded to the townspeople’s request.5 The 
townspeople’s attitude toward their Ottoman authorities provides further evidence against 
the existence of “ancient ethnic hatreds.” Even as late as the beginning of the twentieth 
century, ethnicity did not prevent the Greek and Slavic speaking Christian residents of the 
town from requesting help from the Muslim Turkish authorities in order to prevent the 
spread of violence they feared their fellow Christians would instigate.
If the Ottomans hesitated to send in soldiers before the revolt began, they did not 
lack motivation after the insurgents had captured the town of Krusevo. The Turks 
recaptured the town without a fight and Ottoman troops participated in numerous rapes, 
murders, lootings, and burnings within the town. As a consequence of the Ottoman 
violence and in the aftermath of the destruction, members of the Greek community 
played an increasing role in the area as they brought help to their suffering brethren. 
Similarly, Serbia took the opportunity to increase its nationalist activities and propaganda 
efforts in the region. Thus, Balkan historian Misha Glenny explains, “the suppression of
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Ilinden had therefore failed to crush the nationalist struggle. On the contrary, it had made 
it worse.”6 Following the same pattern that other parts of the Balkans had experienced in 
the nineteenth century, in twentieth-century Macedonia human rights violations sparked 
nationalist agitation.
Although short in duration, the events in Krusevo have left a lasting legacy on the 
region’s history. Just as with the story of Alexander the Great, the Ilinden uprising has 
played an important role in the nationalist histories of the region. In later decades, which 
will be discussed shortly, historians and political figures continued to draw upon the 
proceedings in Krusevo, events often only tenuously supported by facts, in order to 
support their various platforms. Although the full truth of the dramatic events in 
Krusevo will probably never be known, much is known about the leaders of the Ilinden 
rebellion, who would also become important figures in later nationalist histories. The 
group that had led the insurgency had formed in response to the economic hardship 
suffered by the Slavic peasants of the Macedonian area. In 1893 three friends met in the 
city of Salonika, and decided that they should rid the province of Ottoman rule in order to 
bring prosperity back to the Slavic peasantry. They formed a revolutionary committee 
and gradually recruited a larger membership. Several years after the group had instigated 
the Ilinden revolt, in 1905 they settled on the name of the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization (VMRO).7
In their campaign for freedom from Turkish domination, VMRO members 
roamed the countryside in armed bands, or cetas, and terrorized the local populations. 
Reports of misery found their way to the offices of the European diplomats stationed in 
Macedonia and the Austrian Consul in Monastir, August Krai, reported:
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The Committee [VMRO] is extorting money from Bulgarians, Greeks,
Vlachs, Christians, and Muslims with indescribable arrogance. Christians 
who don’t pay are murdered while the Muslim landowners must reckon 
with arson attacks on all their property.8
Krai’s account once again calls into question the “ancient ethnic hatreds” thesis since the
Slavic members of VMRO terrorized Christian and Muslim alike. The kind of activities
VMRO engaged in also helps to explain why the inhabitants of Krusevo had appealed to
Ottoman troops to provide military support just before the Ilinden uprising. In addition,
the VMRO activities reflect a lack of effective governance for the region as a whole.
Krai thus concluded his account by noting, “The longing for order among these
unbearable circumstances and for a new strong administration is becoming ever more
intense.”9 A violent organization such as VMRO could exist and even thrive in
Macedonia during this period because the Ottoman government was not maintaining
stability or protecting the inhabitants of the region.
The Young Turk Revolt
The Ottoman sultan who presided over this disorder had come to power with the 
end of the Tanzimat, or the period of Turkish reform attempts. Sultan Abdul Hamid 
sought to consolidate his autocratic rule, instead of pursing earlier reform efforts, and 
toward this end he fought against not only the forces of nationalism but also against the 
processes of constitutionalism. As a result, Abdul Hamid employed a large number of 
informers and enforced strict censorship of the press. Unsurprisingly, many in the 
empire, in addition to VMRO, found themselves dissatisfied with his reign. In particular, 
many Turkish army officers had begun to form into secret military organizations and, as 
they merged with other similar groups, eventually adopted the name of the Committee for
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Union and Progress (CUP).10 Just as the Krusevo insurgents had, these army officers 
used the rhetoric of universalism as a rallying cry. In fact, Glenny explains, the CUP 
“was not motivated by Turkish nationalism, an ideology still very much in its infancy. It 
was fighting for the modernization and strengthening of the empire under Western 
constitutional principles, and these included the equality of all races.”11
In 1908 from their base in Salonika, the leaders of the CUP, or the Young Turks 
as they would come to be known, sent an ultimatum to Abdul Hamid that demanded the 
restoration of the 1876 constitution. The Army supported the revolutionary leaders and 
across Macedonia the Ottoman garrisons refused to obey orders. In yet another 
demonstration of Christian-Muslim cooperation, Glenny reports that Ottoman soldiers 
“concluded pacts with the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Serbian guerrillas they were meant to
1 9be combating.” Some Bulgarian bands then refrained from attacking the military
leaders of the CUP. Finally, on July 24 Abdul Hamid complied with the ultimatum and
restored the constitution.13
In Macedonia much rejoicing greeted the sultan’s capitulation. One of the Young
Turk leaders, Enver Pasha, exclaimed, “There are no longer Bulgars, Greeks, Rumans,
Jews, Mussulmans. We are all brothers beneath the same blue sky. We are all equal.”14
In Salonika, the gendarmerie commander observed:
[0]n the balcony of the Konak [town hall] Greek and Bulgarian bishops 
and the Mufti [Muslim leader] shook hands and then in the name of 
fraternity, they invited their coreligionists to follow suit.. .A cry of joy 
burst from every lung in the crowd and you could see Muslims, Greeks 
and Bulgarians, the old mortal enemies, falling into one another’s arms.15
One of the VMRO leaders, lane Sandanski, matched his actions to the bold words of
equality and fraternity as he and his followers handed over their weapons to the CUP,
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who acknowledged the sacrifice and then returned the guns. Sandanski and his men then 
proceeded to destroy all the weapons.16 The Young Turks thus came to power by 
fighting against injustice and repressive autocracy and promising the rule of equality for 
all.
Once in power, however, the Young Turks’ rhetoric came into conflict with the 
realities of a vast, decentralized, and polyglot empire. Balkan expert L.S. Stavrianos 
notes that they “were ready to grant political representation and religious freedom to all 
peoples of the empire. But in return they required that these people should support the 
imperial structure and accept Turkish predominance.” After they forcibly crushed all 
opposition to their rule, “they proceeded with their policy of centralization and Turkish 
hegemony.”17 In spite of the universal rhetoric they employed immediately following the 
revolution that declared all people equal regardless of their nationality, in governing the 
empire they resorted to official distinctions based upon nationality. Nationalism served 
to divide people who had so recently found themselves unified in their fight against the 
oppressiveness of Abdul Hamid’s reign. Furthermore, the more the Young Turks 
followed a policy of Turkish hegemony, the greater the nationalist opposition. Following 
the Young Turk revolt, all the attempts to suppress the local nationalisms in favor of a 
greater Ottoman nationalism had the opposite effect and, Stavrianos explains, “[T]he 
result was a vicious cycle of repression and resistance.”18 Just as in the nineteenth 
century, then, repressing nationalism led to its more fervent expression.
The Young Turk revolt provoked many far-reaching consequences but several 
developments in particular would affect the course of Balkan history and, ultimately, the 
fate of Macedonia. Both the Great Powers as well as the new Balkan states interpreted
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the events of the revolt as a signal of Ottoman weakness. Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria 
took the opportunity to declare Bulgaria’s full independence, as opposed to the autonomy 
within the empire that the state had previously enjoyed. Austria-Hungary followed 
Bulgaria’s lead by annexing the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, up until 
that point, had only been occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops. The fear of losing 
territories caused the CUP to reject most of the demands emanating from the Christians 
of Macedonia because they feared secession. In response, the Serb, Bulgarian, and 
Greek guerrillas within Macedonia once again decided to use force as means to achieve 
their ends.19 In addition, the loss for Serbia and Montenegro of a path to the Adriatic 
through Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted them and the other South Slavs increasingly 
to turn their attention southward toward Macedonia.20 Consequently, the four Balkan 
states of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro gradually came together into a system 
of alliances and by 1912 they had all signed diplomatic pacts with one other. In an 
analysis of the establishment of this Balkan League, James Bourchier, a well-known 
Balkan authority and London Times correspondent, wrote that its formation “was the 
direct result of the insensate efforts of the Young Turks to stifle national sentiment 
among the various races of the Empire.”21
Before discussing the actions of the Balkan League it is important to pause 
momentarily to consider the status of the city of Skopje during this time period. In spite 
of the political changes occurring in the areas surrounding Skopje in Bosnia,
Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, the borders of the region of Macedonia had not changed since 
1878. Although the San Stefano Treaty had briefly allocated the city of Skopje to 
Bulgaria, the Congress of Berlin returned control of the city to the Ottomans, who
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continued to administer it in 1910. When the baby girl who would grow up to become 
Mother Teresa was bom in Skopje to Albanian-speaking Catholic parents, the city still 
belonged to the Turks. Technically, then, it is possible to say that Mother Teresa was 
bom in the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks, however, would not enjoy their 
possession of the city for long. In 1912 when Turkish leaders refused to address the 
grievances of many Albanians, 20,000 Albanian tribesman occupied Skopje. Their 
successes provided a graphic demonstration to the Balkan League as to the extent of
99Turkish weakness in Macedonia.
The First and Second Balkan Wars
Even within the structure of the Balkan League, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece had 
not settled their divergent claims to the region of Macedonia. Nevertheless, when 
Montenegro declared war on Turkey in 1912, the other three Balkan states quickly joined 
their ally with the goal of driving the Turks out of Europe, and thus they ushered in the
• 99First Balkan War. The Bulgarians quickly found themselves in a contradictory position. 
Politically, they hoped to capture much of Macedonia and particularly the city of 
Salonika. Military considerations, however, forced them to send troops to fight against 
Constantinople while the Greeks and the Serbs advanced into Macedonia and occupied 
various parts of the region.24 The Balkan allies defeated the Turkish armies surprisingly 
quickly and the 1913 Treaty of London stripped the Ottoman Empire of most of her 
remaining European territories and also created an independent state of Albania.25
The war unleashed considerable violence, particularly towards the civilian 
populations, and the devastation attracted the attention of those around the globe
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concerned with the violation of human rights. Following the conclusion of the Second
Balkan War in 1913, an American group called the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace sent an international Commission of Inquiry to the region to report on
the violence. The Carnegie Inquiry gathered vast amounts of documentation regarding
the atrocities committed, especially against civilian populations, which they then
published upon their return. Especially since many historians and politicians writing in
the decades since the report’s publication have used the inquiry’s conclusions to justify
theories of “ancient ethnic hatreds,” it is worth noting their observations in some detail.
Regarding the violence that followed the conclusion of the First Balkan War, one
member of the inquiry explained that the Balkan War of Liberation,
unleashed the accumulated hatreds, the inherited revenges of centuries. It 
made the oppressed Christians for several months the masters and judges 
of their Moslem overlords. It gave the opportunity of vengeance to every 
peasant who cherished a grudge against a harsh landlord or a brutal 
neighbor.. .To the hatred of the races there was added the resentment of 
the peasantry against the landlords (beys), who for generations had levied 
a heavy tribute on their labor and harvests. The defeat of the Turkish 
armies meant something more than a political change. It reversed the 
relations of conqueror and serf; it promised social revolution.26
Although the inquiry presented, in quite strong terms, the existence of ancient hatreds, for
the most part the study concerned itself with the events of the present and did not delve
deeply into history. As a result, they provided little evidence to explain or support their
claim of ancient hatreds; they merely stated their existence. The evidence that does
exist, such as that of the Christian townspeople in Krusevo, who just nine years earlier
had appealed to the Ottoman authorities for help dealing with bands of armed Christians,
contradicts the inquiry’s assertion. At the same time, the inquiry did discuss the social
injustice faced by the peasantry at the hands of their overlords. That despicable violence
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occurred in the region is beyond doubt; whether that violence occurred because of ancient 
national enmity is less certain, and it surely seems as if the human rights violations the 
peasants suffered contributed significantly to the severity of the of violence. Thus from 
the first revolt of Balkan peoples against the Ottomans, in Serbia in 1804, to the final one 
in Macedonia in 1912, the poor living conditions and lack of basic rights for the Balkan 
peasants, regardless of their language or religion, contributed significantly to the political 
upheaval, military actions, and, ultimately, the end of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans.
The events of the Second Balkan War provide even further evidence against the 
“ancient ethnic hatreds” thesis propounded by the Carnegie Inquiry and others.
Following the conclusion of the First War, both the Serbs and the Greeks began 
campaigns of forced Serbianization and Hellenization of the areas of Macedonia that their 
militaries had occupied, in order to strengthen their justification for annexing these
27areas. It is a telling comment on the continued impermanence and vagueness of the 
people’s ethnicity that the Serbs and Greeks truly believed they could “make” the people 
living in Macedonia Greek or Serbian. Some inhabitants resisted the Greek and Serbian 
policies but Glenny states that those local populations “who refused to accept the 
nationality of the incoming administration (if one can call plundering thugs 
‘administrators’) were mn out of town, harassed, or murdered.”28 The Bulgarians, for 
their part, found themselves dissatisfied by the conclusion of the war as they had won 
militarily but not secured their political objectives. After considerable friction, Bulgaria 
attacked Greek and Serbian forces in Macedonia and the Serbians and Greeks responded 
with a declaration of war on Bulgaria. Montenegro joined on the side of Serbia and 
Greece as did, of all states, Turkey.29 Glenny then notes that in the course of the ensuing
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war, “Greeks and Serbs invited local Turks to join them in atrocities against the
Bulgarian peasantry.”30 Thus within months of the conclusion of the First Balkan War,
the supposed ancient enemies had drastically switched sides.
The Carnegie Endowment Inquiry struggled to clarify the significance of the
transfer of allegiances, but an examination of the inquiry’s findings regarding the
describing the creation of Bulgarian-Greek enmity, sheds light on the development of
nationalist hatreds in general. They explained that the Greek press began to publish
articles that attested to the violence of the Bulgarians:
The Greek press had had little to say regarding the Bulgarian excesses 
against the Turks while the facts were still fresh.... Now everything was 
dragged into the light and the record of Bulgarian bands, deplorable in 
itself, lost nothing in the telling. Day after day the Bulgarians were 
represented as a race of monsters, and public feeling was roused to a pitch 
of chauvinism which made it inevitable that war, when it came, should be 
ruthless.31
In the Second Balkan War, then, the divisiveness of nationalism reached its ultimate 
expression. The Greek press portrayed the Bulgarians as “monsters,” or, in other words, 
less than human.
In this way the Greeks could justify extreme violations of the human rights of the
people who had so recently been their allies. In fact, the inquiry provided the insightful
observation that relates to human rights violations in many settings: “Deny that your
enemies are men, and presently you will treat them as vermin.”32 The inquiry then
examined how it happened that so much of the violence was propagated by and directed
against civilians. They concluded:
The local population is divided into as many fragmentary parts as it 
contains nationalities, and these fight together, each being desirous to 
substitute itself for the others.. .The first consequence of this fact is that 
the object of these armed conflicts, overt or covert, clearly conceived or
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vaguely felt, but always and everywhere the same was the complete 
extermination of an alien population.33
The divisiveness of nationalism, particularly a nationalism that does not consider its
opponents as fully human, has the potential to lead to genocide, or the complete
destruction of a group of people. Thus, while human rights violations repeatedly
produced nationalism in the Balkans, that nationalism, which cleaved the people apart
often in order to justify political ends, in turn led to the worst kinds of human rights
violations.
If “ancient ethnic hatreds” did not cause the violence unleashed by the Balkan
wars, the question then arises as to why the Balkans witnessed such devastation during
the 1912 and 1913 conflicts. The Carnegie Inquiry explored this very question, albeit
without discounting the existence of ancient enmities. In the introduction to their report,
the French senator and member of the inquiry, Baron d’Estoumelles de Constant harshly
criticized the sale of military armaments from Western European countries to the new
Balkan states, noting that France alone had spent one hundred billion francs in the past
forty-three years providing weapons to the Balkans. He thus concluded:
The real culprits in this long list of executions, assassinations, drownings, 
burnings, massacres and atrocities furnished by our report are not, we 
repeat, the Balkan peoples.. .Do not let us condemn the victims.... The 
true culprits are those who mislead public opinion and take advantage of 
the people’s ignorance to raise disquieting rumors and sound the alarm 
bell, inciting their country and consequently other countries into enmity.
The real culprits are those who by interest or inclination, declaring 
constantly that war is inevitable end by making it so, asserting that they 
are powerless to prevent it.34
In spite of their belief in the existence of implacable enmity between the various groups,
the Carnegie Inquiry placed the blame for the horrific violence not on the feelings of the
inhabitants of the Balkans but on the policies of Western Europe. Furthermore, they
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condemned those, either in the Balkans or in Western Europe, who justified the sale of 
weapons by pointing to the inevitability of war or the bloodthirstiness of the participants. 
It appears, then, that referring to a tradition of “ancient ethnic hatreds” as the cause for 
war serves merely as a political excuse to further some other agenda or policy, in this 
case the selling of weapons. The Carnegie Inquiry had limited the scope of their 
investigation to war in the Balkans and published their report in 1914 on the eve of World 
War I. It seems possible that with the hindsight of four more years, the members of the 
inquiry might have felt that their conclusions held true not simply for the Balkans, but for 
other countries of the world as well.
In any event, just four weeks after it had begun and had unleashed horrific 
violence, the Second Balkan War concluded when Bulgaria, attacked from all sides, 
surrendered. The ensuing Treaty of Bucharest gave Bulgaria only a tiny portion of 
Macedonia, leaving her bitter and hungry for revenge. Salonika and most of the coastal 
areas of Macedonia went to Greece, while Serbia retained the north and central portions 
of the region, which included the cities of Monastir and Skopje.35 In 1913, then, the city 
of Mother Teresa’s birth and all its inhabitants, including the three-year-old child herself, 
came under the control of the state of Serbia. Thus while some may claim that Mother 
Teresa was bom in Albania, due to her primary language, others point to Serbia as her 
country of origin, perhaps because that state gained control of the city so soon after her 
birth.
Having acquired a portion of Macedonia, the state of Serbia then had to determine 
how to administer its new territory. At this point, our story leaves the Greek and 
Bulgarian portions of Macedonia in order to follow the history of the territory annexed by
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Serbia. The borders of the Greek and Bulgarian portions of Macedonia have not changed
substantially since their incorporation and in fact those areas remain part of Greece and
Bulgaria to this day. The Serbian portion alone would eventually become the modem
day Republic of Macedonia. In the meantime, however, in 1913 the Serbian leaders
decided that their portion of Macedonia, which they referred to as “Old Serbia,” stood
apart from the state of Serbia and did not, therefore, fall under the same constitution as
that of the Serbian Kingdom.
Shortly after the conclusion of the war, Serbian leaders published a security
decree that basically established a military dictatorship over “Old Serbia.” The decree
contained many draconian laws that affected the basic human rights of the local
population living in the Serbian controlled portion of Macedonia. For example, the
decree stated, “The decision of the police authorities.. .is sufficient proof of the
commission of a crime,” thus robbing the population of the right to a fair trial. Another
provision declared, “Where several cases of rebellion occur in a commune and the rebels
do not return to their houses within ten days from the police notice, the authorities have
the right of deporting their families withersoever they may find convenient.”36 The
inhabitants of Macedonia could thus find themselves uprooted and forced to relocate even
if they had not committed any illegal actions.
Regarding the Serbians’ treatment of the inhabitants of Macedonia, the Carnegie
Inquiry concluded,
In a word, it could be said that the Turkish Taw of vilayets,’ in 
combination with the ancient rights and privileges of Christian 
communities granted to the different nationalities by treaties and firmans, 
gave far better assurance of mutual toleration, and even a more effective 
reign on the arbitrary power of the administration than was afforded by 
this new draft constitution.
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Although the inquiry does not draw any conclusions regarding “ancient ethnic hatreds” 
from observations of the Serbian administration of “Old Serbia,” it nevertheless seems 
telling that inhabitants of Macedonia had enjoyed greater protection of their human rights 
under the administration of the Ottoman Turks then they did once they were incorporated 
into the state run by their fellow Slavs with whom they shared the Orthodox religion and 
a similar language.
At the same time, in an important remark regarding the connections between 
nationalism and human rights, the Carnegie Inquiry stated, “The confused tangle of 
Balkan nationalism can not be straightened out either by attempts to assimilate at any 
price, or by new migration.. .The way to arrive at such mutual protection [of minorities]
.. .is an effective mutual guarantee of religious and educational autonomy.” In other
words, only an appreciation that everyone, regardless of ethnicity, deserves the same 
rights to freedom of religion and education would bring the violence in Macedonia to an 
end. The inquiry thus explicitly rejected the particularism of nationalism in favor of the 
universalism of human rights.
World War I
The story of the Serbian nationalist, a man from the recently-annexed province of 
Bosnia, who in 1914 murdered the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand, is well known, 
as are the consequences of that assassination, which drew the countries of Europe into 
war. In fact, at the war’s beginning, Glenny tells us, “when Austria bombed Belgrade
• I Qand launched its air invasion of Serbia, it was known briefly as the Third Balkan War.” 
Although that name may not have lasted, the Balkan participants in the war certainly
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continued to view their military activities in that light. The Balkan states, including that 
portion of Macedonia known as “Old Serbia,” joined the Great War simply in order to 
continue their struggles with each other for territory.40
In 1915 Prince Ferdinand, the ruler of Bulgaria, mistakenly determined that the 
Central Powers were going to emerge from the conflict as the victors and so he brought 
his country into the war on their side in return for a promise of much of the territory of 
Macedonia.41 After the Bulgarian troops had routed the Serbian army in southern Serbia 
and northern Macedonia, Glenny relates, “Their commitment to the Central Powers 
faded.. .A Bulgarian general had blandly informed his German liaison officer, ‘for us 
Bulgars the war is really over. We have all we want.’” 42 The Bulgarians then refused to 
fight the British and French in Salonika, preferring instead to expand their occupation in 
the Western Macedonian lands claimed by their ally, Austria-Hungary. For a time during 
WWI, then, Mother Teresa’s birthplace came under Bulgarian wartime occupation.
In the meantime, the CUP leadership in Turkey continued to struggle with issues 
of nationalism and war within the empire. By 1915 the Turkish government had also 
joined the Central Powers but claimed that their minority Armenian population was 
aiding the Russian enemy. Under the cover of wartime chaos, the government began a 
program of genocide that involved the arrest, deportation and systematic execution of 
Armenian political, religious, educational, and intellectual leaders. Armenian soldiers 
serving in the Ottoman armies as well as ordinary civilians were also murdered.43 
Although the leaders of the CUP had begun their time in power with such strong words of 
equality, fraternity, and universal rights, once faced with the task of governing the vast 
empire, they degenerated into militant nationalism. Just as had happened in the Balkans,
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this divisive nationalism dictated that only one ethnicity or group of people could live 
within a state, completely ignoring the vast complexities and subjectivities that surround 
the concept of ethnicity. Just as during the Balkan Wars, genocide resulted as the 
ultimate and tragic consequence of this divisive nationalism that insisted on recognizing 
the differences between people instead of focusing on all people’s universal human 
rights.
When confronted regarding their treatment of the Armenians, in spite of evidence
linking the CUP government to the violence, the Turkish leaders claimed helplessness
and attributed the violence to the indignation of Turkish citizens who believed the
Armenians were assisting the Russians. Misha Glenny harshly criticizes the Turkish
position that accused the population of being prone to bloodthirsty behavior. He writes,
All Balkan massacres this century have enjoyed the specific approval of 
state organs, whose agents have usually been the instigators as well.. .Such 
events are invariably accompanied by a historical justification which can 
usually be boiled down to the simple formula of ‘eternal enmity’ between 
two communities. The construction of this justification by historians, 
newspapers and other media under state influence, however, tends to mask 
the real intentions of the elite.44
Just as the Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian elites of the Balkan Wars all tried to use mass
sentiment to sanction their territorial grabs, the Turks also blamed the nationalism of the
people for their wartime policy of genocide toward the Armenians in their effort to create
a Turkish state. These examples show nationalism as a tool of cynical politicians
interested in power and status rather than the welfare of their people. As a tool of the
power-hungry, nationalism comes into sharp conflict with a universal understanding of
human rights that works for the same treatment of all people, particularly the powerless.
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World War I shared yet another sad commonality with the events of the Balkan 
Wars. Although the authors of the Carnegie Inquiry had expressed both sadness and 
surprise at the level of civilian casualties during the Balkan Wars, tragically WWI also 
brought suffering to numerous civilians. In fact, Lauren explains, “It is estimated that in 
Russia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, the civilian loss of life actually exceeded those of the 
military.”45 The suffering of so many prompted a further examination of the universality 
of human rights as many humanitarians responded to the wartime catastrophes because of 
a belief that “these victimized civilians possessed the right to food and care simply by the 
nature of being human.”46 For example, American businessman and humanitarian 
Herbert Hoover created the Commission for Relief in order to convey shipments of food 
and supplies to those suffering in the war zones.47 Thus, the brutal years of WWI and the 
Balkan Wars witnessed extreme violence that came about due to nationalism, particularly 
the divisiveness of nationalism that did not recognize the humanity of those it called 
“others” and so engaged in genocidal policies. At the same time, prompted in part 
because of the massive suffering of so many, humanitarians continued to develop an ever 
more comprehensive understanding of the universality of human rights, or the belief that 
everyone, regardless of the issues that divide people, deserve the same basic rights.
Just as WWI had started in the Balkans, it also partially came to an end there. 
When Allied troops fought their way north from Salonika and eventually occupied 
Skopje, they brought about the collapse of the Central Powers’ Macedonian Front, and 
the German forces then contacted American President Woodrow Wilson to discuss an 
armistice 48 Mother Teresa’s birthplace thus once again changed hands just before the 
victorious states gathered in Versailles for the Peace Conference. The victors faced a
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daunting challenge as WWI had brought about the dissolution of four major empires: the 
Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian, and Ottoman empires had all collapsed during the 
course of the war. As the victors met at Versailles to determine the post-war fate of these 
newly liberated territories, two basic considerations guided their actions.
On one hand, emerging as part of Wilson’s platform of Fourteen Points, Lauren 
notes, “The collective right of self-determination, or the freedom to choose one’s own 
form of government surfaced immediately and powerfully at the peace conference.”49 In 
fact, regarding the specific problems of the Balkan lands, the eleventh of Wilson’s 
fourteen points stated, “The relations of the several Balkan states to one another [should 
be] determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and 
nationality.”50 And yet, this principle proved somewhat difficult to apply in complicated 
areas such as the Balkans where heterogeneous populations, as we have seen, were the 
norm and peoples’ ethnicity and nationality subject to change. In fact, no clearly 
“established lines of nationality” existed at all. Another complicating factor could be 
seen in the fact that in 1917 Russia had experienced the Bolshevik Revolution. Lauren 
explains that the allies hoped that by creating new states, including those inside the 
Balkans, that owed their allegiance to their benefactors, they could “contribute toward 
creating a cordon sanitaire, or a sanitary barrier, to quarantine what many leaders in the 
West perceived as the infectious disease of communism emerging from Lenin’s 
Russia.”51
At the same time, though not participants of the same stature at the Versailles 
Conference, the elites from within the areas of the former empires also had strong 
feelings about how the conference should allocate and divide the land. Particularly
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within and around the state of Serbia, the combination of the collapse of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire and the question of nationalism provoked a variety of ideas regarding 
the lands in which Slavic people inhabited. On one side, many of the leaders of the 
existing Serbian state hoped to see all the lands previously part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire in which Slavs were living incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbia. Others 
formed the Jugoslav Committee, and even before the war’s end they began to promote 
the idea of a federal structure for the Slavic lands. The Committee sought equal 
representation and power for the Croats and Slovenes as well as the Serbs within the new 
state. The government of Serbia and the Jugoslav Committee eventually agreed to form a 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but declined to articulate a clear position 
regarding whether the new state would entail a centralist or federalist government.52 The 
forces of nationalism thus created divisions among the group of Yugoslavs as many 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes insisted upon emphasizing their particularities and their 
differences with one another in their pursuit of power and influence within the new state.
With the blessings of the Allies, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 
with its capital at Belgrade, in fact came into existence just several days after the signing 
of the armistice,53 and both the city of Skopje and the young girl who would become 
Mother Teresa found themselves part of yet another country. In just eight short years this 
little girl could claim to have lived in three different states and to have experienced the 
administration of three separate occupying forces, all without leaving the city of her birth. 
Just as they had during the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the Allies, swayed by their 
different moral and strategic considerations, proceeded to draw the borders and influence 
the creation of governments for the new states. Wilson and others at the conference
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realized that, given the vast complexity of the populations within the territories in 
question, the establishment of new states, even under the auspices of self-determination, 
would create minority populations at risk of persecution from their new governments. 
Wilson thus acknowledged, “Nothing is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than 
the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities.”54 
Wilson thus clearly articulated the connection between the violations of human rights and 
the violence of war, and the connection between protecting human rights and avoiding 
international conflict. In order to combat the problems faced by minorities, the 
peacemakers negotiated an international legal foundation for the protection of minorities 
and insisted that the newly created states, such as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes, assure the protection of the citizens within their borders.55
This legal framework, which became known as the Minorities Treaties, used the 
language of universalism to ensure the protection of rights for all people. These treaties 
required the new states “to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty” to 
everyone “without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race, or religion.” At the 
same time, the treaties also unconsciously recognized the divisions created by 
nationalism as they stated “that the stipulations in the foregoing articles, as far as they 
affect persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, constitute 
obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the 
League of Nations.”56 The treaties thus guaranteed international protection only for those 
groups considered minorities, thus sharply contrasting with the language of universality. 
Given the subjective and vague nature of ethnic identity within Macedonia, we shall see
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shortly that these stipulations within the Minorities Treaties resulted in problems for the 
inhabitants of the region.
What then was the post-war status for that portion of Macedonia known as “Old 
Serbia?” The Treaty of Neuilly, which the victorious Allies concluded with the defeated 
Bulgaria, left the boundaries of Macedonia essentially the same as they had been in 1913 
following the Second Balkan War. The strategic considerations of the Allies did, 
however, deprive Bulgaria of a few key areas, which they then awarded to the new 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in order to hinder Bulgaria’s ability to launch
f a
another offensive. Thus in 1921 when the new kingdom passed its first constitution, 
known as the Vidovdan Constitution, political scientist Malbone W. Graham explains, the 
government continued to treat “Old Serbia” as a part of Serbia and in fact “made few 
modifications in the structure of institutions inherited from Serbia.” Of great importance 
for later developments regarding the divisiveness of nationalism within the state, the 
“Vidovdan Constitution provided a strong dynasty and plentitude of royal authority.. .the 
monarchy contained also an extraordinary amount of moderative power which the ruler 
could freely exercise outside the scope of parliamentarism and which was not subject to 
parliamentary control.”59 This apparent triumph of the forces of centralism over 
federalism would have significant consequences for the proponents of extreme nationalist 
feeling within the new state.
As for national sentiment within the Serbian portion of Macedonia, the confusions 
that had existed before the war did not vanish with the vast amounts of blood spilled in 
the region during the wars. Few historians or ethnographers would claim the existence of 
a separate Macedonian nation or ethnic group during this time period, and the Slavs,
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especially those living in rural areas, still did not profess a firm sense of any national 
identity. A novelist, Stratis Myrivilis, described life on the Balkan front during WWI in 
his novel, Life in the Tomb. He wrote of a family who lived in central Macedonia and 
though they spoke a Slavic dialect described themselves as neither “Boulgar,” “S’rrp,” 
nor “Grrts.”60 From Myrivilis’ work as well as other sources Loring Danforth then 
concludes, “Of those Slavs who had developed some sense of national identity the 
majority probably considered themselves Bulgarians, although, as A. King points out, 
they were aware of differences between themselves and the inhabitants of Bulgaria.”61 
The end of WWI thus brought a conflicting and confusing set of circumstances to the 
inhabitants of Macedonia. Politically they had joined a newly created kingdom as part of 
the state of Serbia. Yet, the Minority Treaties cautioned the new kingdom that the way in 
which they treated minorities constituted obligations of international concern. The very 
nature of the vagueness and subjectivity of the question of national identity within 
Macedonia, however, would make determining who did and did not qualify as a minority 
and therefore deserved international protection, an exceedingly difficult proposition.
Interwar Period
Following the establishment of the Vidovdan Constitution, nationalists from both 
Serbia and Croatia often held divergent opinions regarding policy for the country. For 
the most part they cooperated within the government to work towards a solution of the 
country’s problems. In 1928, however, a nationalist assassinated the Croatian leader 
Stjepan Radic. Graham explains that the move symbolized the failure of the existing 
parliamentary process to resolve the problems of extreme nationalism. The monarch,
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King Alexander, then set aside the constitution as “having failed to create the consensus 
required for national unity and undertook, as was permissible to him in the transitional
constitution-forming period, a personal rule of direct royal responsibility for the
62 • people.” In a symbolic move designed to emphasis national unity, in 1931 the king
also changed the name of the country, obliterating distinctions between Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes, as all became Yugoslavs in the new state of Yugoslavia.63 Just three years
after the Albanian-speaking teenager left Skopje for Ireland on a path that would
eventually take her to Calcutta as Mother Teresa, her hometown found itself once again
part of a state with a new name. Skopje would remain part of Yugoslavia until 1992, the
better part of the lifetime of Mother Teresa, which perhaps explains why so many claim
Yugoslavia as her birthplace.
In any event, although it is a bit of an anachronism to refer to Yugoslavia in the 
years before 1931, for simplicity’s sake, from here on out, throughout the interwar 
period, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will be referred to as Yugoslavia. 
According to Danforth, the official position of all the various Yugoslav governments 
throughout the years before World War II “was that the Slavs of Macedonia were ‘South 
Serbs.’ Macedonia was referred to as ‘South Serbia,’ and the language spoken there was 
considered a dialect of Serbian.”64 In addition, according to one historian of modern-day 
Macedonia, “School instruction was in Serbian, all higher officials were Serbs, and the 
Church was Serbian.”65 As this policy seemed somewhat at odds with a population who, 
if they professed any ethnicity tended to associate more with Bulgaria, the Yugoslav 
government in Belgrade thus embarked on a program of forced assimilation. Historian 
Kofos Evangelos notes that as part of this process, “pro-Bulgarian leaders and members
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of the Bulgarophile intelligentsia were deported or imprisoned. At the same time, 
thousands of Serbs were settled in the region to assist in the assimilation of the native 
Slavs.” In general, peaceful methods of integration were abandoned and compulsory 
means pursued.66 That the Yugoslav government believed it could force the population 
into a Serbian identity in and of itself testifies to the subjective nature of national 
identities, particularly in Macedonia during this time period.
In contrast to what the government hoped to achieve, however, and following a 
pattern that had repeated time and again in the Balkans, the more intense and arbitrary the 
measures, the more they stimulated resistance as the inhabitants began to look to Bulgaria 
as the source of their identity as well as a potential liberator who could free them from 
Serbian oppression.67 Consistent with the pattern, then, violations of human rights 
sparked increased national sentiment among the population. Theoretically, the obvious 
course of action for the persecuted minority within the Serbian portion of Yugoslavia 
would have been to appeal to the League of Nations to enforce the protection due to them 
under the Minority Treaties. One Balkan historian explains, however, that Yugoslavia 
managed to block this channel of appeal by its “refusal to admit the existence of a 
‘Bulgarian’ or ‘Macedonian’ minority.”68 Yugoslavia claimed that Bulgaria, still bitter 
after her loss of most of Macedonia, hoped to use the pro-Bulgarian sentiment within 
Yugoslavia as an excuse to reclaim the lost lands.69 Political considerations combined 
with the subjectivity inherent in national identity allowed a loophole in the Minority 
Treaties under which the Yugoslavian government could deny to the inhabitants of 
Macedonia the right to practice their religion or enjoy education in whichever language 
they chose. An international treaty that attempts to protect people’s human rights,
95
therefore, by implicitly recognizing the divisions brought about by nationalism does not 
seem to work. It is also interesting to note the irony of the Yugoslav government on the 
one hand denying the existence of a minority population and on the other hand engaging 
in a program of forced assimilation.
The Yugoslav policy of forced Serbianization had the result of encouraging 
VMRO, the organization that had originally formed during the Turkish rule of Macedonia 
to fight for a free Macedonia, to continue its violent activities. Following the conclusion 
of WWI, VMRO bands committed numerous acts of terrorism as they attempted to turn 
the population against the Belgrade government. The Bulgarian government tolerated 
VMRO activities and allowed the group to raise funds in Bulgaria. In fact, VMRO 
basically ruled over and administrated the Bulgarian portion of Macedonia.70 Repression 
of human rights thus encouraged the activities of a violent terrorist organization, even as 
the campaign of terrorism caused its own form of human rights abuses. Furthermore, as 
the organization became more and more of a terrorist society, the actions of VMRO 
placed a serious strain on the relations between Serbia and Bulgaria. One historian 
relates that the number of VMRO members entering Yugoslavia from Bulgaria forced the 
Yugoslavs to keep “the Yugoslav-Bulgarian boundary of more than 400 miles lined with 
barbed wire entanglements and rows of ditches. There were high towers and pillboxes 
between them.”71 The stress between the two states proved the truth of Wilson’s 
concerns regarding the conduct toward minorities. The way in which the Yugoslavs 
treated their own population, in this case by denying them basic human rights, created a 
situation of international tension.
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VMRO did not, however, manage to affect any major political changes during the 
interwar years. In part they failed due to the vague nature of their aims: they did not have 
a definitive position on whether they wanted Bulgaria to annex Macedonia or whether 
they hoped for the autonomy of Macedonia. Furthermore, they did not enjoy widespread 
support and instead relied on terrorist activity, with its accompanying human rights 
violations. They had no constructive goals, working instead merely to bring about the 
overthrow of the existing government. Eventually the organization broke into various 
factions more concerned with their leaders’ personal ambitions and vendettas than with 
any kind of national agenda. It is also important to point out that even had appealing to 
the League of Nations been a possibility, it is likely that VMRO would not have pursued 
that course of action because improving the conditions for the inhabitants of Macedonia 
would have necessarily meant the end of VMRO. Finally, in 1934 after another 
assassination deprived Yugoslavia of a monarch* and a coup in Bulgaria brought a new 
government to power, the new Bulgarian government sought friendship with Yugoslavia. 
As one of their first acts, the Bulgarian government ordered VMRO to disband.72 While 
VMRO thus exercised little political impact on the development of Macedonia, because 
their ostensible goal involved a “free” Macedonia of one form or another, like Alexander 
the Great and the Krusevo Republic, VMRO too would come to play an important part in 
later Macedonian nationalist histories.
Alongside VMRO, another organization within Macedonia also challenged the 
existing Yugoslavian government. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, formed in
+The assassination brought about for the first time discussion in the recently created League of 
Nations regarding the creation o f an international criminal tribunal. Although such a tribunal was never 
established, both the existence and absence of international criminal tribunals would continue to play an 
important role in Balkan history, and will be discussed more fully later in this chapter as well as in the two 
that follow.
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1919, enjoyed widespread support in the elections of 1920 in Macedonia, and then was 
banned by the government in 1921.73 The Communists continued to operate, despite 
their illegality, but suffered under yet another handicap. They had committed to obeying 
the orders of the Comintern, controlled by the Soviet Union, but the Comintern’s 
positions, particularly regarding questions of nationality, proved difficult to swallow for 
many within Yugoslavia. Like Wilson, members of the Comintern believed strongly in 
the self-determination of peoples. They objected, however, to what they viewed as the 
small imperialist states that the Allies had created in their attempt to form a cordon 
sanitaire. Stavrianos explains that the Comintern believed “these states had been formed 
by the annexation of large areas with foreign populations. Accordingly the [5th World] 
Congress proclaimed the right of every nation to self-determination, even to the extent of 
separation.” The policy of separation proved a stumbling block, however, as “parties 
committed to the wholesale dismemberment of their own countries had little chance of 
gaining widespread support.”74
It is telling that while both the Communists and the Western Powers agreed on the 
principle of national self-determination, neither side could agree on how to implement 
that principle in practice. Rival political considerations definitely played a role, but at the 
same time, just as in the instance of the Minority Treaties, the principle of self- 
determination of peoples reveals the difficulties in basing a policy on a concept as vague, 
subjective, and subject to change and manipulation as national identity. Furthermore, the 
struggles within the international Communist organizations over the question of 
nationality reveal the way in which nationalism continued to divide people who agreed 
on so many other issues.
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In spite of the handicap they suffered as a result of the divisive national issue, the 
Communists enjoyed some success in part because of the social justice aspect of their 
ideology. Stavrianos explains that Balkan peasants, who still made up a significant 
amount of the population and “who knew little about Marxist ideology could grasp and 
appreciate these ideas. Social justice was bound to have appeal where social injustice
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was the rule.” Just as Serbian repression sparked VMRO into action, the denial of 
social justice to the Balkan peasants allowed the Communists to gain followers. 
Furthermore the repression of the Communists forced them to develop a vast 
underground network and organization and when the Axis armies occupied the Balkan 
Peninsula at the start of WWII, their long tradition of underground struggles helped the 
Communists effectively lead a resistance movement.
World War II
The advent of the World War II brought unprecedented violence and chaos to 
many reaches of the globe. The confusion and bloodshed within Yugoslavia, however, 
proved particularly acute. In order to understand the wartime events that brought near 
anarchy to most of the country, it is necessary to revisit briefly the tensions that existed 
between the various nationalities within Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavian government 
prior to the outbreak of war. Although the country had gone through several major 
changes in government, the central issue over the power and status of the various 
nationalities within Yugoslavia remained unresolved. After the assassination of King 
Alexander in 1934, the government operated without a monarch as a Regency Council 
provided the political leadership. The Serbians and Croatians continued to struggle with
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one another and their tensions, as Graham notes, “opened to the doors of the Yugoslav
7 7household still wider to Axis connivance and conspiracy.”
Following the outbreak of WWII, both Hitler and Roosevelt urged the 
strategically located Yugoslavia to join their respective sides. When Roosevelt’s 
inducements proved less convincing, the leaders of the Regency Council signed a
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Tripartite Pact with Germany. Many Yugoslavs, but Serbs in particular, felt deep 
indignation upon learning of their country’s cooperation with Germany. A military 
leader, General Dusan Simovic, launched a coup and without encountering much 
resistance took over the government. Although Simovic had come to power by opposing 
an alliance with Germany, he quickly discovered that he could not control the country 
and win the support of the Croatian factions in the government, who supported the 
Germans, and so he reluctantly agreed to support the Tripartite Pact. His acquiescence 
came too late, however, and Glenny explains that, irritated by the complexities of 
Yugoslavian politics, “the Fuhrer exploded in fury on receipt of the news from Belgrade. 
Almost immediately he tore up the Tripartite Agreement with Yugoslavia and ordered the 
Wehrmacht to invade the country.” 79 Belgrade quickly collapsed and within days the 
Germans had smashed the Yugoslav army. The divisiveness of Yugoslavian politics that 
emphasized the particular differences between Serbs and Croats once again helped to 
bring disaster to the country.
After they had overrun Yugoslavia, the Nazis established four “puppet” 
governments in Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Montenegro. Yugoslav historian Wayne 
Vucinich explains that of the new regimes the largest and only one with any semblance of 
independence was Croatia, headed by Ante Pavelic. Pavelic had organized the terrorist
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group known as the Ustase and spent years of training in Italy and Hungary learning Nazi 
methods in order to serve fascist interests in Yugoslavia. Following the sad pattern of 
nationalist politics in the Balkans, Pavelic articulated the ideology that Croatia had no 
room for the Serbian people and his Ustase mercilessly persecuted all the Serbian 
inhabitants of the area. Vucinich relates that the Ustase’s “objectives were to exterminate 
the majority of the Serbs and to ‘Croatianize’ the rest. The first was achieved through 
mass slaughter of innocent civilians and such concentration camps as that at Jasnovac,
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and the second through the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church.” Just as 
during the earlier Balkan wars, politics based on nationalism during WWII resulted in 
several tragic consequences. First, nationalism’s emphasis on each group’s particularity 
created such deep divisions between the two groups that some Croatians became capable 
of massive human rights violations against the Serbs. Second, the rhetoric of nationalism 
combined with the idea of the self-determination of nationalities convinced the Croatians 
that they had to rid their state of all Serbs, civilians and soldier alike. One again extreme 
nationalism led directly to genocide.
Given the violence propagated not only by the Ustase but also by the Nazi forces, 
several groups developed within occupied Yugoslavia to resist the foreign militaries.
With the defeat of the Yugoslav army, many officers and soldiers fled to the hills to form 
an organization, led by Colonel Dragoljub (‘Draza’) Mihailovic, and loyal to the former 
government of Yugoslavia now in exile in London. Just as the Ustase attempted to 
create a purely Croatian state (whatever that would have meant in reality), Mihailovic’s 
organization, known as the Cetniks, fought for the “biological survival” of the Serbs in 
the face of the policy of extermination propagated by the Ustase.81 A Cetnik Manifesto
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of 1941 took the extreme position that “transfers and exchanges of populations, 
especially of Croats from the Serbian and of Serbs from the Croatian areas, is the only 
way to arrive at their separation and to create better relations between them.” The 
manifesto thus clearly articulates the divisiveness of nationalism by stating that only 
through the separation of people can they coexist. It is easy to imagine how those who 
supported the “ancient ethnic hatreds” thesis could believe that the Croatians and 
Serbians really could not live together. As the historical evidence suggests the fiction of 
the thesis, however, other factors must have been at work. It seems far more likely that 
the violence, rather than resulting from ancient enmity, arose as the political leaders of 
the various groups propagated extreme nationalist ideologies in order to further their 
political aspirations.
To add to the political and military milieu within the chaotic war-torn Yugoslavia, 
yet another resistance group developed and drew strength from a very different kind of 
ideology. Members of the previously-banned Communist Party of Yugoslavia gathered 
in Belgrade under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. They began to activate the 
underground network of Communists and developed a strategy of guerrilla resistance. 
These Partisans, as the Communists came to be known, had to fight not only the Nazis 
but also the Cetniks, the supporters of the Monarchy, and the Ustase, the local fascist 
organization. They aimed, in addition to the liberation of their country, to establish a new 
socialist order.83
Two factors aided the Partisans in gaining the support of the population. First, the 
violent actions of the Ustase served as a powerful recruiting tool of the Partisans. As 
Glenny explains, the Serbian “peasants had a choice -  to be incinerated or butchered in
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their homes by the Ustase or to fight.”84 Thus, as we have seen elsewhere throughout the
history of the Balkans, extreme nationalism and the violent repression of people’s basic
human rights create strong opposition. In addition, the second factor involved the
universalism within Partisan ideology. Vucinich observes:
Of all the political parties, only the Communists succeeded in organizing 
the masses, regardless of nationality and religion, into a single resistance 
front. The Partisans, under Communist leadership, took up the Yugoslav 
banner, adopted a republican platform, and opposed the various brands of 
Serb and Croat chauvinism, offering an opportunity to Macedonians, 
Montenegrins, Croats, Slovenes, and others to achieve their national 
aspirations for equality with the Serbs and autonomous statehood in the 
new federated Yugoslavia.. .The Serb nationalist program of the Cetnici
O c
[Cetniks] did not appeal to the masses.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, an organization that held social justice as a primary aspect of its 
ideology also focused on universalism. The Communist Partisans disregarded the 
rhetoric of the Serbian and Croatian nationalists’ focus on the particular aspects of each 
group to create an organization that looked past differences of language or religion to 
offer opportunities to everyone, regardless of nationality. It is also noteworthy that in an 
area supposedly divided by national enmity, the non-national Partisans enjoyed the mass 
support that the nationalist Ustase and Cetnik groups failed to achieve.
Before turning to the specific political program that Tito and his Partisans 
promoted, a discussion of the events within wartime Macedonia helps to explain why the 
people of that region also supported the Partisans. The Bulgarians, ever hungry for 
revenge and that portion of Macedonia they felt they deserved, had joined the Germans. 
At first their alliance seemed to yield tangible results because, after the German invasion 
of Yugoslavia, the Nazis allowed the Bulgarian troops and administrative personnel to 
occupy large portions of Macedonia in 1941. With the young woman would become
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Mother Teresa now far away and ensconced in her missions work in India, the city of 
Skopje suffered yet another military occupation. At first the local population within 
Yugoslav Macedonia welcomed the Bulgarians, as the history of the Serb occupation, the 
cultural affinity between many local inhabitants and the Bulgarians, and the interwar 
propaganda efforts of groups like VMRO, had created or allowed pro-Bulgarian 
sentiments among many of the inhabitants.
The Bulgarians, however, maintained hopes of eventually incorporating 
Macedonia into Bulgaria. As a result, they began a formal program designed to convince 
the occupants of Macedonia to demand official annexation. Kofos relates, “A major 
educational program was initiated whereby Bulgarian elementary and secondary schools 
staffed with teachers from Bulgaria were established in almost all towns and villages.” 
Throughout the competition for the national loyalty of the Macedonian Slavs it is 
interesting to note the role that education has played in developing the consciousness of 
the people. It seems that one of the most powerful ways of formulating national identity 
involves controlling the educational system. The Bulgarian occupation, however, also 
employed far harsher methods in order to sway the population. In fact, the Bulgarian 
soldiers acted less like liberators and more like occupiers. For example, when the 
population supported a Partisan uprising in the Monastir-Prilep area, the Bulgarian 
Gendarmerie reacted by executing many villagers, men and women alike.
The harsh policies of the Bulgarian occupation force emphasized the divisions 
between Bulgarians and the inhabitants of Macedonia, rather than their similarities. 
Furthermore, as the Bulgarians engaged in reprisals against the Partisans, they drove 
more Slavs into the camp of the Communists who increasingly claimed to fight for a
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Macedonian state within Yugoslavia. Just as Cetnik violence created increasing support
for the Partisans, Bulgarian repression effected the same results. In addition, just as the
Serbian occupation of Macedonian before the war convinced the local population of the
differences between themselves and the Serbs, the Bulgarian actions began to call into
question the people’s allegiance to Bulgaria. Just as the fight for Macedonia before the
Balkan wars had helped to establish a group of “others” or enemies against which to
define oneself, the post-WWI activities of Macedonia’s neighbors followed in the same
pattern. Their actions thus continued to prove the truth of Danforth’s observation that
people frequently define their identity first in terms of what they are not.90
In the course of these military struggles, the various Communist groups operating
within the territory of Yugoslavia met at the town of Bihac in 1942. They then formed a
Partisan-sponsored parliament of sorts, which served as the political counterpart to the
military resistance within the country. The new organization called itself the Anti-Fascist
Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ).91 In 1943 the AVNOJ met
at the town of Jajce in order to formulate the eventual political structure of liberated
Yugoslavia. The resulting Jajce Resolution stipulated:
On the basis of the right of all nations to self-determination including the 
union with or secession from other nations.. .the Anti-Fascist Council of 
the National Liberation of Yugoslavia passes the following 
decisions:...Yugoslavia is being built up on a federal principle which will 
ensure full equality for the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina.92
The AVNOJ thus articulated, for the first time, the idea of an independent state of
Macedonia. In addition, as already noted, the Partisans, under Tito and through the
AVNOJ repudiated the idea of decisive national politics based on Serbian or Croatian
ethnicity and promised equality within the proposed federal structure. At the same time,
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the AVNOJ could not break-away from nationalist politics all together and thus based 
their concept for the new states on the equality not of all people, but of the six nations. 
As we have seen before, the reliance on the vagaries of nationality as the basis for a 
political ideology can create enormous problems, from which the country of Yugoslavia 
would not escape throughout the entire course of its existence.
The story of the German defeat is well known. It is perhaps less well known that 
Tito’s Partisans won the civil war that had further divided Yugoslavia. Lest too much 
emphasis be placed on the social justice mission of the Communists and Tito’s 
commitment to universalism, it is important to point out that the Partisans engaged in 
deplorable violence following the conclusion of WWII. Although Pavelic himself 
escaped, the Partisans executed 50,000 Croatian Ustase soldiers as well as 30,000 
refugees, many of them women and children. The Communists eventually caught, tried 
and executed Mihailovic, the leader of the Cetniks as an alleged war criminal. The new 
Communist leadership then persecuted the Cetniks and drove many to become
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fugitives. Perhaps even more devastating in the long run, Tito, committed to the 
development of a unified state, refused to publicly admit or discuss the true nature of the 
civil war that had tom the country apart. According to Balkan journalist Chuck Sudetic, 
Tito’s failure to acknowledge the reality of the horrific crimes of nationalism that had 
occurred during the war eroded his legitimacy and ultimately helped to create the 
conditions for the country to collapse once again into a state of ethnic violence,94 a series 
of occurrences that will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
It is somewhat ironic that Tito and the Communists created a federal structure for 
Yugoslavia based on nationalist politics because they held the socialist belief that once
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the population found its basic needs met, as they would within a socialist state, the 
necessity of nationalist rhetoric would dissipate. According to one scholar of Balkan 
politics, Sabrina Ramet, Tito and the other Yugoslav politicians held that “[t]he 
anticipated process of homogenization would, therefore, erode the basis for the federal 
system. No doubt in the ripeness of time national differences would wither away -  a 
prerequisite for the withering away of either federalism or the state.”95 The Communists 
in general, and Tito in particular, acknowledged that the violation of people’s basic 
human rights contributed to the strength of national and ethnic identity. They thus 
theorized that if a country protected the population’s basic human rights, they would not, 
therefore, need nationalism. As Ramet points out, Tito thus envisioned the federal 
structure of Yugoslavia, based on the existence of six separate nations, to serve as a very 
temporary remedy. Tito seems, however, to have underestimated the degree to which 
nationalism serves not only as a recourse for the persecuted, but also as a political tool of 
the powerful and the power-hungry, and national problems would continue to plague 
Yugoslavia.
In 1946, however, immediately following the conclusion of the war, elections 
determined the make-up of a new Constituent Assembly and confirmed Tito as the 
country’s leader. The Constituent Assembly abolished the Monarchy and approved a 
new constitution for the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia [FPRY], which, 
according to Vucinich, “sanctioned and legalized the political, social, and economic 
reforms of the new regime.”96 The first article of the Constitution recognized that the 
right of self-determination of the peoples, including the right of each of the six states to 
secede, would provide legitimacy for the new country. The second article officially
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recognized the existence of those six states proposed by the AVNOJ some years earlier 
(see Map 4 on page 109). Recognizing the possibility of conflict between the idea of 
self-determination and the existence of six previously determined national states, Article 
13, drawing no doubt upon the ideas of the Minority Treaties, stated, “[njational 
minorities in the FPRY enjoy the right to and protection of their own cultural 
development and the free use of their own language.” Finally, Article 23 drew upon the 
language of universal protection of rights, proclaiming:
All citizens of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia are 
equal before the law and enjoy equal rights regardless of nationality, race, 
and creed.
No privileges on account of birth, position, property, status, or 
degree of education are recognized.
Any act granting privileges to citizens or limiting their rights on 
grounds of difference in nationality, race, and creed, and any propagation 
of national, racial, and religious hatred and discord are contrary to the 
Constitution and punishable by law.97
Clearly an inherent conflict existed within these articles of the Constitution. On one hand
the Constitution created six states, each with their own measure of sovereignty, including
the right to secession, based in large part on ethnic, national identity. On the other hand,
the Constitution promised equality for all, regardless of nationality. The conflict between
the universalism of rights on the one side and the particularity of nationalism on the other
would continue to create tension within the new state.
In the meantime, the Constitution did establish the Republic of Macedonia within
the new structure of Yugoslavia. In fact, in a tribute to the legend of the fighters who
struggled against the oppression of the Turks for a “free Macedonia,” the republic was
proclaimed in 1944 on August 2nd, the anniversary of the Ilinden Revolt. In addition, the
leadership established a standard literary Macedonian language as the official language of
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the new republic. Just as it had in the other Balkan states, Danforth acknowledges that 
the official designation of a Macedonian language served as a major contributor to the 
development of a definitively Macedonian identity. He then points out, however, that 
“[t]he decision to establish Macedonian as the official language of the Republic of 
Macedonia in 1944, therefore, confirmed what was already de facto in practice. It did not 
create a language out of the air, rather it granted recognition to a literary language whose 
modem development began in the nineteenth century.”98 The question then becomes 
whether a general Macedonian national consciousness existed prior to this time, as 
Macedonian nationalists would eventually claim it did, or rather, as the Greeks claim,
Tito “created” a Macedonian identity on August 2, 1944. Danforth, acknowledging the 
subjective nature of national identity, recognizes the difficulty, if not impossibility of
i  • 9 9answering the question.
Danforth then points out that whether or not a Macedonian nation existed, “the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia had important political reasons for declaring that one did 
exist and for fostering its development through a concerted process of nation building, 
employing all means at the disposal of the Yugoslav state.”100 Given the emphasis on the 
self-determination of peoples, the Yugoslavs needed to eliminate any remaining sense of 
Bulgarian consciousness among the people. The Bulgarian occupation of Macedonia no 
doubt helped the Yugoslavs with this task. Furthermore, the interwar period had proved 
the impossibility of calling the inhabitants Serbs. Thus, Danforth concludes, “the only 
alternative was to recognize the Slavs of Macedonia as something else -  as 
Macedonians.”101 The ability of the Yugoslavs to “decide” on the existence of a 
Macedonian nation and then to “foster” its development, suggests yet again the
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subjectivity and malleability of nationality in general. At the same time, the 
establishment of a Macedonian nation, irrespective of whatever national consciousness 
may or may not have already existed, also provides another example of politicians 
exploiting nationality in pursuit of a political agenda.
At almost the exact same time, prompted by the enormous suffering wrought in 
part by militant nationalism during the Second World War, concerned citizens of the 
world met to determine an objective standard, in contrast to the subjective nature of 
nationalism, with which to discuss human rights. Following the establishment of the 
United Nations, in 1946 the General Assembly decided to support the creation of an 
International Bill of Rights. Eleanor Roosevelt would eventually head the newly-created 
Commission on Human Rights, which sought the perspectives of philosophers, 
academics, cultural and religious figures, and other experts from around the world to 
participate in this endeavor. Finally, in 1948, after two years, numerous individuals, non­
governmental organizations (NGO’s), the UN, and the governments of all states who 
claimed membership in the UN, produced a draft declaration articulating the human 
rights that all people in the world deserved. On December 10, 1948 the General 
Assembly voted on the document and forty-eight of the delegates voted in favor of 
accepting it, none opposed the declaration, and only eight abstained. Thus the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights came into existence.
In its preamble the Universal Declaration of Human Rights acknowledged, as 
Wilson had following WWI, the connection between human rights abuse and violence, a 
pattern that repeatedly played out over the course of history in the Balkans. In fact, the 
preamble states, “It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse as a last
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resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected
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by the rule of law.” In the Balkans, “rebellion against tyranny” had often taken the 
form of nationalist discourse that called attention to the mistreatment of minorities. 
Wilson had hoped to avoid such problems through the Minority Treaties, which provided 
legal protection for people on the basis of their minority status. As we have seen, 
however, the subjective nature of national identity and hence minority status created 
problems with enforcement of the Minority Treaties.
The Universal Declaration, therefore, states in Article 1 that “All human beings 
are bom free and equal in dignity and rights,” thus recognizing the universality of the 
rights owed to all people. Article 2 continues, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth, or status.”104 Unlike the Minority Treaties, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights does not base the protection of rights for minorities on something as illusive and 
difficult to define as minority status. Instead, all people irrespective of, among other 
things, their ethnicity, deserve the same basic rights. The Declaration then enumerates 
thirty articles that spell out the basic rights to which all people are entitled, including the 
“right to life, liberty, and the security of person,” and the “right to recognition before the 
law.”105 Until this point our discussion of human rights has necessarily been somewhat 
vague; although people intuitively understand the concept of human rights, before 1948 
no internationally recognized definition of human rights existed. Following the writing 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, the peoples of the world had
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agreed upon an objective list of basic rights that did not depend on an individual’s 
perspective or a cultural point of view.
In sharp contrast, as we have seen in the Balkans and in Macedonia, national or 
ethnic identity always involved some measure of individual perspective. In fact, the 
Declaration even officially recognizes the subjectivity of national identity. Article 15 
states first, “Everyone has the right to a nationality,” and then, “No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”106 In 
other words, to a certain extent the decision to change one’s nationality does depend, and 
should depend, on the individual. The Declaration thus recognizes the subjectivity 
inherent in nationalism and, in contrast with the divisive power of national ideologies, 
proclaims an objective definition of the rights to which people everywhere are entitled 
simply by virtue of their humanness.
The Cold War Era
In addition to the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
proclaimed the unity and commonality of people everywhere around the world, the post- 
WWH era also witnessed the dawn of the Cold War, which divided the globe into two, 
distinct, armed camps. Just as the Balkan wars saw former allies turn to enemies, shortly 
after fighting together during WWII, in the post-war setting the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
faced each other as adversaries. When the end of the war brought Tito’s communist 
government to power, it seemed a foregone conclusion that Tito’s Yugoslavia would 
stand shoulder to shoulder with Joseph Stalin’s U.S.S.R. That assumption, however, 
overlooked the degree to which Tito favored Yugoslav national interests over and above
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the dictates of Soviet strategy. Stalin, in turn, deeply resented Tito’s independence and 
disliked his attempts to organize Balkan politics on his own. The tension eventually 
came to a head in 1948 when Stalin denounced Tito and the Soviet Union ceased all 
cooperation with Yugoslavia.107
Although Stalin hoped that his policies would force Tito back into the Soviet- 
dominated Communist fold, Tito developed other plans. He increased trade with the 
West, although without abandoning his country’s socialist ideology. Furthermore, he 
used the spirit of Yugoslav nationalism as a force to mobilize and encourage his country 
in the face of Soviet bullying.108 Yet again outside pressure and aggression stimulated 
the development of national sentiment. Tito’s stance and policies paid rich dividends 
because Yugoslavia began to play a unique role in the Cold War world, as it became, in 
Glenny’s words, “one of the most respected international actors outside the two power 
blocs.” For example, after Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952, in spite of 
Yugoslavia’s socialist orientation, Tito signed a five-year “Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation,” with the two countries in 1953. The three states supplemented their 
political agreement with a military alliance, concluded in 1954, in which they agreed that 
they would consider any act of aggression against one state as an aggressive action taken 
against all three.109 The Soviet Union’s policy toward Yugoslavia only changed in 1955 
when Stalin’s death brought Nikita Khrushchev to power. The two countries then 
normalized their relations, but by that time Tito had carved out a place for Yugoslavia as 
an independent actor within the socialist camp still capable of maintaining good relations 
with the West.110
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In spite of employing Yugoslav nationalism in the service of his foreign policy, 
Tito continued to fear nationalism in general. As Sabrina Ramet explains, Tito and 
Yugoslavia’s Marxists believed that “nationalism was the social relationship in which 
distinct national communities faced each other with mutually exclusive demands fired by 
collective arrogance and tinged with resentment of the unmatched gains of the other.” 
They had hoped that “economic equality [would cause] nationalist temper to abate.”111 
Tito’s Marxists thus recognized the inherently divisive and competitive nature of 
nationalism and feared its ability to create tensions among peoples. They hoped that by 
removing the economic grievances that had played such an important role in generating 
the violence that wreaked havoc across the Balkans they could thus eliminate 
nationalism.
By 1964, however, Tito had to accept the reality that the various nations of 
Yugoslavia were not on the verge of disintegration in favor of socialist unity. Following 
the Eighth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Tito thus 
allowed for a greater degree of federalism and political decentralization within 
Yugoslavia as the separate republics gained greater authority.112 Nevertheless, 
nationalist tensions continued to occur, particularly between Serbs and Croats, the old 
political enemies of the interwar years. Within the Republic of Croatia, Croats feared 
that not only was the central government of Belgrade exploiting them economically, but 
also that they were being exploited merely by virtue of being Croats. As evidence they 
pointed to the gradual demographic displacement of Croats by Serbs, and what they felt 
was the Serbianization of the Croatian language. Ramet points out that although other
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factors could have accounted for these developments, the overwhelming majority of
i l l
Croatians viewed them as evidence of a Serbian menace.
As language had always played an important role in determining the national 
identity of Balkan peoples, in 1967 unsurprisingly language served as the focal point for 
the first major dispute in over twenty years between Serbs in Croats. Since 1954 an 
understanding called the Novi Sad Agreement had regulated the literary language for the 
country by establishing a blend of dialects as a language known as Serbo-Croat or 
Croato-Serb. In 1967, however, Croatians had begun to feel that the standard that 
regulated their language unduly recognized the Serbian dialect. Glenny relates, “Croat 
intellectuals argued that by choosing the Serbian variant as the literary language, the 
Agreement had relegated Croatian to the status of a regional dialect, thus ignoring its rich 
literary history.”114 The Serbs eventually conceded many of the points demanded by the 
Croatians during the dispute, and in return asked for special rights for the Serbs living in 
Croatia.115 Nationalism thus continued to emphasize the differences, real or perceived, 
between two of the groups living in Yugoslavia.
As nationalist feelings continued to grow within Croatia, by 1969 they sparked a 
political outpouring as newspapers began to write critical articles about subjects 
previously considered off-limits. Over the next few years these newspapers, such as 
Hrvatski tjednik (Croatian Weekly), wanted to know why, when the Serbs made up only 
fifteen percent of Croatia’s population, “even in Zagreb, the capital.. .there were 56.5 
Serbs and only 40.8 percent Croats on the city police force in 1971 -”116 Ramet explains 
that as the Croatian renaissance increasingly exhibited anti-Serb overtones, the Serbs 
living in Croatia questioned their own status in the republic as they wondered about the
116
“impact of heightened Croatian national consciousness on their rights of national self- 
expression.”117 The Croatian cultural awakening quickly took on an exclusive character. 
Although the newspapers asked important questions beneficial to all citizens of Croatia, 
by employing anti-Serb sentiment the movement alienated an important minority of the 
population.
Glenny then comments on the awkward nature of questions such as these because:
For the largely rural Serb population in Croatia, numerical supremacy in 
Croatia’s security forces was a guarantee against any resurgence of Ustase 
ideology. For the Croats, it was a permanent reminder that Yugoslavia 
had never escaped its Greater Serbian origins. This conundrum lay at the
heart of Yugoslavia’s national question: the status of Croats as a minority118in Yugoslavia, and of the Serbs as a minority in Croatia.
The problems within Yugoslavia during the early 1970’s demonstrate the extremely 
divisive nature of nationalism, as well as the difficulties in basing a country’s politics on 
national identity. Militant nationalist ideologies that had developed as a result of the 
policies propagated by terrorist leaders such a Pavelic during WWII had convinced the 
people that real and frightening differences existed between them. Thus the existence of 
minority populations, whether in Yugoslavia as a whole or in the Republic of Croatia 
alone became a serious political problem.
Tito responded to the poignant questions being asked in Croatia in particularly 
brutal fashion. As noted earlier, he had never allowed the country to engage in honest 
dialogue about the divisive affects of nationalist ideology during WWII. Similarly, in 
1971 he denounced the Communist leadership of Croatia, declaring that they had lost 
control of the Party. Tito then demanded their resignations and the police and army 
arrested and imprisoned the “ringleaders” in Zagreb. Tito next forced out liberal 
Serbian politicians as well and eventually purged the Communist Party within
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Macedonia. Misha Glenny harshly criticizes Tito’s course of action. Instead of allowing 
the resolution of nationalist problems through a steady democratization of the 
Yugoslavian system, Tito and his closest advisors “were playing Zagreb against 
Belgrade, stirring up animosities in order to consolidate their own authority.” 119 In other 
words, while cracking down on the democratic values and freedom of expression that had 
begun to emerge in Croatia, Tito also exploited nationalist tensions between Serbs and 
Croats to increase his own power. His actions provide yet another example of a leader 
exploiting nationalism as tool for private ends and hidden agendas. Tito used nationalist 
fears as an excuse to rid the Communist party of its most liberal members. As a result, 
his purges in 1971 and 1972 did not lead to the recentralization of political power in the 
government and the Party, but simply the consolidation of authority in the hands of Tito
• 19Hand his small group of trusted advisers. During the remainder of his reign, Tito’s use 
of nationalism to consolidate his own power would not have serious consequences for the 
human rights of the inhabitants of Yugoslavia, but within several decades the long-term 
effects of Tito’s policies would contribute to massive human rights violations.
With the Croatian crisis resolved for the moment, yet another nationalist issue 
arose to challenge the politicians of the country. After much debate, in 1971 the leaders 
of Yugoslavia decided to recognize “Muslim” as a national group on par with the other 
five recognized by governmental policy: the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and 
Montenegrins. While the Republic of Bosnia approved of this policy because it accepted 
the religiocultural heritage of the majority of people within the Republic as sufficient 
basis for national identity, the League of Communists of Macedonia insisted that 
“Muslims who speak Macedonian are Macedonian,” and emphasized that they viewed
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themselves as “Macedonians of Islamic faith.”121 The leaders of Kosovo, officially a 
province within Serbia but one that, during Tito’s reign, enjoyed considerable autonomy, 
also entered the debate. They declared, “Muslim ethnic affiliation cannot be connected 
with this or that republic or spoken language because every citizen, without regard to 
where he or she lives, enjoys the same freedom of expressing her or his national or ethnic
1 99affiliation, which cannot be confused with religious affiliation.” Ramet then explains 
that Kosovo’s position challenged that of Macedonia by contradicting the claim that those 
who spoke the Macedonian language were necessarily ethnic Macedonians and asserted 
instead the right of each individual to choose an ethnic affiliation. Their position allowed 
for the possibility that the inhabitants of Macedonia who spoke a Slavic dialect but 
practiced the Islamic faith might choose to identify themselves as Muslim in the ethnic
1 99sense as opposed to declaring an ethnic identity as Macedonians.
The debate reveals two important aspects of the nature of national or ethnic 
identity. First, there is no fixed upon idea of what determines ones’ national identity. 
Clearly in the Balkans religion, language, and location have all played important roles, 
but when they do not necessarily point to one ethnicity or another, who then makes the 
determination? As we have seen throughout the course of Macedonian history, an 
individual’s subjective choice plays an important role in the decision-making process. At 
the same time, when political power and authority rest, to a certain extent, on issues 
related to the population’s nationality, politicians and military leaders often attempt to 
either force the population into the desired ethnicity, or eliminate them all together. The 
leaders of Macedonia did not, therefore, wish to see a segment of their population able to 
claim a different nationality other than Macedonian. Second, as Ramet points out, “the
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position advanced by each republic -  whether Bosnia, Macedonia, Croatia, or Kosovo -  
is the theory most appropriate to its own conditions. Each unit attempted to impose its 
own theory on the others even though that theory was only appropriate to its own 
republic.”124 In other words, political leaders yet again used the issue of national identity 
to further their own agendas.
The controversy ended when the League of Communists of Yugoslavia declared 
that everyone in Yugoslavia must be free to decide upon their own ethnicity. Ramet 
comments, “This vaguely formulated declaration amounted to a reprimand of Macedonia 
and Croatia and succeeded in brining this particular episode to a close.”125 The LCY 
thus officially endorsed the subjectivity inherent in ethnic identity by declaring that 
anyone could choose to identify himself or herself in whichever way he or she felt most 
comfortable. Objective and external methods for determining ethnic identity simply do 
not exist. Somewhat ironically, once the matter had been concluded, Professor Esad 
Cimic, the first to question openly the idea of “Muslim” as a nationality, left the multi­
ethnic city of Sarajevo, declared himself a Croat, and moved to Zadar, a town located on 
the Croatian coast.126 He thus graphically demonstrated the ability of each individual to 
determine his or her own nationality, as well as the divisive power of nationalism.
Following the Muslim controversy, Titoist nationalities policy recognized six 
different peoples, or nations: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and 
Muslims. The government also acknowledged various groups of “protected nationalities,” 
which included Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Romanians, 
Ruthenes/Ukrainians, Czechs, and Italians. The second group consisted of 2,200,000 
persons, or 10.8 percent of the 1971 population. Although, as noted earlier, the 1946
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Constitution had recognized each republic’s right to secede, the 1974 Constitution, which 
Tito developed following the Croatian crisis, accorded the right of secession to the 
peoples of Yugoslavia, that is to say, to each national group. The 1974 Constitution, 
therefore, did not grant the right to secede to groups such as the Hungarians or the 
Albanians as the government did not consider them as legitimate national groups within 
Yugoslavia.127
Furthermore, the 1974 Constitution did not provide any means of reconciling 
potential conflicts between the “peoples” and the republics. On one hand, the 
constitution suggested that states formed within the territory of Yugoslavia should be 
based on the right of self-determination of the peoples, and hence on their ethnicity or 
national identity. On the other hand, the same constitution attributed sovereignty and 
statehood not to the “Serbs,” “Croats,” and “Macedonians,” but to the six republics, 
regardless of the nationality of their populations. As Tito centralized all political power 
in his own hands, he ruled out the possibility of any outside or federal institution serving 
as an arbiter of the republics’ conflicting demands.128 Thus, in 1980, when Tito died at 
the age of eighty-seven, Glenny relates, “Yugoslavs of all nationalities went into 
demonstrative mourning, barely able to conceive of how their country could govern itself 
without their stem grandfather at the helm.”129 Up until the time of Tito’s death, 
therefore, politics based on nationality had only caused bickering, acrimony, and tensions 
between people and groups of people. The power vacuum created as a result of Tito’s 
shortsighted reliance on the politics of nationalism and governmental structures based on 
the vagaries of national and ethnic identity, however, would have disastrous 
consequences for the human rights of people all across the country of Yugoslavia.
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Conclusion
In spite of the wars, extreme violence, and repeated occurrences of genocide, the 
twentieth century also witnessed the development of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The Declaration attested to the universality of rights that all people deserve 
simply by virtue of their humanity. As concrete testimony of that universality, a huge 
variety of individuals, organizations, cultures, and governments contributed to writing 
and eventually signing the Declaration, thus providing, for the first time, the beginnings 
of an objective definition of universal human rights. In stark contrast, twentieth-century 
politics in the Balkans consistently demonstrated the malleability and subjectivity of 
nationalism. It is thus almost impossible to determine from an outside perspective the 
original nationality or ethnicity of Mother Teresa. It is only possible to state that when 
she was bom, Skopje, the city of her birth was located in the Ottoman Empire.
The vagueness inherent in any definition of nationality means that basing any sort 
of political policy on national identity can cause significant problems. At the same time, 
the vagaries of national identity allow nationalism to serve as a tool for political leaders 
to rally mass support for their own, often secret, agendas. Thus while aspects such as 
language, religion, location, education, cultural traditions, and the existence of an enemy 
all seem to influence the development of a particular national identity, certainly the 
political considerations of leaders also play an incredibly important role. Through a 
focus on all these particulars, the process of developing a specific national identity then 
leads to an emphasis on the vast differences that exist between groups of people. As a 
result, though human rights violations undoubtedly also contribute to national sentiment, 
strong nationalism in the twentieth-century Balkan Peninsula, regardless of its source,
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almost invariably led to human rights violations, and particularly genocide. The 
particularism and divisive effects of nationalism constantly conflict with a universal 
understanding of human rights and serve to hamper those who seek the protection of 
basic rights for all people.
123
NOTES
Lauren, International Human Rights, 74-75.
2Ibid.
3Glenny, The Balkans, 203-304.
4Brailsford, Macedonia, 152.
5Glenny, The Balkans, 203.
6Ibid., 205.
7Ibid., 185-186.
8August Krai, as quoted in ibid., 201.
9Ibid.
10Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 525; and Glenny, The Balkans, 214. 
11 Glenny, The Balkans, 214.
12Ibid., 215.
1 Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 526.
14Enver Pasha, as quoted in ibid.
15Gendarmerie commander, as quoted in Glenny, The Balkans, 216. 
16Glenny, The Balkans, 217.
17Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 527-528.
18Ibid., 528.
19Glenny, The Balkans, 218-219.
20Evtuhov, A History o f Russia, 251-252.
21 James Bourchier, as quoted in Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 532. 
22Glenny, The Balkans, 227-228.
124
23Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 534-535.
24Ibid., 536.
y e
Evtuhov, History o f Russia, 252.
26Intemational Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan 
Wars, The Other Balkan Wars; A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect, with 
an Introduction by George F. Kennan (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1993), 71.
27Glenny, The Balkans, 246.
28Ibid.
29Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 539.
30Glenny, The Balkans, 247.
^  1 • •International Commission, Carnegie Inquiry, 95.
32Ibid.
33Ibid., 148.
34Ibid., 16-19.
Of
Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 539.
International Commission, Carnegie Inquiry, 160.
37Ibid., 164.
38Ibid., 206.
39Glenny, The Balkans, 312.
40Ibid., 333.
41Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 561.
42Glenny, The Balkans, 335.
43Lauren, International Human Rights, 87.
125
44Glenny, The Balkans, 326-21.
45Lauren, International Human Rights, 86.
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
48Glenny, The Balkans, 355-356.
49Lauren, International Human Rights, 93-94.
50Woodrow Wilson, “The Fourteen Points,” delivered in Joint Session, January 8, 
1918, The World War I  Document Archive, accessed from 
http://www.lib,bvu. edu/~rdh/wwi/1918/14points. html on February 1, 2004.
51 Lauren, International Human Rights, 93-94.
52Charles Jelavic, “Nikola P. Pasic: Greater Serbia or Jugoslavia,” Journal o f 
Central European Affairs, 11 No. 2 (July, 1951), 138-139.
53Glenny, The Balkans, 366.
54President Woodrow Wilson, as quoted in Lauren, International Human Rights,
94-95.
55Lauren, International Human Rights, 95.
56Minority Treaties, as quoted in ibid.
57Robert J. Kemer, “Yugoslavia and the Peace Conference,” in Robert J. Kemer 
ed., Yugoslavia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), 103.
58Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 579.
59Malbone W. Graham, “Constitutional Development, 1914-1941,” in Kemer, 
Yugoslavia, 123-124.
60Stratis Myrivilis, as quoted in Danforth, Macedonian Conflict, 65.
61Danforth, Macedonian Conflict, 65.
62Graham, “Constitutional Development,” 125-127.
63Ibid.
126
64Danforth, Macedonian Conflict, 65.
65Stoyan Pribichevich, Macedonia: Its People and History (University Park, PA: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982), 138.
66Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, 47.
67Ibid.
z o  ,
Elizabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London and 
New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), 38.
69Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, 46.
70Ibid., 51-52.
71 •Pribichevich, Macedonia, 139.
72Barker, Macedonia, 38, 45; Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, 
52; and ibid., 141.
Pribichevich, Macedonia, 143.
74Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, 614-615.
75Ibid., 615.
76Ibid.
77Graham, “Constitutional Development,” 130-132.
78Glenny, The Balkans, 423.
79Ibid., 474-476.
80Wayne S. Vucinich, “The Second World War and Beyond,” in Kemer, 
Yugoslavia, 356-357.
81Glenny, The Balkans, 486-489.
82Cetnik Manifesto, as quoted in ibid., 489.
83Glenny, The Balkans, 486, 529.
84Ibid., 486-487.
127
85Vucinich, “The Second World War,” 363-364.
o r
Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia, 98, 108.
87Ibid., 108.
88Ibid., 109.
89Ibid.
9<X>anforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 56.
91Vucinich, “The Second World War,” 366.
1943 Jajce Resolution, as quoted in Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in 
Macedonia, 117.
93Glenny, The Balkans, 530-531.
94Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story o f the War in Bosnia 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 57.
95Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 50.
96Vucinich, “The Second World War,” 383.
97Constitution of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, in Kemer, 
Yugoslavia, 487-491.
QO
Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 67.
"ibid., 65.
100Ibid., 66-67.
101Ibid.
1
Lauren, International Human Rights, 217-237.
103Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as quoted in ibid., 299.
104Ibid., 300.
105Ibid., 300-303.
128
106Ibid., 301.
107Glenny, The Balkans, 533-535.
108Ibid., 535.
Thomas T. Hammond, “Foreign Relations since 1945,” in Robert F. Byrnes,
ed., East Central Europe Under the Communists: Yugoslavia (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1957), 28.
110Glenny, The Balkans, 570.
11 Garnet, Nationalism and Federalism, 54-55, 187.
112Ibid., 51-52.
113Ibid., 99, 101.
114Glenny, The Balkans, 585.
115Ibid.
U6Hrvatski tjednik, as quoted in ibid., 591.
117Ramet Nationalism and Federalism, 111-110.
118Glenny, The Balkans, 591.
119Ibid., 592-593; and Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 134.
120Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation o f Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a 
Multinational State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 69.
12 league  of Communists of Macedonia, as quoted in Ramet, Nationalism and 
Federalism, 182; and Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 180-182.
Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 182-183.
123ibid.
124Ibid., 183.
125Ibid.
126Ibid.
129
127Ibid., 55, 73.
1 9 8  •Pavkovic, Fragmentation o f Yugoslavia, 72-73. 
129Glenny, The Balkans, 622.
130
Chapter III
Achieving Independence, 1980 -  1995
Even after we had come to Macedonia, there was no rest for this body o f ours. Far from 
it; we were beset by hardship on all sides, there were quarrels all around us and 
misgivings within us.
-2 Corinthians 7:5
Just as the twentieth century began with violent wars in the Balkans, the last years 
of the millennium also witnessed extreme violence in the region. Undoubtedly, 
nationalism played an important role in the human rights violations that occurred during 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which, incidentally, was one of the few states that had 
elected in 1948 not to sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The new and 
independent country of the Republic of Macedonia would emerge unscathed by war from 
the ashes of Yugoslavia, but would face considerable challenges regarding both 
nationalism and the protection of human rights in the first years of its existence.
The key to understanding Macedonia’s independence and, of course, more recent 
history, lies in the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. At Josip Broz Tito’s funeral in 1980, 
many present debated the future stability of Yugoslavia without Tito’s authoritative 
leadership. Balkan historian Misha Glenny explains that many articles in the Western 
press predicted the imminent likelihood of civil war and the resulting demise of 
Yugoslavia. Their views, however, ignored the important Cold War position of 
Yugoslavia, as both NATO and the Soviet Union benefited from an intact and stable 
Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the institution of the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) served to 
unite the various republics, and the communist leaders of the six states remained unified 
in their fight against liberalism.1 At the same time, Tito left a confusing political legacy.
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As noted in Chapter 2, the 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution did not provide a way to 
reconcile differences either between the six republics or between the conflicting ideas of 
“peoples” and states. Although Tito feared nationalism and, following the conclusion of 
WWn, had attempted to repress all memories of the nationalist violence that had 
occurred, he had, ironically, created a state in which nationalism played a prominent role. 
As Slovenian journalist Miha Kovac explained, “You could be active within the existing 
political structure only on the basis of defending the interests of your republic or
•j
province... .Nationalism is produced within the very structure of the Yugoslav system.” 
Although the post-Tito Yugoslavian government avoided any major crises in the 
years immediately following his death, the system that he had created began to show 
signs of strain. In 1981 the Albanians in Kosovo, an autonomous province technically 
within Serbia, revolted and demanded equal status with the other six republics. Although 
the federal government forcibly repressed their demands, the event set off alarm bells in 
Macedonia, which also contained a large minority of ethnic Albanians. At the same time 
the wealthier republics, Croatia and Slovenia, began to resent the government’s 
redistribution of wealth in favor of the poorer regions of Yugoslavia. In addition, the 
massive corruption within the government, high unemployment levels, and persistent 
strikes led Glenny to state, “Yugoslavia’s government was under siege in the mid-1980’s 
from its constituent parts,” and yet support from both the West as well as the Federal 
Army allowed the country to continue to function. In spite of all the problems, Glenny 
concludes, “In the absence of overt nationalist agitation, the majority of Slovenes, Serbs, 
and Croats had no reason to bring down the federation.”4 The rise to power of Slobodan 
Milosevic, however, provided exactly that nationalist agitation.
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The Break-Up of Yugoslavia
In the mid 1980’s Milosevic was elected as the president of the Serbian League of 
Communists. From this position, he began to challenge the Titoist system by provoking 
and promoting Serbian nationalism with the conscious intent of using nationalism as a 
means to achieve and consolidate his own personal power.5 Glenny explains that 
beginning in 1987 Milosevic played on the fears created by the earlier Albanian 
demonstrations in Kosovo to provoke Serbian nationalism among Serbs living within the 
province. In 1989 he used the pretext of concern for the Serbian population to embark on 
what he termed an “anti-bureaucratic” revolution, which effectively rescinded Kosovo’s 
autonomous status and incorporated the province completely within the Serbian 
Republic. His actions stemmed not from concerns for the Serb populations within 
Kosovo or even his own feelings of nationalism. Instead, Yugoslavia’s cumbersome 
federal structure provided for the government to be headed by an eight-member Federal 
Presidency, with representatives from each of the six republics as well as the two 
autonomous provinces. As a result, the other republics could outvote Serbia on any issue. 
Ending the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, the second autonomous province, 
allowed Milosevic to control three of the votes within the Presidency, and thus outvote 
the other republics. Once he had completed his political maneuvering, Milosevic 
completely lost interest in the state of affairs within Kosovo, and turned his attention to 
tensions with the Croatian Republic.6 Milosevic, like many other leaders before him, 
used and manipulated nationalism to serve his own private purposes.
At almost exactly the same time that Milosevic rescinded Kosovo’s autonomy, the 
Cold War ended with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. As a result, in January of 1990 the
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Communist Party of Yugoslavia disbanded, bringing a final end to the fragile Titoist 
system. Elections were then scheduled for April and May in Slovenia and Croatia to 
form the first post-Communist governments of those republics. Within Croatia, the 
nationalist leader and former general, Franjo Tudjman, followed a course of action 
similar to that of Milosevic. In order to quickly build a power base, Tudjman developed 
a platform of Croatian nationalism that recalled the events of World War II, when the 
Croatian Ustase had conducted a campaign of genocide against the Serbs. During the 
election campaign Tudjman capitalized on many of the powerful symbols from that era as 
he adopted the “chessboard pattern” red and white flag of the Ustase state.
Anthropologist Bette Denich relates that the choice of that symbol, “served 
simultaneously to erase the regional distinctions among Croats and to emphasize the 
exclusion of those who associated that symbol with fascism and genocide.”7
Tudjman’s actions reveal several important aspects of nationalism in general.
First, the manipulation of Ustase symbols emphasized the particular, exclusive, divisive 
nature of nationalism. Second, the Ustase mythology provided an enemy, namely the 
Serbian minority within Croatia, to aid in the rallying of Croatians to the nationalist 
cause. Third, it is important to note that in the 1990’s most nationalists emphasized the 
divisions that had existed between the people during the World War II era. Particularly 
regarding the tensions between the Croatians and Serbians, the nationalists’ focus on the 
hostilities and abuses that occurred in the middle of the twentieth century further suggests 
a lack of “ancient ethnic hatreds.” Finally, as has happened throughout Balkan history, 
the growth of exclusive Croatian nationalism sparked a nationalist response from the 
Serbs living within Croatia. Denich explains, “Serbs in Croatia started to hold mass
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rallies and organized a nationalist party to oppose the degradation of their constitutional
o
status within Croatia.”
The elections that followed the collapse of Communism thus brought ethnically- 
based parties to power in Croatia, Serbia, and all the other republics except for 
Macedonia, the only republic to exit Yugoslavia peacefully, a topic that will be returned 
to shortly. Regarding the elections, the last American Ambassador to Yugoslavia,
Warren Zimmerman, commented, “By bringing nationalism to power almost everywhere, 
the elections helped snuff out the very flame of democracy that they had kindled. 
Nationalism is by nature uncivil, anti-democratic, and separatist because it empowers one 
ethnic group over all others.”9 Watching the actions of nationalists such as Milosevic and 
Tudjman, it is no surprise that Zimmerman harshly criticized the effects of divisive 
nationalism and viewed it as fundamentally opposed to democratic practices. Before too 
long, those nationalist leaders he had criticized would plunge the country into a war that 
entailed some of the worst human rights violations Europe had suffered since WWII.
Following the elections, Milosevic also gained control of the JNA. With his 
nationalist rhetoric, he threatened to use the army in order to further the cause of all Serbs 
living outside Serbia, especially in Croatia and Kosovo. Journalists Laura Silber and 
Allan Little explain that Milosevic “was able to present the other nations in Yugoslavia 
with a simple sinister choice: either stay in Yugoslavia on my terms, or fight a war 
against one of the largest armies in Europe.”10 Slovenia, the most homogenous as well as 
the wealthiest state took on the challenge. After a referendum in which the population 
voted for autonomy, Slovenia declared its independence from Yugoslavia. A short war 
ensued with relatively minor casualties before Milosevic allowed Slovenia to depart from
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the federation so that he could focus his energies elsewhere. When Croatia followed 
Slovenia’s lead and declared independence, war ensued between the two republics over 
the status of their borders. Allowing Croatia to become an independent country, with the 
same borders that the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia had enjoyed, would have meant 
creating a substantial Serbian minority within the new state. Ostensibly to protect the 
rights of those Serbs living within Croatia, Milosevic contested the boundaries that would 
encompass the two states, and war began between Croatia and Serbia.
The outbreak of more sustained fighting placed the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia 
in a very delicate position. Zimmerman explains that before the war began, Muslims, 
Catholics, and those practicing the Orthodox faith had coexisted fairly peacefully. In 
fact, he notes that Bosnia boasted the highest percentages of ethnically mixed marriages 
out of all the republics. In an effort to bolster their claims for the territory of Bosnia, 
however, Milosevic and Tudjman claimed that Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats should 
live apart from Muslims. Their focus on divisive nationalism laid, in the words of 
Zimmerman, “the philosophical groundwork for a separate Muslim entity.”11 Once again 
particular and exclusive nationalism provoked a nationalist response. Bosnia thus 
declared its own independence and a vicious, three-way war began among the various 
groups that had previously lived together peacefully within the federal structure of 
Yugoslavia.
The war quickly claimed the lives of both civilians and combatants, brutally 
destroyed homes and villages, and created a large number of refugees. Following a 
pattern set in the early part of the century during the First and Second Balkan Wars,
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nationalist leaders worked to rally the populations behind their war aims. Glenny
explains that those leaders,
sought to instill fear less in “enemy” ranks than in their community. If 
ordinary Serbs believed that the Ustase were about to return, or if the 
Croats in the mixed areas of Croatia could be convinced that their 
neighbors were preparing for a Cetnik onslaught, then it would be much 
easier to mobilize them for war, according to the principle “kill before you 
are killed.”12
Just as the nationalism of the earlier Balkan wars had resulted in extremely bloody 
conflicts and loss of civilian life, the nationalist leaders’ use of propaganda resulted in a 
similar pattern of events in this more recent Balkan conflict.
After Bosnia had declared its independence, nationalist Serbian leaders within 
Bosnia, with the backing of Milosevic and the JNA, declared their own Serbian mini­
state within Bosnia. It is interesting to note that the man who became the political leader 
of this mini-state, Radovan Karadzic, did not begin his political career as a nationalist, or 
even as a Marxist. Instead, after the collapse of the Titoist system Karadzic attempted to 
found Bosnia’s first Green Party. When environmental issues failed to provide a
powerful rallying cry, he, like many other leaders before and since, only then turned to
• 1 ^  nationalism as a way to further his personal ambition. Under Karadzic’s leadership,
military figures attempted to physically carve an “ethnically pure” Serbian state out of the
remains of Bosnia. Towards that end, they waged war on the Bosnian defense forces as
well as against Muslim civilians.
Journalist Samantha Power cautions against viewing the large number of resulting
refugees as a simple by-product of war. Instead, she writes:
[T]he purging of non-Serbs was not only an explicit war aim of the Serb 
nationalists; it was their primary aim. Serb gunmen knew that their 
violent deportation and killing campaign would not be enough to ensure
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the lasting achievement of ethnic purity. The armed marauders sought to 
sever permanently the bond between citizens and the land.. .Theirs was a 
deliberate policy of destruction and degradation.14
Exclusive, particular nationalism that played on the people’s fears, thus led not only to
war but also to grave human rights abuses. It is important to note at this point that,
although all three sides engaged in war, the evidence agrees that the Serbian military
forces committed the vast majority of these abuses.15
As war and violence continued to escalate within Yugoslavia, the outside world
struggled to find a response. Led by Germany, the European Community recognized
Croatia as an independent state in 1991. By spring of 1992, all three breakaway republics
had won international recognition from Europe, America, and the United Nations,
thereby changing the conflict from a civil war to an international war. Thus, before new
international boundaries had been established, the areas of Bosnia and Croatia began to
be referred to in general as simply “the former Yugoslavia.” The international
community responded to the situation with a variety of attempts to stem the tide of
violence. Various mediators proposed peace-plans, which the participants then ignored.
In a move that would become important for Macedonia, the United Nations imposed
sanctions against Yugoslavia in an effort to coerce Milosevic and the other belligerents
into ending the conflict. In addition, UN peacekeepers deployed to various parts of the
former Yugoslavia. Although none of these polices showed any signs of bringing the
war to an end, within the U.S. various politicians argued against any forceful American
action to end the hostilities. Authorities such as George Kennan and George Bush’s
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger cited the existence of “ancient ethnic hatreds,”
as a justification for this American policy of inaction.16
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According to many journalists, even Bill Clinton fell under the spell of the 
“ancient ethnic hatreds” idea after reading Robert Kaplan’s book, Balkan Ghosts: A 
Journey Through History}1 Kaplan portrays the Balkans as a region steeped in hatred 
and violence and in fact opens the book with the astounding and unsubstantiated claim: 
“Nazism, for instance, can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a 
breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, Hitler learned
j o  •
how to hate so infectiously.” How then is it possible to reconcile the views of those 
who believe that “ancient ethnic hatreds” have colored the Balkans for centuries with the 
evidence against the theory amassed in this thesis? Several factors both help to account 
for the difference in views and shed light on the dangerous nature of nationalism.
We have seen that various leaders throughout the course of Balkan history have 
manipulated nationalism to serve their own agendas. Regarding the conflict in the early 
1990’s, Bosnian historian Noel Malcolm explains that the leaders who terrorized Bosnia 
during the war actively propagated the myth of ancient enmity. They “wanted the world 
to believe that what they and their gunmen were doing was done not by them, but by the 
impersonal and inevitable historical forces beyond anyone’s control.”19 U.S. 
policymakers who preferred a course of American inaction in the Balkans, for whatever 
their own personal reasons, could then grasp the logic of “ancient ethnic hatreds” as a 
convenient excuse. In addition, as Balkan leaders such as Milosevic and Tudjman 
manipulated nationalism to serve their own quests for power, part of their nationalist 
rhetoric involved convincing the people that the current enemy had always been an 
enemy. Glenny observed a similar pattern during the Second Balkan War, as was
139
discussed in Chapter 2. Thus rather than exploring historical evidence, politicians as well 
as journalists such as Kaplan, took the current rhetoric about history as historical fact.
It is telling that, in contrast with figures such as Kaplan and Kennan, much of the 
analysis that has emerged since the onset of the war places the blame for the violence not 
with the bloodthirsty populations at large, but rather with the leaders. For example, in 
1992 Warren Zimmerman wrote in a confidential cable to Secretary of State James 
Baker, “Historians can argue about the role of the individual in history. I have no doubt 
that if Milosevic’s parents had committed suicide before his birth rather than after, I 
would not be writing a cable about the death of Yugoslavia. Milosevic, more than
9 0anyone else, is its gravedigger.” Historian Dennison Rusinow agreed with
Zimmerman’s sentiment, only expanding slightly to note:
Yugoslavia disintegrated primarily because of megalomaniac and ruthless 
demagogic politicians (most of them ex- or pseudo ex-Communists) and 
nationalist intellectuals (often, also ex-Communists) who discovered that 
nationalism was a more potent tool to mobilize support and to gain or 
retain power than Marxism had ever been.21
Nationalism can easily serve as a powerful tool for the power hungry, and that
nationalism can then so quickly lead to gross abuses of human rights.
War, however, and the commission of human rights abuses clearly engulfed a
large number of people within Yugoslavia. The question then becomes why, if the
people did not nurse ancient grievances against other ethnic groups, did so many permit
and participate in the violence. Ambassador Zimmerman speaks to that issue, noting,
“The breakup of Yugoslavia is a classic example of nationalism from the top down -  a
manipulated nationalism in a region where peace has historically prevailed more than
99war.” The nationalist leaders thus used symbols, such as the Ustase flag, to instill fear
140
in the people and convince them, as discussed earlier, of the need for violence.
Furthermore, an important part of this process involved the manipulation of the media in
order to propagate the nationalist message the leaders desired. Glenny explains:
Television played a seminal role in preparing people not just for war but 
for the spiral of massacre that was to come. Day after day RTV Belgrade 
and Croatian Television (HTV) emitted images of atrocity, while historical 
documentaries and movies about the Second World War romanticized 
each nation’s soldiery.. ..[0]ne friend from Belgrade described RTV 
Serbia and HTV as the two greatest war criminals of them all.
Following a similar pattern as that of the propaganda machines during the Second Balkan
War, nationalist leaders manipulated the media to instill violent feelings and fear in their
populations.
Lest the comparisons between the Second Balkan war and the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia be taken as evidence that in fact the Balkan people have nursed grievances 
against one another for at least a century, it is important to point out that while the 
process is the same, the people involved differed completely. During the Second Balkan 
War, the propaganda devices created enmity between Greeks and Bulgarians, not 
between Serbs and Croatians. As further testimony to the recent nature of the tensions 
between the latter two groups, Glenny again points to the World War II era as the source 
of most of the images of violence broadcast on television. Tito’s repression of the events 
following those conflicts, so that no comprehensive and truthful version of the facts 
emerged, in some ways allowed later leaders to manipulate those same events for their 
own ends. These twin issues of the responsibility of individuals and the importance of 
establishing a truthful historical record of events will be returned to at the end of the 
chapter.
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Macedonian Independence
Before the war in the former Yugoslavia had come to an end, one republic, 
Macedonia, managed to declare its independence and establish itself as a full-fledged 
member of the international community without resorting to violence. On the eve of the 
collapse of Communism, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia contained a population of 
mostly ethnic Slav Macedonians with a substantial minority of ethnic Albanians, along 
with a considerable number of other, smaller, minority groups. Albanian demands within 
Kosovo concerned Macedonian leaders, as they feared the growing discontent of 
Albanians within Macedonia. These officials worried that radical elements within 
Kosovo would create instability and undermine authority inside Macedonia.24
When the Yugoslav Communist Party disbanded in 1990, ethnic groups within 
Macedonia scrambled to form political parties, just as they had in Croatia. A variety of 
both Albanian and Macedonian nationalist parties quickly sprang up. One Macedonian 
group, following the pattern of exploiting symbols and events from the past to strengthen 
a nationalist platform, adopted the name of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization -  Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNU).25 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the original VMRO had served as a terrorist organization 
ostensibly dedicated to the formation of a “free” Macedonia. As evidence of the 
particularist nature of these ethnically based political parties, Henryk J. Sokalski, the man 
who would later lead a UN mission in Macedonia, explains, “Few or no ethnic Albanians, 
Turks, Roma (Gypsies) or Serbs have joined ethnic Macedonian parties and vice versa.
In their efforts to gain public support most Macedonian political parties have given
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priority to ethnic interests, contributing to the growing nationalism of all ethnic groups in 
the country.”26
In contrast to the situation in Croatia and Serbia, however, in Macedonia no single 
party won a clear majority of seats in the parliament, even after three rounds of voting. 
Although VMRO had won the largest number of seats, 38 out of 120, various coalition 
governments proved short-lived. Finally, in January of 1991 the parliament elected the 
former Communist, Kiro Gligorov, as president, and in March he formed a cabinet of 
non-party experts. Regarding the character of the new government, historian Aleksandar 
Pavkovic remarks, “The failure of the nationalist parties to win outright control of the 
government and the inclusion of Albanian party leaders in successive Macedonian 
governments probably prevented the escalation of inter party conflict into an inter ethnic
• 9 7conflict.” If politics based on nationalism led to war in the other parts of Yugoslavia, 
then politics within Macedonia that escaped somewhat from the narrow confines of 
nationalist rhetoric contributed to the republic’s peaceful transition to independence.
Originally the new president and government of Macedonia had not supported the 
nationalist parties’ demands to proclaim independence from Yugoslavia. Once the 
fighting escalated in Croatia in 1991, however, the Macedonian government decided to 
hold a referendum on independence. Anthropologist Loring Danforth points out that 
during the referendum not only did citizens of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia vote 
on independence, but people who identified themselves as Macedonians, regardless of 
their country of origin or residence, also participated, albeit unofficially, in the process. 
Danforth writes, “The extension of the right to vote -  even unofficially -  to Macedonians 
who were not citizens of the republic reveals a blurring of the distinction between two
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crucial categories, citizens of the Macedonian state, on the one hand, and members of the 
Macedonian nation, on the other.”28 While citizenship within Macedonia proves a 
relatively easy category to describe objectively, as has already been discussed, much 
more subjective factors determine national identity. In fact, it seems that within the 
Balkans there is little to no difference between an “ethnic identity,” or one that is 
associated with a specific ethnic group, and a “national identity,” which is related to a 
particular “nation.” The ethnic group and the nation usually refer to the same concept, 
although the concept itself is vague and subjective.
Following the referendum in which the voters indicated their desire for 
independence, the Gligorov government proclaimed the country a sovereign and
9 Qindependent state and successfully negotiated the peaceful withdrawal of JNA forces.
In 1991 the city of Skopje thus changed hands yet again, this time serving as the capital 
of the independent Republic of Macedonia + (see Map 5 on page 145). One year after 
Mother Teresa had celebrated her eightieth birthday, her birthplace entered the 
jurisdiction of yet another new state. As leaders within Macedonia began to write a 
constitution and define the nature of the new state, they continued to struggle with the 
differences between national identity and identity based on citizenship. The preamble to 
the constitution referred to both the Krusevo Republic and the decisions of the AVNOJ, 
discussed in Chapter 2, thus demonstrating again the importance of symbols and 
establishing a historical continuity in the nationalist process of forming a new state. 
Furthermore, the preamble provided a privileged position for members of the
+The name of the new country ignited a fierce debate with Greece and, consequently, elicited 
much international attention. The tensions with Greece over the name “Macedonia” will be dealt with 
shortly. In the mean time, and for convenience sake, the terms “Macedonia” and the “Republic of 
Macedonia” are used interchangeably to refer to the newly independent country. The choice of words does 
not imply any conscious political stance.
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Macedonian nation. It states, “Macedonia is established as a national state of the 
Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with 
the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics+ and other 
nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia.”30 The preamble thus proclaimed 
Macedonia first and foremost as the state of the Macedonian people, and only after that as 
the state for all other minority groups.
Similarly, Article 7 of the constitution established the Macedonian language as 
the official language of the Republic of Macedonia. The article then allowed the 
mechanisms of local self-government in areas dominated by inhabitants of a “nationality” 
to use their own language in addition to the Macedonian language. Regarding education, 
Article 48 allowed members of nationalities “the right to instruction in their
language.. .[but] in schools where education is carried out in the language of a
•   ̂1nationality, the Macedonian language is also studied.” The constitution thus followed 
the pattern established by Yugoslavia, in which one predominant “nation” enjoyed a 
higher status and greater benefits than other groups of “nationalities” living within the 
country.
Unsurprisingly, the minority groups within the country objected to many aspects 
of the constitution. A policy analyst for the Balkans relates, “Opposition to the definition 
of the state articulated in the preamble was evident from the outset.”32 The Albanians 
rejected their secondary status, behind that of Macedonians, while Serbian leaders felt 
their group deserved a more official minority status on par with the other groups. By its 
emphasis on the national distinctions between the peoples, the constitution exacerbated
+Although many different terms are used to officially designate the group unofficially referred to 
as the “Gypsies,” the word “Roma” will be used throughout this thesis except for where it occurs in direct 
quotations.
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the tensions and differences that existed between the various groups living within 
Macedonia. The constitution thus provides one more example of the way in which a 
reliance on politics based on nationalism can cause a multitude of problems.
In addition to the politics of particularist nationalism, however, the leaders of 
Macedonia also emphasized a more universal conception of the human rights deserving 
to all the people within Macedonia. In September of 1991 the newly elected National 
Assembly of Macedonia declared, “The Republic of Macedonia, as a sovereign and 
independent state, shall strive for persistent respect of the generally adopted principles of 
international relations contained in the documents of the United Nations, the Final 
Document of CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] from Helsinki 
and the Paris Charter.” The Helsinki document had come about when a large number of 
states met at the CSCE in 1975. The participants at the conference recognized the 
important connections between security among states and the respect for human the rights 
of individuals. The resulting Helsinki Final Act not only referred to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by name, but also, as human rights expert Paul Lauren 
explains, “it contained very explicit language recognizing ‘the universal significance’ of 
human rights.”34 By referring to the Helsinki Final Act in their declaration of 
sovereignty, the leaders of Macedonia pledged to uphold the universal human rights of all 
people within the country. In addition, in spite of the rhetoric of nationalism in the 
preamble to the constitution, the preamble also declared the importance of “the
1 c
guaranteeing of human rights, citizens’ freedoms and ethnic equality.”
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The government matched actions to rhetoric as Macedonia acceded to all major
international instruments created to promote the protection of human rights.
Furthermore, as Sokalski reports:
[T]he National Assembly has built a comprehensive legislative network to 
comply with the provisions of the International Covenants on Human 
Rights and other binding international standards. By virtue of the 
constitution, international agreements duly ratified -  including human 
rights instruments -  have permanently become incorporated into the 
domestic legal order, immune from acts of Parliament.36
In addition to testifying to the universal nature of human rights, the Macedonian
legislation regarding international protection of human rights speaks to the objective
nature of those rights. Since the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948, a vast number of organizations, institutions, and binding international documents
have all focused on the universal aspect of human rights. That these independent and
international bodies can make laws for the people of Macedonia, laws that even their own
Parliament cannot challenge, suggests that these rights exist outside of and independent
of specific cultural practices and norms. Part of the justification for this universalism
stems from the idea that, in the words of Sokalski, “gross violations of human rights go
hand-in-hand with situations that may threaten the peace and security and are likely to
degenerate into confrontation.”37 In addition to Macedonia’s avoidance of excessive
nationalism in the government, her promotion of universal human rights perhaps
contributed to her successful and non-violent bid for independence. Nevertheless, in
addition to troubles created by the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, the particularist
nationalism in the Macedonian Constitution and Government would continue to create
problems both internally and externally for the fledgling state.
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External Problems Resulting from Macedonian Independence
Upon declaring independence in 1991, Macedonia immediately faced significant 
problems in gaining international recognition. The constitutional emphasis on the 
connection between the Macedonian nation and the newly established Macedonian state 
created difficulties with those countries whose populations included a Macedonian 
minority. Greece and Bulgaria both protested against the establishment of an independent 
Macedonia because, as was discussed in Chapter 2, they had incorporated portions of 
Ottoman Macedonia into their states. Greece and Bulgaria feared that Macedonian 
leaders hoped to expand their territorial boundaries to encompass all the regions in which 
they could claim that Macedonians comprised the majority of the population. The 
Macedonian Constitution in some ways helped foster this belief as Article 49 stated, “The 
Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian
TO
people m neighboring countries.” In contrast to promoting the universal human nghts 
of everyone within the state, Article 49 promised to look after the interests of specifically 
Macedonian people, wherever they might live. Thus, Glenny explains, “The Slav 
Macedonians, poor and small in number, have been branded as ruthless expansionists by 
three of their four neighbors, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece.”39
Perhaps in part to counter possible Macedonian claims to the Bulgarian territory 
inhabited by Macedonians, the Bulgarian Government refused to admit the existence of 
any Macedonian minority, asserting instead the Bulgarian nationality of the entire 
population. Glenny explains, however, “You may find many areas, both in Macedonia 
and Bulgaria where the peasants do not really know whether they are Macedonians or 
Bulgarians (and in some places they think they may be Serbs).”40 The situation in late
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twentieth-century Macedonia thus appears strikingly similar to that of the early twentieth 
century. Ethnic or national identity is a subjective and confusing category, certainly 
difficult to determine from an outside and objective perspective. Nevertheless, 
politicians do not hesitate to claim the existence of a particular ethnicity in order to 
bolster support for their political goals. In spite of the tension regarding minority issues, 
in 1991 Bulgaria became the first country to recognize Macedonia’s independence. 
Significantly, though, Bulgaria recognized Macedonia only as a state and refused to 
admit the existence of a separate Macedonian nation.41
In contrast with Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) refused to recognize Macedonia until 1996, preferring instead to view the 
border between the two states as simply administrative 42 In 1991 Milosevic even put 
forward a proposal to dismember the country and partition it with Greece. The Bulgarian 
and Greek leaders, however, rejected Milosevic’s proposition. Nevertheless, reliable 
sources within Macedonia continuously warned of the possibility that Milosevic would 
attack the new country. And, indeed, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had attacked 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia upon each republic’s declaration of independence. 
Furthermore, within Serbia leaders began to call for the protection of the rights of the 
Serbian minority within Macedonia 43 Rather than a concern for the rights of the Serbs, 
however, nationalist leaders in Serbia used the situation in order to provide a possible 
excuse for their southward expansion.44 The situation thus further demonstrates the 
dangers of a policy that promotes the rights of a particular group of people, rather than an 
appreciation of the universal rights that all people deserve, regardless of their nationality.
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In addition, before Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, Serbia had served as 
Macedonia’s largest trading partner. Although not yet a UN member in 1992, Macedonia 
agreed to support the UN sanctions levied against Yugoslavia in an attempt to bring the 
war there to an end. As a result of ending trade with Serbia, Macedonia lost 
approximately $1.8 billion in revenue, a deficit that hurt the small country deeply.45 The 
sanctions caused the beginning of an economic crisis within Macedonia, which then 
placed further strain on tensions between ethnic groups. Historian Gus Xhudo comments, 
“The worsening economic crisis will not bode well for its ethnic minorities who are 
already causing unrest.”46 Xhudo thus links economic problems with the existence of 
nationalist agitation, providing further evidence for the idea that the lack of stability and 
economic distress contribute to the rise of nationalism. The link between the two has 
been a standard part of the development of Balkan nationalism since the decay of the 
Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century.
In spite of political tensions, a high degree of cultural affinity existed between the 
Macedonian and Serbian populations. Sokalski explains, “Much of Macedonia’s 
intelligentsia graduated from leading Yugoslav universities. Their common Slavic 
background and religious tradition in the Orthodox Church, numerous intermarriages, and 
very close ties in all walks of life throughout the federation’s existence have left a lasting 
imprint of their own.”47 In spite of all these cultural similarities, in 1967 Macedonians 
had followed a Balkan precedent of establishing a national church, and unilaterally 
declared the existence of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church. The Serbian 
Patriarchate insisted, and in fact continues to insist, that Macedonians are Serbs and 
therefore the Macedonian Church has no reason for existence. In addition, since the
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break-up of Yugoslavia, the Belgrade-based head of the Serbian Orthodox Church has
declared that all churches and monasteries built prior to 1967 within Macedonia actually
belong to the Serbian Church.48
The tensions between the two churches graphically demonstrate the divisive
nature of nationalism. In spite of the vast number of similarities between the two groups
of people, the nationalist emphasis on establishing a separate and distinct church created
divisions between the two groups of people. Furthermore, the rhetoric from both sides
demonstrates the way in which nationalism serves as a tool to disguise ulterior motives,
as each side’s position on the existence of a Macedonian Orthodox Church depended on
their political goals. Finally, the example reveals the continued vagaries and
subjectivities of national identity as Serbian leaders once again made the claim, as they
had during the interwar period, that Macedonians were really Serbs.
If relations between Macedonia and Serbia proved difficult, those with Greece
quickly became far worse. Shortly after declaring its independence, Macedonia appealed
to the European Community (EC) for recognition. It is important to point out that
Macedonia sought recognition from other countries and international organizations not
simply for the practical benefits, although those considerations undoubtedly also played a
role, but also for psychological reasons. Danforth explains:
[I]dentity involves both self-ascription and ascription by others. This is 
just as true for states as it is for individuals. In order to establish its 
identity as the Republic o f Macedonia, it is not enough for this Former 
Yugoslav Republic to declare its independence under that name; it must 
also be recognized under that name by other states and by major 
international organizations as well. Only in that way will its identity be 
legitimated in the world of international affairs.49
152
The process of ascription by “others” that Danforth describes serves as an important 
corollary to the subjective nature of national identity. The evidence clearly demonstrates 
that a person’s own imagination plays a crucial role in determining his or her identity. 
What happens, however, when a person’s decision regarding how to identify him or 
herself does not agree with an outsider’s determination? We have seen that in 
Macedonia, outside actors’ attempts to impose an identity on Macedonians not only 
contributed to their own development of their identities as something different and 
unique, but also caused many political problems for the territory in general. Modem 
Macedonia would continue to experience similar problems due to the attitudes of her 
neighbors.
When Macedonia appealed to the EC for recognition, Greece, as a member of the 
EC, lobbied against the request. Part of the dispute stemmed from Greece’s belief that 
Macedonian leaders wanted to annex part of northern Greece. Because of Greece’s 
strenuous objection to Article 49 of the Macedonian Constitution, Macedonian leaders 
drafted two amendments that stressed Macedonia’s peaceful intentions and desire to 
remain within established borders. Furthermore, President Gligorov even offered to join 
Greece in signing a bilateral agreement attesting to the permanence of their shared 
international border. An EC Arbitration Commission, created in order to investigate the 
possibility of recognizing the former Yugoslav republics, advised the EC that Macedonia 
had fully complied with all EC guidelines. Nevertheless, as a result of Greek pressure, 
the EC ignored the recommendations of its own Arbitration Commission and decided not 
to grant recognition to Macedonia.50
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Following the EC rejection, the Republic of Macedonia then set its sights on the 
United Nations. When France proposed that the UN admit Macedonia under the 
provisional name, “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM), both sides 
agreed to compromise and postponed the decision of an official name for the country.
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia thus became an official member of the 
United Nations, seated alphabetically in the General Assembly under the letter “T.” One 
year later, in December 1993, the EC finally followed suit and recognized the Republic as 
well.51
In spite of the conciliatory position adopted within the Macedonian government, 
as well as the international recognition Macedonia succeeded in attaining, Greece 
persisted in her dispute with the new country. In addition to objections regarding the 
Macedonian Constitution, Greece also rejected the country’s use of the name 
“Macedonia,” as well as the new country’s use of many symbols associated with the 
ancient land of Macedonia. Following the Macedonian referendum, a great debate had 
taken place within Macedonia regarding the symbols that the new state should adopt. 
Although almost everyone agreed upon the importance of making a decisive break with 
Communism, leaders then sought symbols behind which the entire population of 
Macedonia could rally.52
In 1978 an archeologist had excavated the royal tombs of the ancient Macedonian 
family located in Vergina, currently part of northern Greece. The excavation established 
that a 16-pointed sun or star design had been the symbol of the royal house of ancient 
Macedonia. The most famous of all ancient Macedonians, Alexander the Great, had used 
the symbol as his own emblem. After much discussion, the Macedonia Parliament
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adopted the device as part of the state flag for several reasons. First, in contrast with the
Ustase flag chosen by Croatians that emphasized the exclusion of the Serbian
populations, the symbol appealed to the many different ethnic groups within Macedonia.
Scholar Keith Brown explains:
Vlachs.. .now fly an eight-pointed star and claim descent from Philip II by 
various dubious arguments.. .Albanian parties, by contrast, claim 
Alexander because he was the son of Olympias, the Illyrian queen, and 
they claim descent from the Illyrians.. ..The spirit of the selection of the 
16-pointed star by a parliament drawn from different ethnic groups seems 
to evoke this past diversity... .[W]ithin FYR Macedonia it remains one of 
the more inclusive symbols from the past.53
Rather than choosing a symbol that emphasized the particularities of one ethnic group,
the Macedonian government succeeding in finding a symbol with which everyone could
identify, which in itself was no small accomplishment. Furthermore, as has occurred
throughout the history of the region, the government sought legitimacy by emphasizing
their continuity with the past. Thus, they referred to the Krusevo Republic in the
preamble to the constitution and sought to associate themselves with the legend of
Alexander the Great.54
The Greeks, however, strenuously objected to the Macedonian use of what they
considered exclusively Greek symbols. Greek leaders claimed that Alexander the Great
was Greek, and for the Macedonians to appropriate his name, legend, and symbols
amounted to cultural thievery. In spite of the ambiguity of the evidence regarding the
actual facts of Alexander’s life, as was discussed in the introduction to this thesis, as well
as the very different meanings of the words “Macedonian” and “Greek” in ancient times,
in the modem world both Macedonia and Greece vied for the exclusive rights to the
cultural legacy of Alexander the Great. It is ironic that the actual symbol on the flag has
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different names in the two countries. While the Greeks call it a star, the Macedonians see 
it as a sun. Nevertheless, the nationalist rhetoric has created a situation in which the two 
sides cannot share the symbol; one or the other must forgo their claims to Alexander’s 
legacy.55 Their dispute emphasizes the divisive nature of nationalism and demonstrates 
both sides’ interest in ignoring history and the subjectivity of national identity, in favor of 
an oppositional and black and white view, which starkly divides one side from the other.
Greek anger at her neighbor’s supposed theft of Greek cultural identity 
manifested itself in a variety of political actions. As already noted, Greek leaders lobbied 
against the EC recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. In an even more damaging 
move, the Greek government imposed a devastating unilateral trade embargo on 
Macedonia. Since the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia had ended all trade with the 
north, the Greek embargo from the south almost completely isolated the new state of 
Macedonia.56 In addition, following the nationalist pattern of demonizing the enemy, the 
Greeks waged a propaganda campaign against the inhabitants of Macedonia. Glenny 
thus relates, “[T]he innocent visitor arriving from Greece or Bulgaria may imagine 
Skopje to be inhabited by a sub-human species. In fact, if one had to choose an interior 
city in the southern Balkans to live in, Skopje would come out on top with ease.”57 Part 
of the nationalist process of identifying an enemy or an “other” thus often involves the 
depiction of that enemy as somehow less than human.
Although a full exploration of the reasons behind the Greek position on 
Macedonia is beyond the scope of this thesis, several observations suggest possible 
causes for the Greek perspective and further reveal aspects of the divisive nature of 
nationalism in general. Historian Evangelos Kofos, a Greek-Macedonian himself,
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explained his intense and personal dislike of the Republic of Macedonia’s appropriation 
of the history of Alexander the Great. He said, “It is as if a robber came into my house 
and stole my most precious jewels -  my history, my culture, my identity.”58 On a 
personal level then, Kofos viewed the legend of ancient Macedonia as exclusively Greek; 
allowing Macedonia to use the symbols associated with Alexander would necessarily 
mean that those symbols somehow did not belong to Greece.
At the same time, politicians within Greece used the issue of the debate with 
Macedonia in their bids for power. In 1993 the Greek politician Andreas Papandreou and 
his party ran an election campaign based on the promise to stand firm on the issue of 
Macedonia. The tactic worked, and both he and his party gained control of the Greek 
government. The extremely nationalist party of Antonis Samaras used similar tactics to 
win seats in the government.59 Keith Brown provides yet another explanation for the 
Greek position on Macedonia. He points to the friendly relationship between Greece and 
Serbia that persisted in spite of UN sanctions against the Milosevic regime. By closing 
the Greek border, the Greek government forced Macedonia to ignore the sanctions and 
continue to trade illegally with Serbia.
Much evidence suggests that in spite of official rhetoric in support of UN 
sanctions, Macedonian firms continued to do business with Serbia out of economic 
necessity. Western officials confirmed that Macedonia, in fact, served as the biggest leak 
in the UN embargo. The deputy head of the international monitors stationed in 
Macedonia, Brathen Kjersti complained, “When we’re there, they send the trucks two, 
three, four kilometers back from the border... .But as soon as we leave the trucks go 
through. Actually.. .they’re monitoring us.”60 Thus Brown concludes, “The flag, in this
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light, appears merely as a useful pretext to disguise the Greek-Serbian axis; if the 
Macedonians were to yield, another would easily be found.”61 In both examples 
politicians made use of nationalist rhetoric in order to further their own agendas.
Internal Problems Resulting from Macedonian Independence
In addition to tensions that arose as a result of Macedonia’s relationships with her 
neighbors, the Macedonian government also had to face significant problems that resulted 
from the internal composition of the new state. As already noted, the Macedonian 
constitutional description of the state involved both a nationalist aspect, or a definition of 
Macedonia as the state of the Macedonian people, and a civic aspect, which focused on 
the rights equally due to all those residing within the state of Macedonia. For Slavic­
speaking ethnic Macedonians, no contradiction existed between the two different 
conceptions of the state. Ethnic Albanians and other minority groups, however, resented 
their secondary status within a state that defined itself primarily as the state of the 
exclusively Macedonian nation.62
Practically speaking, the ethnic Albanian groups within Macedonia objected to 
governmental actions that they viewed as discriminatory. For example, various policies 
restricted the use of the Albanian language for official business, and the government 
refused to confer legal recognition on an Albanian university. Furthermore, Albanians 
resented perceived inequalities in the election laws and felt they were underrepresented in 
state institutions. One policy analyst explains:
All the ethnic Albanian parties and factions are pressing for greater 
cultural equality, for expanded local self-government and ultimately for 
the establishment of what amounts to a binational state in which the
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Albanian population would be elevated constitutionally to a status equal to 
that of the Macedonian nation.63
Following the usual pattern in the Balkans, exclusive nationalism on the part of the
Macedonian government sparked nationalism in return. Albanian political leaders thus
began to press for rights and privileges to be granted to their particular ethnic group or
nation. Rather than calling for equal protection under the constitution for all people,
regardless of ethnicity, Albanian politicians sought the same status for their particular
group as that enjoyed by the particularly Macedonian ethnic group. Albanian leaders
argued their case so strenuously that the neighboring country of Albania managed to
block Macedonia’s entry into the CSCE. Although Albania had recognized the Republic
of Macedonia, the Albanian government then claimed that the Macedonian government
was denying basic human rights to the ethnic Albanian minority and thus did not deserve
membership in the CSCE.64
Macedonian leaders, however, did not view the Albanian demands as a legitimate
response to the inequalities in the governmental system. Instead, Macedonians feared
that the Albanians were planning to secede and form their own, even smaller state, or join
with the neighboring state of Albania.65 Furthermore, the Albanian position also called
into question the viability, if not the very existence of the Macedonian state. One scholar
notes, “To concede to Albanian demands might weaken their [the Macedonian
government’s] control over the state’s institutional defenses against perceived threats to
Macedonian identity from Bulgaria and Greece, as well as Albania, not to mention
Serbia. Yet this resistance to accommodation appears to be making matters worse.”66
Attempting to repress Albanian nationalism, therefore, only served to encourage it.
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The exclusive nationalism on both sides then led to increased tensions between 
the two major ethnic groups within Macedonia. In i992, riots in Skopje prompted the 
Macedonian police to arrest an Albanian youth. The arrest in turn touched off further 
riots in which four people died and thirty more were injured. One year later, 
Macedonian authorities arrested eight ethnic Albanians, including the state’s deputy 
defense minister, on charges of organizing paramilitary groups and seeking to destabilize 
the state. In fact, in response to the repression of their demands, some ethnic Albanians 
had formed a terrorist organization in Western Macedonia known as Unikom. Unikom 
promoted the use of violence to solve the political problems faced by ethnic Albanians. 
The formation of the Albanian organization then spurred some ethnic Macedonians to 
organize their own terrorist group, the VMRO Defense Committee, with the stated
/TO
mission of killing Albanian leaders seeking to establish autonomous Albanian areas. 
Although the spiral of exclusive nationalism led increasingly to the potential for violence 
and human rights abuses, ethnic war did not erupt in Macedonia as it did in Bosnia, 
where Serbian paramilitary organizations wreaked havoc on the Muslim civilian 
populations. Before turning to some of the reasons for the different situations in 
Macedonia and Bosnia, a few further comments on the nature of ethnic identity within 
Macedonia are necessary.
In spite of the existence of very real tensions between Macedonians and 
Albanians, on many levels in the early 1990’s the population of Macedonia enjoyed a 
level of stability unknown throughout the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Glenny even 
notes that Albanians within Macedonia were “without question the most prosperous of 
the three component territories in which Albanians live [Macedonia, Kosovo, and
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Albania]... .True they do not have full access to the organs of power, but the harsh 
repression of the pro-Serb communist leadership in Macedonia has been rapidly eroded 
since the elections of 1990.”69 Furthermore, by 1994 the major Albanian political party 
was cooperating with the government to combat divisive nationalism. The Macedonian 
Parliament had also created an interethnic council and an interethnic commission to 
protect minority rights. Political scientist Lenard Cohen thus observes, “Macedonia’s 
political development has actually been remarkably peaceful and relatively
70democratic.” If the country of Macedonia made so much positive progress towards the 
establishment of a functioning and inclusive democratic system in the early 1990’s, the 
question then becomes why did so much tension persist between the ethnic groups?
An important part of the explanation lies in Macedonia’s dire economic situation. 
As a result of the UN sanctions and the Greek embargo, Macedonia’s per capita GNP fell 
from approximately US$1,800 to less than US$760. The drastic drop in standard of 
living led Cohen to remark, “Such economic deterioration contributed to renewed internal 
tensions within the country, particularly between the country’s ethnic Macedonian 
majority and the large Albanian minority.”71 Cohen thus echoes the arguments of other 
scholars who linked the economic situation in Macedonia with the development of 
nationalism. Following a well-established pattern within the Balkans, economic distress 
directly stimulated nationalist development and nationalist friction.
Another source of tension involved the role of the media. Although the 
Macedonian government published both an Albanian and a Turkish newspaper 
nationally, at the same time the government also controlled the powerful national daily 
Nova Makedonia. Some observers criticized the way in which the national government
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could present only its own version of events through the large, powerful, government- 
supported newspaper.72 In addition, the media in general tended to attribute a nationalist 
significance to ordinary events. An official with the UN Commission on Human Rights 
reported that on June 18, 1994, a Macedonian youth died in Tetovo, a larger city in the 
Western portion of Macedonia, during a street fight between Macedonian and Albanian 
gangs. Although a relatively minority incident, it received intense and nationalist media 
coverage. The Macedonian newspaper that reported on the event failed to mention that 
the Macedonian had instigated the fight, and that an Albanian later drove the injured 
victim to the hospital. The UN report then stated, “Thus the media manipulated an 
unfortunate incident to promote ethnic distrust and tension.”73
Just as Milosevic and Tudjman used the media to build their own power bases, the 
UN report on the use of the media in Macedonia came to similar conclusions regarding 
Macedonian politicians’ manipulation of the media. The report explained, “The situation 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia appears to be characterized by attempts 
on the part of the political forces to assert their influence over the major media outlets in 
order to secure political power.”74 Furthermore, the report then linked control of the 
media with the dire economic outlook in Macedonia because “the poor economic 
situation is hindering the development of private media to rival the state-dominated 
media outlets.”75 Thus, the two factors of economic difficulties and political 
manipulation came together in Macedonia to foster particularist nationalist sentiments 
through the use of the national media.
In addition to controlling the media, yet another tool political leaders can draw 
upon in order to exploit ethnic differences in the service of their own agendas involves
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the use of the census. In 1991, as it faced disintegration, the government of Yugoslavia 
had embarked on a census to determine the exact numbers and proportions of the 
different ethnic groups within the country. Within the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
ethnic Albanians boycotted the census, claiming that the government would purposefully 
undercount them. The statisticians involved in the census then used earlier figures 
combined with other information such as population growth to project the approximate 
number of ethnic Albanians located within Macedonia.76
Before the preliminary results of the census had even become public, leaders of 
the ethnic Albanian community claimed that the census had miscounted them. They 
stated that in fact Albanians constituted as much as 40 per cent of the population of 
Macedonia. A curious situation arose in which representatives of the other minority 
groups followed the Albanian example, and cited larger figures for the total number of 
inhabitants belonging to their ethnic group. In fact, as one senior policy analyst 
remarked, “Added together, these claims surpassed the total number of inhabitants of 
Macedonia, even without counting Macedonians. These claims clearly sacrificed
• • 7 7statistical accuracy to an effort to gain political power and hegemony.” By boasting 
increased numbers of their particular ethnic groups, the political leaders of each group 
hoped to argue for a greater share of political power in a country that based its 
government, to a certain degree, on politics based in the concept of ethnicity.
The ethnic Albanian leaders then began a publicity campaign designed to draw 
international attention to their plight. Their tactics worked and, in 1992, a German 
diplomat began to organize a census in Macedonia that the “international community” 
would supervise. In 1994 when the internationally sponsored census of Macedonia got
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underway, senior policy and political analyst Victor A. Friedman was working for the 
United Nations’ peacekeeping force then stationed in the former Yugoslavia. He traveled 
to Macedonia and observed not only the process of the census, but also the international 
monitors who oversaw the census.
Friedman explains that the 1994 census,
gave implicit legitimacy to Albanian claims for special treatment, in 
addition to legitimizing Albanian politicians’ right to claim discrimination 
and to demand a recount, as it were. At the same time, the proposals [for 
the 1994 census] helped reify as a Macedonian-Albanian conflict tensions 
that had been building since the riots in Kosovo in 1981 but that were not
n o
an inherent feature of Macedonian life at all periods.
Friedman’s observations reveal several important aspects of the ethnic tensions within 
Macedonia. First, he suggests that the Albanian politicians used the census to further 
their own political agendas. In fact, Friedman explicitly states that the census “was 
clearly linked to a political issue, namely the claim of Albanian politicians for special 
(nonminority) status for Albanians within Macedonia based on their large numbers.”79 
Even more importantly, he explains that the international community’s decision to hold 
the census gave legitimacy to the claims of tension between the Macedonians and the 
Albanians, when in fact the two groups had coexisted peacefully at many points in their 
history together.
In addition to revealing the ulterior designs of local politicians, the 1994 
Macedonian census also demonstrated that the concept of ethnic identity remained just as 
subjective at the end of the twentieth century as it had at the end of the nineteenth 
century. For example, the group of Macedonian Muslims, that is to say those within 
Macedonia who spoke a Slavic language but followed the Islamic faith, had difficulties 
identifying their ethnic identity on the census forms. Did their language make them
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“Macedonian,” or did their religion mean they were actually “Albanian,” or even 
“Turkish?” Many of these Macedonian Muslims lived in isolated, underdeveloped parts 
of the country where their precarious economic situation left them vulnerable to 
manipulation at the hands of ethnically based political parties. Regarding the economic 
plight of the Macedonian Muslims, Dzevad Dzuliovski, the president of the Cultural and 
Scientific Association of Macedonian Muslims commented, “The Macedonian state has 
little interest in us, and gives us no economic, educational or social help.. ..Most of our 
people live in western Macedonia in villages with no roads; our people do the hardest 
work.”80
Friedman explains that as a result of Macedonian Muslims’ economic 
vulnerability, Albanian and Turkish politicians had “convinced some of them that they 
[were] Slavicized Albanians or Turks rather than Islamicized Slavs and that they could 
therefore rely more on Turkish or Albanian political parties to support their economic
0 1
interests.” Just as the nineteenth-century Macedonian peasants had shifted identities 
between Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian in order to respond to the changing economic 
situation, so too at the end of the twentieth century the inhabitants of Macedonia adjusted 
their ethnic identity depending on the economic conditions. The political leaders thus 
exploited a situation of economic need in order to gain support for their ethnically based 
political parties. One of the most notable ironies in the whole process occurred when 
Macedonian-speaking Muslims demanded census forms in Albanian or Turkish. Since 
those Muslims could not read Albanian or Turkish, they then had to also demand an 
interpreter to translate the forms into Macedonian.82
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Following the conclusion of the census, the German diplomat who had organized
the whole endeavor explained his view that the different nationalities disliked each other.
As evidence to support his claim, he pointed to the lack of mixed marriages in the
country and the private and public tension between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians.
Friedman directly refutes that claim as he states:
[T]he statement itself is an exemplary instance of a present construction 
being projected onto the past. It imposes a view of Macedonian reality . 
that at the same time serves the interest of the local political elite.. .and 
promotes a version of the history of Macedonia that is at variance with 
concrete evidence -  for example, the assistant minister of education is the 
son of an Albanian father and a Macedonian mother, the prime minister’s 
brother-in-law is a Turk, a Macedonian friend of mine who used to work 
in the government has an Albanian wife.83
Just as the “ancient ethnic hatreds” claim surfaced in Bosnia as an excuse to obscure all
kinds of different political agendas, so too in Macedonia claims of a history of ethnic
tension ignored a reality of more or less peaceful co-existence. Furthermore, an
important part of nationalist rhetoric in general involves convincing both the participants
as well as the outside observers of the historical, long-term nature of the quarrels between
groups.
It is interesting to note the similarities between observations regarding the 
Macedonian census and those that deal with other censuses, taken at different times in 
different geographical locations. Benedict Anderson, a scholar of nationalism, explored 
the role of the census in colonial East Asia. He found that before 1850 both colonial and 
earlier local authorities had counted people simply for the purposes of taxing and levying 
armies. By 1870, however, colonial authorities began to classify and quantify the people 
under their control by placing them into specific ethnic groups, but those authorities 
ignored the blurred and subjective nature of the people’s identities. Anderson writes,
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“The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one -  and only 
one -  extremely clear place. No fractions.”84 As the colonial authorities then organized 
the societies under their control based on their own classification systems, in many ways 
they then brought these different groups into existence.
Anderson’s analysis has bearing on several aspects of Macedonian history. It is 
interesting that the shift from a system that counted people based on a practical necessity 
to one that attempted to quantify ethnic groups occurred at roughly the same time that 
governments began to shift from a system of jurisdictional sovereignty to territorial 
sovereignty, a process that was discussed in Chapter 1. During the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, many Balkan peoples experienced a transition from the old Ottoman 
system, which had followed a policy of jurisdictional sovereignty, to a more modem 
nation-state that employed a concept of territorial sovereignty. At almost exactly the 
same time, the colonial powers of the Western World were developing a new kind of 
census that did not measure a person’s capacity to work, a concept that would be 
important under a system of jurisdictional sovereignty. Instead, they developed a census 
that would count people based on their ethnic identity, a concept important for the 
emerging idea of the modem, territorially bound nation-state, with a population 
theoretically comprised of people from the same “nation.”
Both Anderson and Friedman point out the difficulties inherent in attempting to 
use a tool such as a census, that relies on an objective system of quantification, to 
measure something as patently subjective and confusing as national identity. In both 
cases, the census had less to do with the real nature of ethnic identity, and more to do 
with the political purposes of those who organized the census in the first place. In any
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event, Friedman concludes his analysis by noting, “The census solved nothing and the 
question of language use at the federal level continued, in 1995, to serve as a source of
t O c
federal tension.” Based on Friedman’s observations of the way in which the census 
helped to solidify the tensions between Albanians and Macedonians, and the way the 
Albanian leaders used the census to further their own goals, another policy analyst noted, 
“[T]he manner in which it [the 1994 census] was carried out, and even the fact that it was 
carried out at all, probably intensified the conflict between ethnic Albanians and 
Macedonians rather than moderating it.” The census thus provides yet another example 
of the subjectivities inherent in ethnic identity. The lack of objectivity then allows 
politicians to exploit ethnic identity for their own reasons and in the process polarize 
groups of people into mutually exclusive and particular ethnic groups.
Solutions for Macedonian Independence
The early years of Macedonian statehood did not witness violence and human 
rights abuses of the kind that occurred in other areas of the former Yugoslavia. At the 
same time, politics based on particular nationalist politics created a situation of tension 
within the state, with the potential to explode into nationalist violence of the kind in the 
rest of Yugoslavia. If tools such as a census do not work to solve problems of ethnic 
tension, how then can these serious problems be addressed? By appealing to the United 
Nations in 1992, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov successfully pursued one aspect of 
a non-nationalist solution to the immediate problems facing the Republic of Macedonia.
After Macedonia had declared her independence, President Gligorov found 
himself at the head of a country facing serious ethnic tensions, as well as considerable
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external difficulties. Following the withdrawal of the JNA, Macedonia lacked an army
or any kind of a significant defense force to protect her boundaries from external
aggression. Sokalski explains:
When it left Macedonia the Yugoslav army took home practically 
everything that could be considered defense-related. An unverified story 
has it that the Yugoslavs actually left four tanks behind, but only because
0 7
they could not start them.
Given the utter lack of military capabilities, President Gligorov could easily have 
followed the pattern established by Tudjman, Milosevic, Karadzic, and others, and used 
nationalism as a rallying cry. He could have then built militia forces unified behind 
exclusive nationalist ideologies, and dedicated to creating a state for ethnic Macedonians 
alone. Instead, Gligorov remained committed to the heterogeneous state that had 
emerged following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Rather than invoking particularist 
nationalism, Gligorov instead appealed to the United Nations, a truly international and 
ethnically diverse organization committed to human rights, for help. The United Nations 
Security Council paid heed to Gligorov’s request and, in 1992, Resolution 795 authorized 
“the Secretary General to establish a presence of the United Nations Protection Force in 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”88 Instead of a nationalist paramilitary 
force, the UN provided Macedonia with an international force that would help ensure the 
new state’s stability.
The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Macedonia deployed with a dual 
mission. Since Yugoslavia and Macedonia had not established a clear border between 
them, according to Sokalski, UNPROFOR monitored “the border areas and reported] to
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the UN Secretary-General.. .any developments that could pose a threat to Macedonia.”
In fact, several encounters between patrols from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
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those of Macedonia did occur, but UNPROFOR troops mediated an agreement between 
the forces and successfully achieved the withdrawal of both sides’ soldiers.90 Throughout 
recent Balkan history the establishment of borders between new states has led to further 
wars. In fact, Serbia and Croatia went to war over conflicting ideas about their borders. 
The political justifications for establishing borders has also led to the manipulation of 
nationalism as politicians tried to claim a particular identity for a certain group of people 
in order to justify their incorporation into another country. By its mission, then, 
UNPROFOR worked against these kinds of developments. Indirectly perhaps, it helped 
guard against the spread of particularist nationalism in the service of politicians eager to 
redraw international boundaries.
The second aspect of UNPROFOR’s mission involved deterring potential threats 
to the country’s stability; simply by its presence it served as a symbol of the international 
community’s commitment to uphold Macedonia’s territorial integrity.91 UNPROFOR 
proved successful in this aspect of its mission as well. Because of the deployment of 
three hundred U.S. troops as part of UNPROFOR’s Macedonian mission, in 1994 U.S. 
President Bill Clinton commented on the status of the mission. In a letter to the House of 
Representatives, Clinton wrote, “Through observation and monitoring operations along 
the FYROM [former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] border with Serbia, UNPROFOR 
Macedonia continues to be effective in preventing a spillover of the conflict.”92 
UNPROFOR Macedonia thus provides a marked contrast to the situation elsewhere in the 
former Yugoslavia where UN troops deployed only after the onset of the conflict and 
belatedly attempted to “keep the peace.” In Macedonia the timely deployment of
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international troops served as an effective deterrent to all aggressors and played a 
significant role in that country’s avoidance of hostility.
Nevertheless, Macedonia still continued to face problems. Although 
UNPROFOR successfully deterred any form of external conflict, the force had a much 
more limited mission regarding internal tensions. Xhudo explains, “These UN troops 
cannot, in any event, act against the internal forces at work, primarily the Albanian illegal 
groups of Kosovo and Macedonia.. ..They and Western observers have not the slightest
• cnability to handle this threatening trouble from within.” The evidence suggests that 
tensions between ethnic groups within Macedonia provided at least as serious a threat, if 
not a greater one, than frictions with Macedonia’s neighbors. If an international military 
force helped Macedonia to alleviate external tensions with her neighbors, the question 
both for politicians within Macedonia and for the international community at large 
quickly became how to resolve the internal tensions peacefully and democratically.
In 1995 a group of policy analysts and scholars known as the South Balkans 
Working Group, from an American organization called the Center for Preventative 
Action, traveled to Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania to assess the ways in which those 
states could solve their internal problems. They developed many practical 
recommendations designed specifically for each area, but most importantly they noted,
“In formulating these recommendations, the working group developed one guiding 
principle: Uphold the full package of Helsinki norms as they have evolved since 1989.”94 
The South Balkans Working Group thus proposed the protection of universal human 
rights as a solution to the divisive politics of nationalism that plagued Macedonia 
throughout her first years of independence. The Group specifically stressed the
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importance of universal protection of human rights as they stated, “Helsinki principles 
are thus often treated as if they were a menu of options. The Working Group concluded 
that the Helsinki principles as they have evolved since 1989 must be treated instead as a 
coherent package that imposes obligations as well as rights on all parties to these 
disputes.”95 In contrast to nationalist leaders who sought rights and privileges for 
members of their specific, particular ethnicity, this group of outside analysts 
recommended that the solution to the problems of nationalism involved protecting the 
rights of everyone involved, regardless of their particular ethnicity.
Many other individuals and organizations shared the views of the South Balkan 
Working Group. Sociologist Bogdan Denitch points to the inherent contradictions 
between a functioning democratic government that promotes rights for all citizens and 
nationalist politics that promote the rights of one particular group. He writes, “[T]he 
only possible kind of decent, modem, democratic state is one that is, at the very least, 
defined as the state of all its citizens, irrespective of national origin or religion.”96 The 
very foundation of the modem, democratic system of government, then, lies in the 
universal protection of rights, regardless of nationality or ethnicity. Denitch examines the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the violations of human rights that occurred as a result 
of particularist nationalism. He then concludes, “The only concrete beginning of a 
solution to these kinds of questions and dilemmas is an internationally supervised and 
enforced bill of rights for minorities and for human rights in general.”97 Denitch thus 
joins the South Balkans Working Group in calling for the protection of universal human 
rights as a solution for tensions that arise from particularist nationalist politics.
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An important part of Denitch’s analysis involves the participation of the 
international community in promoting rights within the area of the former Yugoslavia. 
Since the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, most of the 
countries of the world have accepted that the objective nature of universal human rights 
makes it possible and legitimate for people and organizations anywhere to take an interest 
in and comment on human rights practices everywhere. Furthermore, the Declaration 
also spelled out the connection between human rights and international peace and 
stability. Thus it is not only possible, but also important for the countries and 
organizations of the world to involve themselves in the promotion of human rights 
anywhere those rights are threatened. As Alexander the Great discovered so long ago, 
protecting human rights often has practical benefits for everyone involved. Since 
particular nationalism threatened the peace within Macedonia, it thus follows logically 
that many intergovernmental, non-governmental, and governmental organizations would 
devote resources to monitoring the protection of human rights inside the new state.
In response to the violence perpetuated as a result of nationalism in the former 
Yugoslavia, in 1992 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights established the 
office of a Special Rapporteur to monitor the protection of human rights in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia. In 1994 the Special Rapporteur traveled to Macedonia and met 
with the President, the Prime Minister, and many other high-ranking officials, which in 
and of itself testifies to the Macedonian government’s commitment to the promotion of 
human rights. The Rapporteur stated, “[Vjarious steps have been undertaken in order to 
improve the human rights situation in the country. Nevertheless, the situation is still not 
satisfactory. Mainly due to the slow legislative process, effective legal means for the
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protection of human rights still do not exist.”98 If the solution to ethnic tensions within
Macedonia involved the protection of universal human rights, then it is important that the
Macedonian government continue to translate ideals regarding human rights into concrete
measures designed to protect the rights of all people within the state.
The non-governmental organization known as Helsinki Watch also monitors
human rights practices around the world. In 1978 Helsinki Watch was established to
monitor adherence to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Helsinki Watch’s mission thus
similarly testifies to the objective and universal nature of human rights. In their January
1994 report on the situation within Macedonia, the organization noted, “Current human
rights problems in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia include.. .discrimination
in the treatment of ethnic minorities.”99 Importantly, the Helsinki Watch
recommendations do not include special treatment for particular minority groups, such as
that called for by some ethnic Albanian leaders. The report instead recommended that:
[T]he government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.. .[e]nd 
all discrimination in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 
assure that all minority members receive equal rights without 
discrimination.. .[and] [a]ssure that everyone in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia has the right to freedom of expression and 
assembly.100
The report thus focuses on the rights that everyone deserves, regardless of their minority 
status or ethnic affiliation. Instead of special treatment for particular groups, the report 
advocates equal rights for all citizens.
In addition to non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations, individual 
governments also recognize the importance of the promotion of universal human rights. 
For example, the U.S. State Department explains:
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A central goal of US foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for 
human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The United States understands that the existence of human rights helps 
secure the peace, deter aggression, promote the rule of law, combat crime 
and corruption, strengthen democracies, and prevent humanitarian 
crises.101
The government of the United States thus joins the UN, Helsinki Watch, and many other
organizations in pointing to the strong connections between human rights and peace. One
way in which the State Department translates those beliefs into actions involves the
writing of Country Reports, in which the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor monitors and observes human rights practices within the many countries of the 
1
world. The structure of these reports and the human rights they focus on stem directly
101from those enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The 1993 U.S. State Department Report entitled Macedonian Human Rights 
Practices thus notes, “Minorities, including Albanians, Turks, and Serbs, have raised 
various credible allegations of human rights infringements and discrimination at the 
hands of the ethnic Macedonian population.”104 While the American report does not 
outline specific policy recommendations to solve the problems and human rights abuses 
that occurred as a result of nationalist politics, the report does note, “Human rights groups 
and ethnic community representatives meet frequently with foreign representatives 
without government interference.. ..The Government did not oppose visits or 
investigations by international human rights groups.”105 It seems that the Macedonian 
government respected the importance of promoting human rights and accepted the 
objectivity inherent in those rights by freely allowing outside actors to monitor human 
rights practices. In general, the evidence suggests that the Macedonian Government 
recognized the importance of protecting the human rights of all citizens. At the same
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time, and for a variety of reasons, the government had not yet managed to fully 
implement all of the necessary measures.
The various individuals and organizations that have pointed to the protection of 
human rights as part of the solution to nationalist tensions within Macedonia, also 
focused on the economic situation within the country as contributing the ethnic problems. 
As a result, the South Balkans Working Group asserted, “No effort to reduce ethnic 
conflict is likely to succeed in Macedonia if economic and social conditions 
deteriorate.”106 Similarly, Tadeusz Macowiecki, the Commission on Human Rights’ 
Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia, noted that the sanctions and embargo 
placed Macedonia in an incredibly difficult situation, “which seriously hampers 
implementation of the economic and social rights of its citizens.” Macowiecki thus 
concluded, “[E]ffective international assistance is urgently required in order to remove or 
alleviate these external factors.”107 Since the evidence convincingly points to the 
connections between economic problems and particularist nationalism, with its attendant 
possibilities for human rights abuses, the solution for Macedonia’s ethnic tensions lies in 
part in promoting economic development and recovery within Macedonia.
By 1995, then, Macedonia, with considerable outside assistance, had succeeded in 
peacefully establishing its independence from Yugoslavia, the only one of the six 
republics to do so without violence. Nevertheless, external relations with the Republic of 
Macedonia’s new neighbors and internal tensions among the different ethnic groups 
provided serious challenges to the new state’s stability. While the international military 
contingent of UNPROFOR succeeded in preventing the external threats to Macedonia’s 
stability from developing into wars, the monitoring and promotion of human rights for all
176
citizens, regardless of ethnicity, surfaced as a possible solution to internal tensions. Most 
importantly, though, the events of the early 1990’s brought massive economic problems 
to Macedonia, which continued to create the conditions for increased ethnic conflicts.
Solutions for the Problems in the Former Yugoslavia
In sharp contrast to Macedonia’s peaceful evolution, the republics of Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia all fought wars with Yugoslavia for their independence. As noted 
earlier, while Milosevic’s Yugoslavia engaged Slovenia in only a brief ten-day war, 
Croatia and Bosnia became increasingly mired in violent conflict throughout the early 
1990’s. In 1992 the UN had imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia in an unsuccessful attempt 
to coerce the warring parties into negotiations. Although international negotiators had, in 
1993, proposed a plan to end the hostilities, first the Bosnian Serbs and then the 
Americans rejected the plan, albeit for very different reasons.+ UN peacekeepers had 
deployed to protect several vulnerable pockets of Muslims inhabitants, but by July of 
1995 the Bosnian Serb troops had destroyed these so-called “safe areas” and massacred 
large numbers of the civilian populations.108
Throughout these first years of the conflict, the U.S. decided to remain on the 
sidelines, preferring to leave the solution of the problem to the Europeans. When the 
mainly Muslim city of Srebrenica fell, however, and Serbian military forces massacred 
over 7,000 civilians in one of the worst atrocities in Europe since WWII, the American 
public began demanding a change in policy. Samantha Power explains:
Op-ed writers, human rights activists, former diplomats, and journalists
had spoken out throughout the war in opposition to Clinton’s policy, but
"Tor a full discussion of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, see Silber and Little, Death o f  a Nation, 
Chapter 21, “Last Chance Cafe: The Rise and Fall of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,” 276-290.
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nothing ignited their fury quite like the fall of the so-called safe-area 
[Srebrenica]. The events of mid-July provoked a rare degree of unanimity 
on the editorial pages in the United States, and those in Paris and London 
as well.109
Thus, for those interested in the protection of human rights, the media serves as a double- 
edged sword.110 On one hand, numerous politicians in the Balkans have used the media 
to instigate nationalist violence simply in order to further their own ambitions. Their use 
of the media led directly to serious human rights abuses. On the other hand, the 
incredible media pressure on American President Bill Clinton played a significant role in 
forcing a change in policy, and ultimately ending the human rights abuses in the former 
Yugoslavia. Media attention forced Clinton to reevaluate the American role in ending the 
war, and, shortly after the fall of Srebrenica, he assigned senior diplomat Richard 
Holbrooke the task of negotiating an end to the war.
The combination of the vigorous American commitment to ending the war as well 
as the military pressure of American-led NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces 
brought the three leaders, Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 
Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina together for 
negotiations. With Holbrooke’s guidance the three sides finally agreed upon terms for 
ending the war. At Dayton, Ohio in 1995, they signed an agreement that drew 
boundaries between the three entities and established the framework for their 
relationships to one another. Most importantly, as a tangible sign of Western support for 
the Dayton Accords, 60,000 NATO troops deployed to the former Yugoslavia to 
implement the agreement. Just as UNPROFOR troops helped secure peace within 
Macedonia, the international NATO forces played an essential role in maintaining the 
cease-fire that the political leaders had agreed upon. Silber and Little explain:
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Within the first two months, the warring sides met the deadline to pull 
back from the zones of separation. After more than four years of war, tens 
of thousands of people killed, and more than two million made homeless, 
there was no more shelling, no more fighting. The roads were open, at 
least formally.111
The Dayton Accords and the NATO deployment thus brought the overt hostilities and 
human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia to an end.
Nevertheless, many problems remained. Implementing the civilian part of the 
agreement, which called for joining the different parts of Bosnia back together, forming a 
functioning government, allowing freedom of movement, and providing for the return of 
refugees, proved much more difficult.112 In fact, the situation in the former Yugoslavia 
following the end of the most recent wars in many ways resembled that of Yugoslavia 
following WWH. In both cases serious human rights violations had occurred as a result 
of divisive nationalist politics. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that during both wars 
individual politicians manipulated the forces of nationalism in order to further their own 
personal ambitions. Tito dealt with the situation, as was discussed in Chapter 2, first by 
murdering many members of nationalist factions, and then by repressing all evidence of 
the devastating civil war and ethnic violence. As we have seen, however, that approach 
proved disastrous for the future stability of Yugoslavia. The lack of a truthful historical 
record allowed later leaders to manipulate the ethnic violence of the Second World War 
to serve their own purposes. Perhaps even more importantly, by failing to call individual 
leaders to account for their important role in propagating the violence, Tito allowed a 
situation to develop in which modem political leaders could hold large groups of people 
responsible for the atrocities committed. For example, rather than holding a public trial 
of the Ustase leader Ante Pavelic, Pavelic escaped. The lack of an objective record of
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events that established the guilt of individual leaders enabled later Serbian nationalist 
leaders to blame “all Croatians” for the massacres that had occurred during WWII.
In the 1990’s the international community decided to follow a different course of 
action regarding the human rights abuses that had occurred within the former Yugoslavia. 
In August 1992, the UN Security Council expressed alarm at the human rights violations 
occurring within the former Yugoslavia, particularly within Bosnia. The council 
condemned the “mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and 
abuse of civilians in detention centers, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, hospitals 
and ambulances.. .[and the] wanton devastation and destruction of property.”113 The 
Security Council could take a strong position on the grave human rights violations 
because, as Lauren explains, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, drawing on the Universal 
Declaration’s protection of the right to life, had elaborated humanitarian laws “dealing 
with sick and wounded combatants, the treatment of prisoners of war, and, most 
innovatively, the protection of civilian populations in time of war.”114 The council could 
thus draw upon international and objective criteria to condemn the human rights 
violations committed during the course of the war in Bosnia.
Having established a standard by which to judge the crimes committed in the 
region, the Security Council then called for a Commission of Experts to provide “the 
Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia.”115 In December 1992, the five-member War Crimes 
Commission met for the first time in Geneva. Significantly, the U.S. identified specific 
individuals that should be brought to trial, including Milosevic, Karadzic, the leader of
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the Bosnian state, and Ratko Mladic, the commander of the Bosnian Serb military forces. 
Although U.S. President Bush and his staff equivocated on whether or not to label the 
atrocities “genocide/’ they did begin to use the term “ethnic cleansing” to refer to the 
Serbian policies that specifically targeted civilians of different ethnic groups in order to 
create an “ethnically pure” Serbian state.116
The following year the United Nations, concerned with the many crimes 
committed in the former Yugoslavia, including “ethnic cleansing,” decided “to establish 
an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia.”117 In contrast to the policies Tito had pursued, the international 
community thus decided to hold the individual leaders accountable for the human rights 
violations, using an internationally agreed upon standard of judgment. In spite of these 
historic achievements, Holbrooke, his team, and many others would continue to negotiate 
with those named as war crimes suspects. Several years would pass before the newly 
formed tribunal would take historic actions against the individual perpetrators of human 
rights violations in the Balkans.
Conclusion
Following the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s, both the former 
Yugoslavia as well as the region of Macedonia experienced serious problems due to 
particularist nationalism. Political leaders used and even created nationalism as a means 
to achieve personal power. In the process, through their use of symbols, the media, and 
propaganda to instill fear in their own populations, they created a culture that permitted
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massive violations of human rights. In many ways, the subjectivity and malleability 
inherent in the very concept of nationalism allowed the politicians to manipulate national 
feelings for their own ends. Part of the nationalist rhetoric then involved viewing the 
current enemy as a long-term, historical enemy. When nationalist politicians did talk 
about protecting human rights, they invariably limited the scope of their concern to the 
people that fell within their particular ethnic or national group.
In contrast, various different solutions to the problems both within the former 
Yugoslavia and in Macedonia involved protecting the universal human rights due to all 
people, regardless of their ethnicity. Instead of blaming large groups of people for the 
atrocities and violence that had occurred within the former Yugoslavia, the United 
Nations set up a War Crimes Tribunal to establish a truthful historical record and publicly 
proclaim the guilt of the individual leaders. Along with the Tribunal, many other 
organizations that had developed since the 1948 signing of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights continued to testify to both the objectivity as well as the importance of 
human rights. The protection of human rights for individuals leads directly to 
international stability and the maintenance of international peace. In fact, a fundamental 
aspect of a functioning democratic system involves the universal protection and 
promotion of the rights of all citizens. The emphasis on universal human rights and the 
avoidance of some of the worst extremes of nationalist divisions perhaps helped to allow 
Macedonia to secede peacefully from Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the persistence of ethnic 
tensions and the dismal economic situation continued to threaten the stability and 
development of the new country.
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Chapter IV
Nationalist Challenges to Independence, 1995-2002
Macedonia is a nice little country in a high crime neighborhood.
-Chris Hill, former U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia
As the last decade of the twentieth century neared its end, the Republic of 
Macedonia seemed poised for success. Many of the internal and external problems that 
had plagued the country during the first years of its existence were slowly resolving 
themselves, and the economy showed measurable signs of improvement. The good 
tidings would not last, however, and the nationalist war and accompanying human rights 
violations in the neighboring province of Kosovo threatened to completely destabilize 
Macedonia. Although the Republic weathered the original storm, the longer-term effects 
of the crisis in Kosovo brought the country to the brink of civil war in 2001. The 
succession of violent challenges to Macedonia’s newly won independence led political 
leaders, both within the country and without, to continue to wrestle with issues related to 
nationalism and the protection of human rights.
Greece, as was discussed in Chapter 3, had refused to recognize the Republic of 
Macedonia, for nationalist reasons centered around the Greek view that their Slavic 
neighbors had unfairly “appropriated” the symbols, history, and cultural legacy of the 
most famous of all Macedonians, Alexander the Great. As a result, Macedonia had only 
been able to join the United Nations under the compromise name, “the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia,” and the Greeks took that compromise agreement very seriously. 
On April 3, 1995, the Greek permanent representative to the United Nations, Christos 
Zacharakas, sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations that alleged:
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In his statement before the Security Council, permanent 
representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the 
United Nations, used, when referring to his own country, a denomination 
that runs counter to the provisions of Security Council resolution 
817(1993).
I would like to remind that, according to the second paragraph of 
the said resolution, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been 
admitted to the United Nations ‘being provisionally referred to for all 
purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia,’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the 
name of the state.’”1
Even more damaging than Greece’s strident refusal to allow the country to use any name 
other than one provisionally agreed upon, Greece, as was discussed in the previous 
chapter, had also imposed a seriously damaging unilateral trade embargo on her neighbor 
to the north.
The impasse between the two countries had dragged on in spite of many persistent 
attempts by international negotiators to break the deadlock. Just months after Zacharakas 
had submitted his letter to the Secretary-General, however, Richard Holbrooke traveled 
to the capitals of the two countries and negotiated an Interim Accord. As was discussed 
in Chapter 3, Holbrooke had brokered the Dayton Accord that had ended the fighting in 
the former Yugoslavia. In the course of those deliberations, Holbrooke managed to 
pressure Greek leader Andreas Papandreou into calling off the blockade. In return, 
Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov agreed that his country would redesign their 
national flag. Although the dispute over the name continued, and in fact continues to this 
day, both sides agreed to further negotiations under the auspices of United Nations 
negotiator former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. With the economic embargo lifted, 
business transactions quickly resumed between the two countries and by 1998 Greece had 
become the largest investor in Macedonia, and her second-largest partner in trade. By
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signing the Interim Accord, both sides demonstrated their ability to move beyond the 
divisive and exclusionary nationalist rhetoric that they had previously employed, and 
their agreement proved mutually beneficial for both countries.
Similarly, although the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
had originally refused to recognize the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign state, by 
1996 that country also acknowledged the official existence of her neighbor to the south. 
The two states did not, however, agree on the location of the international boundary that 
separated them. Nevertheless, the force commander of the United Nations Preventative 
Deployment force (UNPREDEP, which had succeeded UNPROFOR) negotiated a United 
Nations Patrol Line in 1995. The head of the UNPREDEP mission, Henryk Sokalski, 
explains that the patrol line “was accepted by the two parties as a ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’ with the aim of preventing ‘incidents by accident’ along their border.. ..The
a
new line followed manageable visible features and facilitated UN troop patrols.” Both 
the agreement and the regular patrols by UN troops therefore served to decrease the 
tension and the likelihood of violence between Serbia and Macedonia. Thus, a non­
nationalist and international force mediated against the eruption of potential nationalist 
tensions over the status of the border.
Almost a Multi-Ethnic Success Story
Just as Macedonia’s external problems appeared to be moving towards resolution, 
it seemed as though many issues of inter-ethnic tension within the country could be 
resolved peacefully, a fact that would have important bearing on later nationalist violence 
within the country. Although two major clashes occurred between ethnic Macedonians
193
and ethnic Albanians between 1995 and 1999, at the same time political leaders from the 
two groups were pursuing important non-violent ways of resolving legitimate problems. 
The first incident centered on the existence of an Albanian-language university located in 
the predominantly Albanian town of Tetovo. In February of 1995 ethnic Albanians 
celebrated the opening of the university. The Macedonian government, however, refused 
to recognize the institution. When police began to close down the “illegal educational 
establishment,” violence erupted between police and ethnic Albanian crowds; one man 
died while twenty more people were injured.4
Although the incident could be seen as a simple nationalist brawl between ethnic 
Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, at the same time much more complicated factors 
explain the tension surrounding the Albanian university in Tetovo. Anthropologist 
Jonathan Schwartz explains that professors at the state university in Skopje, including 
some from minority groups, objected to the university in Tetovo not on ethnic grounds, 
but for economic reasons. He writes, “They were not opposed to the project as such, but 
it took time and planning to establish a university. Their own university in Skopje was 
itself in desperate need of reform and financial aid. The professors and students were 
taking steps to increase the proportion of underrepresented ethnic groups, especially 
Albanian and Rom [Gypsy] communities.”5 In yet another way, then, the difficult 
economic situation within Macedonia contributed to ethnic tensions. At the same time, 
Schwartz reveals that the university in Skopje had in fact worked hard to include ethnic 
Albanians as both teachers and students, thus undercutting ethnic Albanian claims 
regarding their access to education.
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The question then becomes why some ethnic Albanians remained dissatisfied with
the university in Skopje and insisted on opening their own, separate, distinctly Albanian
institution. Alice Ackermann, a professor of international relations, explains that issues
other than simply the right to education surrounded the school in Tetovo. She believes
that the real issue involved the possibility of Albanian becoming an official language on
par with Macedonian.6 Similarly, Schwartz reports:
In speaking with informants from diverse ethnic groups about the 
Albanian university, the typical judgment was that ‘it is politics.’ People 
thus suggested that the demand for a separate Albanian university is not 
based on legitimate civil needs, but as a method for achieving political 
power. The men I interviewed in Tetovo were quite candid about this. 
Ethno-national politics had top priority, even if there was a risk of war.7
The issue of the university, then, seems to have less to do with simple ethnic
tensions, and more to do with the pursuit of power on the part of individual ethnic
Albanian politicians. Following a well-established pattern, those leaders hid their power
agenda in the language of nationalism, and rights for their particular ethnic group. Those
politicians themselves then made clear the direct connection between nationalist politics
that seek to prioritize the rights and privileges of one particular group, and the human
rights violations that would definitely occur if their country became embroiled in a civil
war. It is important to note, however, that this particular issue did not lead to war or
violence between ethnic groups. Instead, the government, with the help and prodding of
the international community began taking steps to resolve the problem of higher
education for Albanians in their native tongue. In addition to the measures mentioned
earlier to encourage Albanian and other minority groups to attend the university in
Skopje, which included a fairly strict quota system, another compromise solution took the
form of the proposed South-East European University. This university, which planned to
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begin offering classes in 2001, would serve as a private institution of higher learning and 
would offer courses in the Albanian language.8
A similar set of circumstances accompanied the second violent clash between 
ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, which occurred in the town of Gostivar in July 1997. 
A United Nations report of the Secretary-General stated that ethnic tensions began 
heating up when the two major Albanian political parties held a unification congress “in 
an atmosphere of nationalist fervor.. ..The congress called for parallel government 
structures, autonomous institutions, a pan-Albanian parliament and ethnic 
regionalization. The appearance of black-shirted paramilitary guards in Tetovo during 
the congress was a disquieting manifestation of ethnic extremism.”9 The politics based in 
ethnicity on the part of the ethnic Albanian political leaders thus demonstrates the 
divisive nature of nationalism, as Albanians sought to have institutions that paralleled but 
remained separate from those of the rest of Macedonia.
In the meantime, municipal authorities in the predominantly Albanian cities of 
Gostivar and Tetovo had decided to hang the national flags of Turkey and Albania equal 
to the national flag of Macedonia in front of the municipal halls. In the middle of a 
debate occurring in the National Assembly involving the use of symbols that belonged to 
other countries, the local authorities responded to an earlier order from the Constitutional 
Court and sent police officers to force the removal of the foreign flags. During the course 
of a violent confrontation between ethnic Albanian demonstrators and the police, three 
people died and some two hundred others were injured. In the following months the 
mayor of Gostivar, Rufi Osmani, was convicted on charges related to the flag hanging 
and sentenced to thirteen years and eight months in prison. Regarding the events in
196
Gostivar, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights concluded, “[T]he
force used by the police in the Gostivar incident far exceeded the reasonable level
required to restore law and order to the situation.”10
Nevertheless, just as in Tetovo, this incident was resolved through the normal
workings of civil society and without resorting to extra-legal nationalist violence. To
resolve the controversy, the parliament approved and enacted a new law regarding the use
of flags. The rapporteur then reported:
While imposing no conditions on the design of the minority flags or their 
use at private occasions, the laws hold that minority flags must be smaller 
in size than the State flag of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
and may be displayed only on national holidays at local self-governed 
municipalities where a national minority makes up a majority of the 
municipal population.11
The rapporteur concluded, “that the new law on minority flags of 8 July 1997 appears to
be a reasonable compromise, taking into account the interests of all sides.”12
Furthermore, the imprisoned mayor would be released the following year, as a result of a
political process that will be discussed shortly.
In both Tetovo and Gostivar, the Macedonian Government addressed legitimate
problems through an established legal process, in other words, through the workings of
civil society. Schwartz explains that the true task of a civil society involves allowing
citizens the space to express their differences and individual ethnic identities while at the
same time maintaining that identity within the established framework of the society. He
then goes on to say, “In the context of the Balkans today ethnic and national movements
generally threaten the very existence of civil society. Exclusive ethnic membership
obviates the common and consensual citizenship.”13 In other words, while differences
are a normal part of human existence, when they become the basis for exclusive
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membership in a particular national movement, they threaten the common, or universal 
premises upon which the concept of citizenship is based. It is important to point out that 
although Macedonia suffered from several instances of ethnic violence, for the most part 
tension arising from ethnic differences was resolved through the workings of civil 
society.
In general, relations between ethnic Macedonians, ethnic Albanians, and other 
minorities remained productive and positive, rather than destructive and negative. In 
fact, Ackerman notes, “most ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have lived there for 
generations -  they consider Macedonia their home, and themselves Macedonian 
citizens.. ..[Tjhere is no evidence of ancient ethnic hatreds between Slavic Macedonians 
and ethnic Albanians.”14 Kiro Gligorov, President of Macedonia until 1998, similarly 
noted the shared history between the two groups. He explains, “[I]n the Second World 
War as well, we had joint Macedonian/Albanian units which fought against occupation. 
And the people who were in those units, some of them are still alive.”15
Although ethnic differences and tensions persisted, it nevertheless seems as 
though the absence of militant nationalist agitation helped to create a generally positive 
situation regarding the protection of human rights. The Special Rapporteur noted, “[T]he 
Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has made considerable 
achievements both in the maintenance of peace and in the protection of human 
rights.. ..All indications are that the government remains committed to implementing 
policies which will continue this encouraging trend.”16 While not discounting the 
difficult problems involving excessive use of force by the police, the rapporteur 
nevertheless concluded, “On the basis of her observations and the commitments which
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the Government has made to her, the Special Rapporteur recommends to the Commission 
on Human Rights that it remove the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from her
17mandate.” Thus, one of the most prominent organizations designed to monitor the 
protection of human rights within Macedonia determined that it was no longer necessary 
to have a special mandate to observe human rights practices within the country. If 
Mother Teresa still followed events in the town of her birthplace, one can only imagine 
that in the last years of her life, before her death in 1997, she rejoiced to see the progress 
that coalitions of different ethnic groups had made towards protecting universal human 
rights.
The continuing political developments within the country reflect this positive 
assessment. Researcher Violeta Caceva points out that from the time Macedonia
declared independence, an Albanian party had always been a coalition partner in the
1 8central government. Furthermore, of all the states in the world in which the Roma, or 
Gypsies, reside, only Macedonia could boast a popularly elected and serving Roma 
member of the parliament.19 In a very surprising and hopeful development, in the 
election of 1998 two extremely nationalist and opposing parties decided to collaborate. 
VMRO, the leading Macedonian nationalist party, which was discussed in Chapter 3, 
under the leadership of Ljubco Georgievski, joined forces with the Albanian nationalist 
party of Arben Xhaferi, the Albanian and Turkish Party for Democratic Prosperity 
(DPA). Together, the two parties formed a coalition government under the leadership of
70new President Vasil Tupurkovski.
Anthropologist Keith Brown explains the startling turn of events by pointing to 
the corruption that had accompanied the previous party’s tenure in office. The socialist
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party that had taken over the country following the collapse of Yugoslavia had presided 
over the transition to a freer market than that which had existed in Yugoslavia. As a 
result, those people with contacts in the party managed to takeover many formerly public 
companies. In 1998 VMRO shifted its tactics away from a focus on nationalism as a 
rallying cry and instead opposed the government because of its corruption. The Albanian 
party followed a similar course of action, and both groups discovered that by working
91together they could defeat the ruling party. Just as nationalism had often served as a 
tool for politicians attempting to gain power, when that tool became ineffective, those 
same politicians dropped nationalism in favor of a more appropriate and beneficial 
strategy, in this case attacking corruption. Importantly, VMRO’s behavior in office 
matched the pre-election rhetoric. A United Nations report explains that the leader of 
VMRO and the new Prime Minister of the country, Ljubco Georgievski, “underlined that 
the fostering and development of inter-ethnic relations will be one of the fundamental 
tenets of his Government.”22 Georgievski matched action to rhetoric and the new 
government immediately secured the early release of Osmani, the former mayor of 
Gostivar, and other officials who had been imprisoned following the flag controversy in 
that city.23
In spite of all the progress that had occurred in the political realm, the dire 
economic situation continued to present serious problems for political leaders. 
Macedonian politicians agreed that in spite of ethnic tensions, the economy remained the 
primary difficulty. Former President Gligorov in fact stated, “The most important thing 
for us would be for Macedonia to be developed economically.”24 Scholar P. H. Liotta 
explains that President Vasil Tupurkovski held exactly the same view as Gligorov. Liotta
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writes, “His long-term expectation, both for the survival of Macedonia and for the
recovery of the Balkan region, is that Western governments and businesses must provide
economic aid, infrastructure support, and direct investment.”25 Furthermore, the Special
Rapporteur describes the connection that exists between economics and human rights:
The economic situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
remains difficult, and continues to limit the Government’s progress in 
providing for full enjoyment of economic and social rights.. ..As 
elsewhere, it is evident that economic problems in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia have negative repercussions on the overall human 
rights situation.26
Although nationalist agitation is often blamed as the primary source of violence and 
human rights violations, the history of Macedonia demonstrates that economics often has 
as much, or more, to do with the root of the problems.
Perhaps the serious economic difficulties influenced the new coalition 
government to make an extremely poor political decision. When Taiwan offered 
Macedonia $300 million in cash and more than $1 billion in aid and investment in return 
for diplomatic recognition, the leaders of Macedonia accepted the deal.27 The decision to 
recognize Taiwan embroiled Macedonia in an entirely different kind of nationalist 
struggle: the serious antagonism between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. 
When it came time for the Security Council to discuss extending UNPREDEP’s mandate, 
therefore, Qin Huasun, the Permanent Representative from China voted against the 
extension. He argued in the Security Council, “The situation in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia has apparently stabilized in the past few years, its relations with 
neighboring countries have been improved, and peace and stability there have not been 
adversely affected by developments in that region.”28 While the first two arguments 
provided by Huasun appear plausible, it would have been difficult to marshal convincing
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evidence to prove that regional stability, or lack thereof, was not adversely affecting 
Macedonia. In fact, events would graphically demonstrate that regional stability played 
the critical role regarding peace within Macedonia.
In the meantime, few believed the Chinese representative’s reasons for voting 
against extending UNPREDEP’s mandate. During the same discussion in the Security 
Council, Mr. Calovski, the representative from Macedonia, stated, “the extension of its 
mandate is supported by all - 1 repeat all -  member states except one, and that because of 
bilateral considerations, something that we all consider to be in full contradiction of the
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Charter of our organization.” In addition, Henryk Sokalski, the head of the 
UNPREDEP mission commented, “Most observers agreed that the real reason for 
China’s veto was the establishment of diplomatic relations between Macedonia and 
Taiwan, and there is no question of a direct cause-and-effect relationship.” In addition, 
former Macedonian President Gligorov criticized his government’s actions, “which he 
called ‘the direct trigger’ of China’s veto.”31
Sokalski then points out that Gligorov’s reference to a “direct trigger” implies the 
existence of an indirect trigger as well. He theorizes that, especially as the security 
situation in neighboring Kosovo began to disintegrate in 1997 and 1998, leaders within 
Macedonia began to consider ways in which to invite a stronger military presence, such 
as NATO, into the country, and in the process advance their country’s hopes of one day 
joining that military alliance. Sokalski quotes a leading Macedonian politician who said,
“There was no way to avoid replacing UNPREDEP with NATO in its new role.. .[but] we
22
should have found a more sophisticated method.” In other words, the goal of
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recognizing Taiwan had ultimately been to replace UNPREDEP with NATO, even
though the strategy employed contained some serious flaws.
In any event, Prime Minister Georgievski did indeed allow 12,000 NATO troops
to be stationed in Macedonia and to deploy along the border with Kosovo.33 Sokalski
reports, however:
UNPREDEP’s departure left a vacuum of its own. Before long an 
increasing number of public figures realized that NATO was primarily 
preoccupied with Kosovo and had neither a mandate nor any immediate 
intention to operate in Macedonia. NATO’s stationing of a logistical 
support base for the Kosovo operation fell short of Macedonia’s 
expectations for an active NATO presence in the country.”34
Similarly, in his last report before the end of UNPREDEP’s mandate, UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan noted, “Peace and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia continue to depend largely on developments in other parts of the region,
particularly in Kosovo.”35 Annan’s words not only directly refuted the rationalization
given by the Chinese representative regarding UNPREDEP, but they would prove
ominously prophetic in light of the nationalist agitation and human rights violations that
would destabilize Macedonia just three short years later.
War in Kosovo Begins
Ethnic diversity and ethnic tension within Kosovo,+ a province that borders 
Macedonia, has proved both similar and yet very different to the situation within 
Macedonia. As was discussed in Chapter 3, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had 
ended Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and fully incorporated the province into the Serbian
+While the international community and most ethnically Slavic groups refer to the province as 
“Kosovo,” the ethnic Albanians call their home “Kosova.” For the sake of using the internationally 
accepted and familiar term, this paper will refer to the province as “Kosovo.”
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Republic. Anthropologist and humanitarian aid worker Janet Reineck explains that the
legislation Milosevic adopted “placed effective control of Kosovo’s police, judiciary,
economy, and political life, in the hands of the Serbian government. The vast majority of
Albanians in public service were dismissed to be replaced by Serbs, who then launched
an organized campaign of repression against them.” In response, Ackermann relates,
“Resisting Serbian repression, Kosovo Albanians set up alternative political and social
institutions as a major element of their strategy of non-violent resistance and
noncooperation.”37 As elsewhere, on the surface it appeared as though ethnic divisions
played the primary role in the tensions between the ethnic groups that began to mount in
Kosovo in the 1990’s.
As in other parts of the Balkans, however, the reality turned out to be much more
complicated. Milosevic had originally rescinded Kosovo’s autonomy for reasons that had
less to do with ethnicity and more to do with his own personal pursuit of power. At the
same time, a brief description of the longer-term relations between the two groups belies
the idea that simple ethnic conflict served as the primary cause of the violence and human
rights abuses. Just as Macedonian nationalism developed as a response to the
propaganda efforts of Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbians, as discussed in Chapter 1,
Albanian nationalism also developed in response to other nationalist efforts. Policy
analyst Barnett Rubin explains:
Albanian nationalism defined itself in resistance to Serbian and other 
Slavic and Greek nationalist claims, and its founding symbolic event also 
occurred in Kosovo. In 1878 Albanian intellectuals convened the League 
of Prizren, the first Albanian nationalist organization, named for the 
Kosovo town where it first met. The league contested Serb claims to 
Kosovo and other territories and asked the ‘Great Powers’.. .to support an 
Albanian state, which gained recognition in 1913, though without Kosovo 
or the Albanian-majority areas in Macedonia.38
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Rubin thus provides further evidence regarding the oppositional nature of nationalism.
In other words, people often form a national identity in opposition to competing claims
from other national groups, which thus emphasizes the divisive nature of nationalism.
Further evidence regarding the nature of ethnic identity in Kosovo comes from
anthropologist Ger Duij zings' extensive research into the nature and history of the ways
in which Kosovars have identified themselves and formed relations with one another. He
describes an extremely complex society with many more facets than the simple
opposition of Albanian and Serbian ethnic identities. He writes:
Yet Kosovo also has a history of coexistence with considerable movement 
across its ethnic and religious frontiers, through trade, cultural diffusion, 
religious exchange, and conversion. Many cultural traits were and still are 
shared across group boundaries, and throughout its entire history the
- IQ
ethnic and religious barriers have been anything but watertight.
Thus, a reliance on the oversimplified idea of ethnic tensions between groups, much less
on “ancient ethnic hatreds,” to explain the violence in Kosovo in the 1990’s ignores the
much more complicated picture. This is not to say that group differences and diversity
do not exist or do not matter. In fact Duij zings notes:
In Bosnia, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims speak basically the same language 
(religion being the main distinction), whereas [in Kosovo] Albanians and 
Serbs -  or for that matter Turks and Gypsies -  all speak different 
languages. In addition, among Albanians there is a threefold religious 
divide into Muslims, Catholics, and a substantial community of Shi’a 
oriented dervish orders, whereas Serbs are Orthodox.40
Mother Teresa serves as an example of this diversity. Although she came from an
Albanian-speaking family, her family practiced the Catholic faith.
Religious differences, however, did not necessarily produce religious hatreds.
Just as throughout the Balkans members of different religions coexisted and even shared
205
traditions with one another, as discussed in Chapter 1, in Kosovo as well “Muslims and
Christians of different ethnic backgrounds have visited each other’s sanctuaries,
worshipped each other’s saints, and ignored the evident theological objections of
religious orthodoxies.”41 The discussion of religion in Kosovo thus serves as a reminder
that many factors other than ethnicity have served to distinguish groups of people from
one another. Duij zings explains:
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the main lines of division were 
between Albanian landlords and the rest of the population.. ..In fact other 
divisions have been much more salient in daily life and local contexts than 
the ethnic one, such as clan or tribal loyalties, religion, the urban-versus- 
rural dichotomy, language (which is not always coterminous with ethnic 
division) or gender.4
Duijzings thus draws the same conclusions regarding the lack of “ancient ethnic 
hatreds” in Kosovo that have been discussed throughout the paper, as well as in many 
other places, regarding Macedonia in particular and the Balkans in general. Rather than 
a simple construction of ethnic or national identity, a variety of other factors played an 
important role in influencing the behavior and ideology of people in the Balkans. 
Duijzings also agrees with findings regarding the subjectivity of ethnic identity. He 
writes, “[Ejthnic and religious identities are not as fixed as our experience in Western 
Europe suggests. One can have more than one ‘exclusive’ identity, and one can change 
identity more easily and more drastically [than in Western Europe].”43 The personal 
nature of ethnic identity, and people’s ability to change and manipulate those identities, 
further undermines the idea that “ancient ethnic hatreds” provoke violent conflicts and 
human rights abuses.
Nevertheless, in Kosovo in the 1990’s a violent conflict indeed erupted and 
brought misery and human rights abuses to many Kosovars. The question then becomes,
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why in fact did this violence occur? As discussed in Chapter 2, Albanians had held a 
secondary political status within Tito’s Yugoslavia, although they enjoyed a large 
measure of local autonomy within Kosovo. Their position only worsened when 
Milosevic rescinded their autonomy and dismissed large numbers of ethnic Albanians 
from state employment. Milosevic’s actions, which he undertook to promote his own 
personal power, had disastrous consequences for Kosovo. Reineck explains, “[T]he 
massive firings had catastrophic effects on Albanian lives, catapulting many families into 
poverty and wreaking havoc on civil life. Professional people — engineers, actors, 
professors -  have tried to make ends meet by selling cigarettes and vegetables in the 
marketplace and doing hard labor.”44 Thus, an economic crisis developed in Kosovo in 
which many lacked the basic human rights defined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. In particular, Article 23 states, “Everyone has the right to work, to free 
choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work.”45 It is telling, 
however, that during this economic crisis, Albanians continued to engage in business 
with Serbians,46 thereby further undermining the argument of “ancient ethnic hatreds.” 
Actors both inside and outside of Kosovo attempted to deal with the worsening 
situation. In Kosovo, a movement of parallel institutions and passive resistance 
developed under the leadership of Dr. Ibrahim Rugova to deal with the economic 
distress.47 At the same time, an Italian humanitarian organization known as St. Egidio 
sponsored negotiations that began in 1993 and culminated in 1996 with high-level 
negotiations between Rugova and Milosevic. Rubin explains, “Part of the reason for 
their success, in St. Egidio’s estimation, was that it had built up relations of trust with 
both sides through years of humanitarian effort.. ..[At the meetings in 1996] the
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discussions focused first on humanitarian issues.” Just as the solution to many of the 
nationalist problems in Macedonia, as discussed in Chapter 3, involved the promotion of 
universal human rights, a similar pattern began to appear in Kosovo.
The Rome Agreement, signed in September 1996, dealt with the educational 
system in Kosovo. Rubin highlights the agreement’s significance, noting, “Milosevic 
effectively recognized Rugova as the leader of his people. Rugova had agreed to discuss 
an issue of immediate practical importance, not simply the independence of Kosovo.”49 
Rugova thus let go of nationalist issues, such as the status of Kosovo, and focused instead 
on human rights, in this case the right to education. Shortly after the signing of the 
Rome Agreement, a United Nations’ report on minorities noted, “The recent agreement 
between President Milosevic of Serbia and Dr. Rugova on the question of education is a 
major step forward. Both sides should take the opportunity to continue and broaden this 
dialogue, including through direct talks.”50 It is important to note that in dealing with 
minority issues, the report stressed the importance of universal human rights, such as the 
right to education.
Sadly, neither Rugova’s campaign of passive resistance nor the groundbreaking 
steps taken through the Rome Agreement succeeded in mitigating the conflict. Rubin 
explains that when it came time to implement the agreement, the two sides disagreed on 
the practicalities. At a moment when the West might have stepped in to exert some 
leverage, the West in general ignored the agreement.51 Similarly, when Rugova’s 
resistance movement failed to win international support, a group of militant ethnic 
Albanians within Kosovo decided to form the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to harass 
Serbian police and military forces in Kosovo. At the same time, Milosevic’s regime
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continued to suffer a loss in legitimacy following the failure of his war in Bosnia and
Croatia, and the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. Sociologist Eric Gordy thus
explains, “Since the signing of the peace accords in the winter of 1995 it [the Milosevic
regime] no longer had a war with which to justify its continuation.”
Milosevic thus increasingly turned his attention to Kosovo. “Many in the
Belgrade opposition,” according to Reineck,
believe that Milosevic is waging a campaign to maintain his sovereignty in 
Kosovo in the wake of the Bosnian tragedy and his failure to create the 
Greater Serbian state he championed. The aggression in Kosovo is not 
about preserving the ‘cradle of Serbian culture.’ It is about saving face, 
about defending a precarious political career with an anachronistic, 
contrived nationalist crusade.54
Just as Milosevic originally provoked the crisis in Kosovo in 1989 for personal reasons,
he continued to contribute to the worsening state of affairs not out of extreme
nationalistic sentiments, but rather as a way to bolster his own repressive regime.
Milosevic thus directed the Serbian forces to engage in an increasingly violent and
repressive campaign against the KLA.
The KLA had begun as a fairly small group, and Dr. Rugova had originally
publicly disassociated himself from their activities and refused to allow his government
to provide support for their tactics.55 The first factor that served to dramatically increase
the KLA’s power came with the collapse of the neighboring Albanian state in 1997.
Albania had provided large amounts of inexpensive war materials and supplies for the
black-market. With the country’s collapse following a financial crisis, cheap weapons
surged onto the market and flooded into Kosovo. Rubin concludes that the arms “finally
enabled the Kosovo Liberation Army to field a militarily significant force.”56 By the
beginning of 1998, then, the KLA regularly attacked and killed Serbian officials and
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policemen. The KLA had, in addition, secured complete military control of several areas 
within Kosovo.
Rubin then relates, “The decision by Belgrade to take back one of these areas led 
to the first major massacre of the war, that of the Jashari clan in Drenica in an operation
S7extending from February 28 to March 5, 1998.” Rubin’s account reveals two important 
aspects of the violence. First, by implicating Belgrade he provides support for the idea 
that Milosevic directed the campaign. Second, he notes that the Serbian forces not only 
attacked the insurgents, but also in fact massacred a whole family of civilians. Journalist 
and genocide expert Samantha Power explains that the Serbian attack turned the tide for 
the KLA. Following the massacre popular support for the guerilla organization increased
co
dramatically. Other sources agree with Power’s analysis and as one scholar notes, “The 
death of Adam Jashari, a regional KLA commander, added a sense of martyrdom on the 
part of the ethnic Albanians. There was a significant increase in the ranks of the KLA 
and a spread of hostilities.”59 Following an established pattern of nationalist activity in 
the Balkans, then, repression and human rights violations, such as violent attacks on 
civilians, created an upsurge in militant nationalist activity.
Several United Nations reports confirm the extent to which the Serbian police and 
military ignored the basic human rights of the insurgents and directed their attacks 
against ethnic Albanian civilians. A 1997 report on the situation of human rights 
observed, “The Special Rapporteur has continued to receive reports of serious ill- 
treatment and torture committed in Kosovo against persons in police custody.”60 One 
year later a report of the Secretary-General stated:
The desperate situation of the civilian population remains the most
disturbing aspect of the hostilities in Kosovo. I am particularly concerned
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that civilians increasingly have become the main target in the conflict.
Fighting in Kosovo has resulted in a mass displacement of civilian 
populations, the extensive destruction of villages and means of livelihood, 
and the deep trauma and despair of displaced populations. Many villages 
have been destroyed by shelling and burning following operations 
conducted by federal and Serbian government forces.61
Many observers likened these disturbing events in Kosovo to the similar tactics of “ethnic
cleansing” that had occurred in Bosnia and Croatia.62
Duijzings contrasts the policies of “ethnic cleansing” with the reality of the
diverse and multi-faceted population that had lived in Kosovo before onset of hostilities.
He explains:
[T]he war fought in former Yugoslavia, and the process of national 
homogenization and ‘ethnic cleansing’ that have accompanied the war 
seem to have been primarily motivated by the necessity to forge single and 
unambiguous identities out of a population that is very much mixed and of 
diverse origins.. ..It seems that the violence in former Yugoslavia is in the 
end not only the result of opposite and incompatible identities, it is 
perhaps even more the means to achieve them.63
The danger of extremist nationalist ideology, then, lies not only in its ability to convince
people of the existence of “ancient ethnic hatreds,” but through violence to actually bring
into being a state of hatred based in ethnicity where none had existed before. Particularist
and exclusive nationalist ideology of this kind cannot help but serve as a serious
impediment to those interested in promoting universal human rights.
War in Kosovo Ends
The situation in Kosovo continued to worsen, and by the end of 1998 sources 
showed a sharp build-up of Serbian forces in Kosovo.64 In January of the following year, 
Serbian troops massacred a number of ethnic Albanians at the village of Racak, causing a 
large number of people to become refugees. At this point, the West finally became
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seriously involved in the situation and demanded that the parties gather at the French 
town of Rambouillet for negotiations. The leading Western powers, and the U.S. in 
particular, used the threat of NATO air force strikes to back their demand that the leaders 
negotiate with one another,65 employing the same tactics of coercive diplomacy that had 
proved successful in ending the war in Bosnia and Croatia, as discussed briefly in 
Chapter 3.
The U.S. and the West thus threatened violence in order to halt human rights 
violations. It is only unfortunate that the U.S. had not entered the conflict sooner, either 
to support Rugova’s campaign of non-violent resistance, to pressure both sides to 
implement the Rome Agreement, or to insist on further negotiations regarding the 
promotion of universal human rights for all those involved in the problems in Kosovo.
By 1999, however, given the human rights abuses that had already occurred, Milosevic’s 
track record of “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia and Croatia, and the alarming build-up of 
Serbian forces in and around Kosovo, it does seem as though the West had few options 
other than to threaten Milosevic with the use of force to try and compel a political 
settlement, and then to use force when that settlement proved elusive. It is also 
important to note that after the Rambouillet negotiations had failed, the U.S. and NATO 
felt that they had exhausted all other non-violent options for resolving the situation. In 
the end, however successful the NATO war against Milosevic might have been in ending 
the atrocities that Milosevic had organized against Kosovar Albanians, as we shall see the 
use of violence in the defense of human rights abuses proved an imperfect, though 
perhaps necessary, solution for the broader problems of regional stability.
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In spite of the complex set of circumstances that had preceded the atrocities in
1999, to many observers it appeared as though the U.S. and the other western states
participated in the negotiations at Rambouillet on the “side” of the ethnic Albanians. In
particular, Annex B of the draft agreement that the U.S. was urging both ethnic Albanian
leaders and Serbian leaders to sign stated:
NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, 
and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access 
through the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] including associated 
airspace and territorial waters.66
By signing the agreement, Serbian leaders would be allowing NATO free access to their
entire country. Regarding Annex B, analyst Rubin notes, “This curious provision seems
almost designed to force a war, if it did not simply result from careless drafting.”67
By the time the Albanian and Serbian leaders gathered in Rambouillet, the conflict had
become so polarized and black and white that the major powers had no choice but to
appear to “choose sides.” Attempting to improve the human rights of suffering ethnic
Albanians placed the U.S., in the minds of many observers, necessarily on the “side” of
ethnic Albanian extremists, thus further demonstrating the difficulties that arise as a
result of exclusive nationalist ideologies. Of course, the U.S. did not help the situation by
drafting Annex B of the Interim Accord.
In addition, the American media contributed to the problem by its oversimplified
portrayal of the complex history of the region. Following the pattern of selective
victimization, discussed in Chapter 1, in general American media sources omitted
references to the KLA as a guerrilla force that had killed Serbians as part of its own
campaign of resistance. The media not only helped to gamer American support for the
war, but also contributed to a process whereby, in historian Misha Glenny’s words, “little
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sympathy is expressed for the victims of the conflicts if they belong to a national 
community which is considered the original aggressor.”68 The media’s omission of 
Serbian suffering in Kosovo thus also contributed to the perception that NATO was on 
the “side” of the Albanians.
In any event, the Serbian delegation, which Milosevic had not authorized to 
negotiate any aspects of the agreement, refused to sign, and when the ethnic Albanian 
delegation finally did sign the agreement, the NATO governments had no choice except 
to either commence a bombing campaign against the Milosevic regime, or else to 
seriously lose credibility by demonstrating to the world the lack of force behind NATO’s 
threats. Some detractors of NATO’s actions accused the alliance of using the language 
of human rights as smokescreen for their own ulterior motives, in this case the defense of 
NATO’s credibility and important role in Europe. While many historical examples, 
from the time of Alexander the Great to the Great Power actions in the Balkans of the 
nineteenth century, provide instances in which human rights rhetoric did indeed obscure 
self-centered motives, during the war in Kosovo NATO went to great lengths to combat 
this perception. It is again important to point out that NATO leaders also had exhausted 
all non-military options before proceeding with the air strikes.
Throughout the conflict NATO leaders attempted to overcome the image that the 
alliance was on the side of ethnic Albanian guerrillas, and stressed instead that their goals 
included the protection of universal human rights. For example, when NATO threatened 
the use of force before the Rambouillet negotiations, one analyst explains that it “sought 
to ensure that its demands corresponded precisely to those uttered by the Security 
Council. While this fact did not provide a legal justification for the threat in itself, the
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alliance was less vulnerable to pursing its own goals and agenda through violent 
means.”69 Similarly, in a “Statement on Kosovo” made by the Heads of State and 
Government at a summit that occurred after the bombing campaign had begun, NATO 
leaders stressed their commitment to universal principals in their humanitarian 
intervention, as opposed to the perception that they had chosen sides. The statement 
declared, “The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for 
which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law.”70
In addition, NATO leaders worked hard to minimize the unavoidable 
contradictions between the tactics of war, and an operation with the stated goal of 
protecting human rights. Samantha Power explains, “The Geneva conventions 
prohibited the bombing of dual civilian-military sites if the ‘incidental loss of civilian 
life.. .would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage’ of the 
strike. American and European lawyers had almost as much to say about the conduct of 
the operation as their political supervisors.”71 As noted in Chapter 3, the Geneva 
Accords, which regulate the conduct of warfare, drew directly on the ideas of the 
Universal Declaration in their prohibitions against employing violence towards civilians. 
NATO’s deliberations regarding specific bombing targets suggest both the objectivity of 
universal human rights as well as the power of those rights to impact international 
conduct. NATO’s actions thus contrasted starkly with the policies of the Milosevic 
regime, which directly targeted civilians in the course of its repression of the KLA.
To almost everyone’s surprise, Milosevic did not quickly cave into the NATO 
demands after the bombing began, and the war dragged on for several months. While
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NATO’s military sought to coerce Milosevic into surrendering, international diplomats 
attempted to formulate a settlement that would bring the hostilities to a close. After 
several months of a lack of diplomatic progress that corresponded to an ever-increasing 
military campaign, Russian President Boris Yeltsin suggested that Russia and the United 
States work together to find a solution. Faced with pressure from his own associates, 
unhappy soldiers and their families, as well as from Russia, Milosevic finally surrendered 
on June 3, 1999, and seventy-eight days after it had begun, the bombing campaign ended. 
Samantha Power notes that Milosevic had surrendered in part because he was “afraid that
• 77if NATO indeed staged a ground invasion, he would be arrested for war crimes.” If
Milosevic did surrender because he feared the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), his actions then provide further testimony of the power of
international organizations dedicated to protecting universal human rights.
The resulting agreement between Milosevic and NATO stipulated that all Serbian
troops and police would leave the province of Kosovo and 50,000 NATO peacekeepers
would instead ensure the area’s security. More than one million of the ethnic Albanians
who had become refugees during the war returned home and began the hard work of
putting their lives back together.73 Although NATO had brought the military conflict to
an end, upon Milosevic’s surrender the United Nations passed a resolution that stipulated
exactly how the province would be governed. In particular, and of great importance to
later developments within Macedonia, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 demanded:
[T]hat the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end 
immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for 
demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security 
presence.. ..[And decided] that the responsibilities of the international 
security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will 
include:.. .conducting border monitoring duties as required.74
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In addition, the Resolution declared “that the main responsibilities of the international 
civil presence will include:.. .protecting and promoting human rights.”75 To address a 
problem of abuses of minorities, Resolution 1244 stipulated the protection of human 
rights, not the protection of the rights of one particular group of people over and above 
all others.
Although Milosevic remained in power, by September 2000 the Serbian people 
had grown tired of their leader’s reckless military adventures. The citizens thus voted 
him out of office in favor of Serbian economics professor Vojislav Kostunica. Although 
Milosevic attempted to contest the results of the election, large numbers of workers, 
police, students, and soldiers marched non-violently to Belgrade, demanded the end of 
Milosevic’s tenure in office, and secured the transfer of power to Kostunica. Some 
months later, in return for a large pledge of economic aid, the Kostunica government 
handed Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).76 Finally, the individual responsible for so much nationalist violence and so 
many abuses of human rights would be required to answer for his crimes in front of an 
objective and international court of justice. The topic of the ICTY will be returned to at 
the end of the chapter.
Immediate Impact on Macedonia
In the meantime, neighboring Macedonia had suffered immensely as a result of 
the war next-door. Once NATO had begun the bombing campaign against Milosevic, 
Serbian forces began rounding up at gunpoint all the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and 
herding them to the border. In what they termed “Operation Horseshoe,” Serbian troops
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forced more than 1.3 million Kosovars from their homes and into Macedonia and 
Albania.77 Macedonia proved unable to cope with the unraveling humanitarian disaster 
and at one point Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski even closed the border to keep 
further refugees from entering. Many ethnic Albanians then found themselves trapped in
'70
an uncertain and dangerous wasteland in between Kosovo and Macedonia.
Georgievski did not govern the country by himself, however, and his coalition 
partner, the ethnic Albanian leader Arben Xhaferi pursued a somewhat different policy. 
In addition to making strong statements in favor of the NATO campaign in general, he 
called on ethnic Albanians to take Kosovars into their own homes to avoid having the 
Kosovars resettled in yet a third country. At the same time, even though Macedonian 
police had treated some Kosovars very harshly at the border, Xhaferi exercised a policy 
of moderation and restraint. According to Ackermann, he “called on ethnic Albanians 
not to let themselves be provocated because that would play into the hands of
• • *70
Milosevic.” The Macedonian government eventually did reopen the border, and in 
early May Prime Minister Georgievski promised Secretary-General Kofi Annan that the 
border would remain open. All in all, over a quarter of a million refugees arrived in 
Macedonia, one refugee for every eight citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.80
Although most of these ethnic Albanians would eventually return to Kosovo 
following the conclusion of NATO’s bombing campaign, a 2002 U.S. Country Report on 
Human Rights Practices noted that, “approximately 8,000 remained in the country at 
year’s end, and the Government believes that there may be about an equal number of
Q 1
unregistered refugees.” The policies Xhaferi promoted in response to the refugee crisis 
contrast starkly with those employed elsewhere by other nationalist leaders. It is easy to
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imagine that Xhaferi could have used the situation of massive destabilization in 
Macedonia to call for a militant nationalist crusade to right all real and perceived wrongs 
against ethnic Albanians. It is impossible to prove a definitive connection, but Xhaferi 
did not follow such a course of extreme nationalist rhetoric, and Macedonia did not 
descend into ethnic violence, in spite of the amazingly difficult situation that landed on 
her doorstep.
Nevertheless, in addition to the huge number of refugees, the NATO campaign
affected Macedonia in many other ways as well. Ackermann explains:
The economic spill-over effects from the Kosovo crisis therefore hold the 
potential of negatively affecting inter-ethnic relations, not only because 
Slavic Macedonians were blaming Kosovar Albanians for draining the 
economic system, but also because in times of economic stress existing 
inter-ethnic divisions become magnified as ethnic groups are forced to 
compete over the allocation of scarce resources.82
Ackermann’s conclusions thus provide further evidence for the links between difficult
economic situations and ethnic tensions. Macedonia’s economy, which had been in a
precarious enough position before the war, took yet another blow as a result of the crisis
in Kosovo. Scholar Robert Hislope recounts, “In 1996 Macedonia had registered its first
year of economic growth since independence. A steady upturn commenced but was cut
short by the crisis in Kosovo in 1999.”83 A U.S. State Department report similarly notes,
“The crisis cut many firms off from customers in Serbia and made the transportation of
goods to and from other parts of Europe more difficult and expensive. The overall
economic effects of the Kosovo crisis are not clear yet, but the initial impact on the
economy was quite negative.”
Saddened by the desperate economic situation within Macedonia as well as the
host of other problems that would continue to plague Macedonia following the onset of
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the crisis in Kosovo, Saso Ordanoski, editor of a Macedonian magazine remarked, 
“Macedonia was forced to end up paying the bill for Serbia’s injustice against Kosovo’s 
Albanians. In the end.. .if NATO countries had used only a small proportion of what they 
had spent on bombs to modernize Macedonia and other Balkan countries, the region
??85would have had a far better chance not only for integration but for survival.”
Ordanoski’s observations do not necessarily condemn the NATO actions in Kosovo, 
rather, they allude to the complex nature of both the problem and the necessary solution. 
Since the violence did not arise out of simple ethnic hatred, any solution to the tensions 
must deal with the wider roots of the conflict. Since economic distress undoubtedly 
contributed to the tension, it seems that alleviating the economic problems should be as 
central to a final solution as the use of military force to halt the immediate violation of 
human rights.
Many others within Macedonia shared Ordanoski’s negative assessment and, 
immediately after the onset of NATO’s bombing campaign against Milosevic, protestors 
in Macedonia took to the streets. Demonstrators gathered outside the American 
Embassy, chanting slogans denouncing NATO. By nightfall the crowd had grown and 
threatened to turn violent. Demonstrations also spread to the German and British 
embassies. As the American Ambassador and his staff took refuge in the embassy vault, 
a phone call to NATO brought the arrival of American military forces, who diffused the 
situation. After less than an hour the situation calmed down and the ambassador freed 
himself and his staff from the vault.86 A brief analysis of this episode reveals the dangers 
in an over-reliance on ethnicity to explain events, as well as the complicated nature of 
ethnic identity in general.
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General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, had learned of 
the demonstrations when US Ambassador to Macedonia, Chris Hill, called him from the 
embassy vault to ask for assistance. After the NATO troops had dispersed the crowd, 
Hill explained to Clark “that the pro-Serb crowd had been bused down to the capital from 
a northern town that had a largely Serb population.” Clark then concluded, “This last fact 
confirmed my view that this was a planned attack designed to spark resistance to NATO 
in Macedonia and contribute to destabilizing a friendly democratic government. It was
• 87part of the way Milosevic would fight back against NATO and his neighbors.” 
Unfortunately, Clark does not share any evidence that would explain how he made the 
leap from a “pro-Serb crowd,” to the deliberate provocation on the part of Milosevic. In 
contrast, several major newspapers characterized the crowd in a somewhat different 
fashion as they reported on the event.
John Nadler with the Ottawa Citizen provides the most convincing evidence that 
might support Clark’s assertion regarding the nature of the crowd. He writes, “In Skopje,
oo
a mob of about 2,000 ethnic Serbs attacked the U.S. Embassy.” In contrast, the Agence 
France Presse did not specify the ethnicity of those gathered as it announced, “pro-Serb 
demonstrators protesting NATO air strikes in neighboring Yugoslavia yesterday laid
• • 8Qsiege to the U.S., British, and German embassies.” Alessandra Stanley from the New 
York Times had a similar take on the event: “[Tjhousands of sympathizers with Serbia 
marched on the American Embassy.”90 The American and French papers thus refused to 
identify the exact ethnicity of the demonstrators, pointing instead to the fact that either 
they sympathized with those of Serbian ethnicity or with those currently living in Serbia.
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Macedonian politicians presented a slightly more nuanced depiction of events. 
Regarding the demonstration, Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski told the Boston Globe, 
“The two biggest problems the country is facing at the moment are the inflow of refugees 
from Kosovo and the emergence of anti-NATO and anti-American feelings among the 
Macedonian public.”91 Similarly, though not referring to the protests directly, former 
Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov said in an interview, “It is obvious that after seventy 
years of common life there are many friendly business and family ties [with Yugoslavia] 
that play a very important role. That is why the Macedonian population accepted very 
unheartedly [szc] the strikes against Yugoslavia.”92 Both politicians allude to the fact that 
while the demonstrators might have had strong ties with Serbia and sympathies for 
people living in Serbia, they in fact belonged to Macedonia.
My own personal experience corroborates the assessments of the politicians. I 
was working in Macedonia at the time as an English teacher, and found out later that one 
of my students, a young woman named Zorica, had in fact skipped my class to go throw 
stones at the American Embassy. She saw no contradiction in returning to class to 
continue learning English the next week. Although she carries a Macedonian passport 
and would probably in her first response identify herself as Macedonian, further 
discussions revealed that her family considers themselves Serbian, even though they live 
in Macedonia and have done so for some time. Similarly, another close friend named 
Zoki participated in the demonstrations outside the British Embassy before police 
wielding teargas forced him to return home to his British fiancee! They are now happily 
married, have two children, and live in France. One can only wonder how their children 
will eventually define their ethnic identities. Furthermore, in the weeks that followed the
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event, I heard many Macedonians explain that in fact students in a high school located 
next-door to the embassy had served as the primary source of protestors, as many wanted 
to avoid the day’s lessons and tests.
The story of the protest outside the American Embassy thus demonstrates yet 
again the difficulty in determining a person or a group’s ethnic identity. Does their 
language, citizenship, country of residence, family history, or political sympathy play the 
greatest role in determining their ethnic identity? From an objective, external standpoint, 
it is impossible to say. Each individual person present at the embassy that night would 
have to answer the question of their ethnicity for him or herself. Furthermore, the 
complicated nature of identity makes it almost impossible to conclude that individuals or 
groups of people acted or felt a certain way simply because of their ethnicity.
In all these different ways, then, the crisis in Kosovo contributed to massive 
destabilization within Macedonia. The economy suffered considerably and ethnic 
tensions grew worse in a region that had been making steady progress on ethnic problems 
through the workings of civil society. In addition, a country that had previously 
welcomed NATO’s presence began to witness serious signs of anti-American sentiment 
among the population. Adding to the general difficulties, over a quarter of a million 
ethnic-Albanian refugees streamed into the small country of Macedonia, which by itself 
could only claim a population of just over two million. Of great importance for later 
developments, many scholars testify that along with the flood of refugees, guerrillas from 
the KLA also made their way into Macedonia.93 Although NATO’s military solution 
undoubtedly halted the “ethnic cleansing” and potential genocide on the part of Serbian
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forces, the operation fell short in dealing with the broader context and longer-term effects 
of the operation, particularly with regard to the situation within Macedonia.
Nevertheless, the Macedonian politicians refused to let the crisis bring down the 
government. Although Macedonian authorities worried about the effect of the KLA in 
Macedonia, Ackermann relates, “The Macedonian authorities have responded mostly 
with preventative rather than repressive measures, such as the monitoring of the 
movements of KLA members.”94 The Macedonian government thus did not contribute to 
the same cycle of violence that had occurred in Kosovo, where Serbian forces had 
launched a harsh counter-attack against KLA forces, violated the human rights of many 
in the process, and thereby increased the popularity of and support for the KLA troops.
At the same time, ethnic Albanian politicians also exercised a policy of moderation. As 
was already noted, Xhaferi had called for restraint regarding the refugee situation. In 
general, Rubin notes, “Albanians by and large continued to pursue their goals peacefully 
through the country’s political process.”95 In her final assessment, however, Ackermann 
notes rather ominously, “But whether there will be continued KLA activities again 
depends on finding a political solution for Kosovo.”96
Longer Term Impact: Almost a Civil War
In 1998 the Republic of Macedonia seemed poised for success as a multi-ethnic 
democracy; by 2001 nationalism was on the upsurge, and accompanying violence and 
human rights violations dragged the country to the brink of a major civil war. The 
question then becomes, with all the ways in which the Macedonian government had 
progressed towards resolving ethnic conflicts and tension through the workings of civil
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society, how did this startling change come about? An examination of both the 
immediate and longer-range causes for the violence and human rights violations within 
Macedonia sheds further light on the divisive nature of nationalism, as well as the lack of 
compelling evidence for “ancient ethnic hatreds” as the direct cause of that violence.
The violence in Macedonia began in late February 2001 when a group of ethnic 
Albanian insurgents launched an attack in the border village of Tanusevci, ushering in 
several months of conflict between Albanian rebels and government forces, who were 
primarily ethnic Macedonians. Hislope explains that the immediate impetus for the 
attack involved the official delineation of the border between Serbia and Macedonia, 
which had been established just several weeks earlier and threatened the Albanian 
nationalist project of a greater Albania.97 Scholar Justin Eldridge similarly notes,
“Skopje and Belgrade’s efforts to delineate the border between Kosovo and Macedonia 
probably led some ethnic Albanians in the area to believe that the government would 
soon threaten family ties and cross-border business, to include the lucrative smuggling of 
cigarettes and other commodities.”98 Sokalski also writes, “The signing of the 
Macedonia-FRY agreement on the final demarcation of their mutual border irritated 
radical politicians in Kosovo, who believed they should have been involved in the 
negotiation process since some of the disputed territory was situated along the Kosovo 
section of the border.”99
The Albanian forces thus sought to control the village themselves in order to 
protect the people’s business, family, and political connections with ethnic Albanians 
living on the other side of the border. Although the issue and nature of borders and their 
connections with nationalism was discussed more extensively in Chapter 1, it is useful to
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note here that borders by their very nature divide people from each other. While those 
divisions in and of themselves do not necessarily have negative implications, feelings of 
nationalism, rooted in the concept of a territorially defined nation state, stand in 
opposition to an understanding of universal human rights, which seeks to view all people 
as equally deserving of the same rights regardless of the particular location in which they 
may reside, or the state in which they claim citizenship.
Yet another way in which the nature of the border between Macedonia and
Yugoslavia contributed to the violent conflict involved the patrolling of that border. As
was noted earlier, until the end of its mandate first UNPROFOR and then UNPREDEP
had patrolled the borders between Macedonia and Yugoslavia. A 1997 United Nations
report testifies to the importance of those patrols, noting:
In the past three months they [UNPREDEP] conducted over 200 patrols 
per week and observed an average of some 153 patrols each week by the 
armed forces of Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the host 
country. Observed illegal smuggling incidents decreased substantially 
during the period from early spring 1997.100
As already discussed, in contrast to UNPREDEP, NATO had no intention of 
dealing with problems inside Macedonia, as its interests and mandate instead led NATO 
to focus primarily on Kosovo. Once NATO’s air war with Belgrade had ended, however, 
UN Resolution 1244 had authorized NATO’s forces, dubbed KFOR, to enter Kosovo and 
charged them with securing the border. Eldridge explains that in reality, “the increased 
fighting [in Macedonia] belied the hollow claim that it [KFOR] had effectively secured 
the border. Both U.S. and German troops, whose zones of responsibility in Kosovo 
border Macedonia, came under the harshest criticism.”101 While UNPREDEP managed 
to decrease smuggling incidents, KFOR’s inability to effectively guard the border
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allowed weapons and insurgents from Kosovo to cross the border and continue their 
actions in Macedonia. The country thus continued to suffer from the poor political 
decision to officially recognize Taiwan. Macedonian political leaders did in fact 
recognize the magnitude of their mistake, however, and in June 2001 the government 
quietly discarded Taipei in favor of Beijing, thus clearing the way for eventual United 
Nations support for a peacekeeping mission.102
In the meantime, over the course of spring, the violence spread from Tanusevci to 
other villages situated near the border between Macedonia and Kosovo, as the group of 
ethnic Albanians, who began to call themselves the National Liberation Army (NLA), 
secured an increasing amount of territory, killing several Macedonian soldiers and 
policemen in the process. In March, clashes began to occur in the areas surrounding the 
fairly sizeable city of Tetovo, which contained a majority of ethnic Albanian inhabitants 
and was also located fairly close to the border. “By summer,” Sokalski writes, “a 
sizeable part of Macedonia’s northern and western territory, consisting of at least eighty 
mostly ethnically mixed villages, had fallen prey to NLA units. Some sixty Macedonian 
soldiers and policemen lost their lives in ambushes or in combat. Civilian victims, 
including thousands of displaced persons, have yet to be fully accounted for.” Regarding 
UNPREDEP’s role in stabilizing Macedonia and effectively preventing violence, 
Sokalski then concludes, “Indeed, two years following UNPREDEP’s termination, peace 
in Macedonia was breached; by a stroke of bitter consolation, peace in Macedonia was 
vindicated -  too late.”103
The end of the UNPREDEP mission and the demarcation of the border thus 
provided some of the causes for the violence. At the same time, one NLA commander
227
admitted, “We have been planning this for years. We are not some new group that was 
just cobbled together.”104 An examination of the broader, longer-term causes of the 
violence further demonstrates the connections between events in Kosovo and violence in 
Macedonia. At the same time, an analysis of the roots of the conflict shows the difficulty 
in pinning the violence and human rights violations directly on ethnic tensions or 
“ancient ethnic hatreds.” Many other factors including the difficult economic situation 
and the ambitions of individual politicians played an equally important, if not a much 
greater role, in the outbreak of hostilities.
Particularly following the crisis in Kosovo, as has already been discussed, 
Macedonia suffered from a dismal economic outlook. Even after the outbreak of 
renewed violence, political analyst Brenda Pearson explains, “The majority of ethnic 
Macedonians and Albanians believe that the biggest problems in the country are poverty 
and unemployment -  they view turbulent inter-ethnic relations and renewed violence as 
less urgent then shoring up the economy.”105 A United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) poll, conducted in January 2001, one month before the conflict began, supports 
Pearson’s conclusions. The people surveyed by the UNDP ranked the importance of the 
problems confronting the country: “unemployment (70.4 percent), low salaries (61.7 
percent), poverty (59.2 percent), high prices (50.2 percent), crime (48.7 percent), 
corruption (46.9 percent), health (40.9 percent), instability in the region (38.3 percent), 
and ethnic problems (37.6 percent).”106 Hislope then concludes that the combination of a 
high number of unemployed ethnic Albanian men faced with a bleak economic future and 
who did not particularly trust the Macedonian state contributed significantly to the onset
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of hostilities. Significantly, this analysis has more to do with the economic situation than 
relations between ethnic groups.
A further problem with the hypothesis that violence developed directly as a result 
of ethnic tensions arises from the way in which this argument overlooks the complex 
realities of ethnic identity. Although the economic situation brought hardship to the 
people of Macedonia, everyone did not suffer equally from the crisis. In particular, since 
the socialist system of Yugoslavia had historically marginalized ethnic Albanians, they 
had had a greater experience with the private sector. Those experiences then proved a 
considerable asset for many, but not all, ethnic Albanians as Macedonia made the painful 
transition to a free-market economy. The majority of rural Albanian farmers and those 
Albanians who remained in small industry did not share in the prosperity enjoyed by 
others of their ethnic group. These economic differences provided important class 
distinctions among ethnic Albanians.107 Thus, just as it had during Ottoman times, 
economic status played an important role in differentiating people. Moreover, 
differences existed between ethnic Albanians living in different regions. In general, 
Albanians living in Macedonia enjoyed a higher standard of life and less government 
repression than those in Albania or in Yugoslavia. In a telling insight, one scholar notes, 
“There are more shared experiences between Macedonian Albanians and ethnic 
Macedonians than between Albanians from Kosovo and those from Albania.”108
In addition to economic differences, political ideologies also divided ethnic 
Albanians. By 2001 several different political groups struggled to win the allegiances of 
ethnic Albanians living in Western Macedonia. As a result, many of those involved in 
the conflict with the Macedonian government had grown particularly dissatisfied with the
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established Albanian political parties. They stated that for them the fight involved 
challenging the existing Albanian political parties, and they only joined the NLA as an 
afterthought. Ali Ahmeti, the leader of the NLA, thus provided an alternative for those 
Albanians who had lost faith in the country’s elected political leaders. According to 
Pearson, Ahmeti sought to unite the fragmented groups of ethnic Albanians by launching 
a civil war against the Macedonian state. She explains, “[T]he conflict really was a civil 
war turned upside down; the inter-ethnic dimension of the conflict became the exit 
strategy for ethnic Albanians at war with each other.”109
Liotta supports Pearson’s conclusion as he explains, “[T]he insurgency was as 
much about intra-ethnic Albanian division and rivalry as it was about the fight for civil 
society and more equitable distribution, administration, and justice within the Republic of 
Macedonia.”110 U.S. Ambassador James Pardew, who would prove instrumental in 
finding a political solution to the conflict, similarly testified, “I think the objectives of 
these people who are running this insurgency are personal power for themselves.. ..At the 
end of the day, I think they are seeking greater political influence inside the Albanian 
community both in Macedonia and in Kosovo.”111
Just as in other instances in the Balkans, then, leaders employed and encouraged 
nationalism to unite a group of people fragmented by many differences including class 
and political ideology. Their political strategy involved unifying disparate groups of 
people in the face of a common enemy, in this case the established Macedonian 
government. Significantly, as part of their bid for power, the leaders of the NLA 
demanded greater rights for ethnic Albanians within Macedonia. Rather than working for 
universal human rights, the insurgents fought for the rights of their particular group.
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Although the Macedonian government, comprised of both Macedonian and Albanian 
politicians, had made progress towards the protection of universal human rights, the slow 
pace of implementing those reforms helped the NLA to label their insurgency as an
119ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that according to many 
external and objective sources, the Macedonian government had indeed taken great steps 
towards the protection of both minority and human rights, which suggests that the 
conflict had less to do with civil rights for ethnic Albanians and more to do with other 
factors such as economics, the political ambitions of individual leaders such as Ahmeti, 
and the very real human rights abuses that had occurred within Kosovo.
As the war between Ahmeti’s NLA and the Macedonian Government continued, 
the cycle of violence began to resemble events in Kosovo: ethnic Albanian guerrillas 
would attack government forces, provoke an overreaction on the part of the government, 
which would then bolster support for the NLA from the ethnic Albanian community.
U.S. defense official and adviser Richard Perle points out that the victims of the 
government’s reaction included “a great many Albanians who have not in my view 
decided.. .to opt for a radical solution.”113 Ambassador Pardew suggests that Ahmeti and 
others understood the strong connections between human rights abuses and nationalism 
and deliberately sought to provoke the government in order to bolster the nationalist 
feelings of the undecided segment of the population.114 Individual leaders, then, 
employed a powerful strategy of violence combined with the rhetoric of rights for a 
particular group, to polarize groups of people and create ethnically orientated, divisive, 
nationalist ideologies. Those ideologies provided the background for the serious human 
rights violations that accompanied the conflict.
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An incident that occurred in the ethnic Albanian village of Ljuboten provides an
example of the severity with which the Macedonian government attempted to combat the
insurgency. Following a landmine explosion that had killed eight government soldiers,
Macedonian forces responded by attacking Ljuboten, which was located near the site of
the explosion. Human Rights Watch reported:
The operation left ten civilians dead and resulted in the arrest of more than 
100 men, many of whom were severely beaten while in police custody.
Contrary to assertions by the Macedonian government, a Human Rights 
Watch investigation on the ground in Ljuboten found no evidence of a 
presence by the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army.. ..The 
evidence available to Human Rights Watch indicates that the attack on 
Ljuboten had no military justification and was carried out for purposes of 
revenge.115
The Human Rights Watch report thus graphically demonstrates the truth of the statements 
regarding the government’s overreaction to the campaign of insurgency. The 
Macedonian government forces clearly violated the human rights of the villagers as they 
waged a campaign for revenge, killed civilians, and beat prisoners who had been 
detained.
At the same time, the report also suggests the lack of ethnic conflict that had 
existed in the village prior to the onset of the military campaign. The evidence that the 
report provided to disprove the government’s assertion of the presence of the NLA 
involved an agreement that the village of Ljuboten had entered into with neighboring 
villages. Community leaders within Ljuboten asserted that it would have been 
impossible for NLA insurgents to infiltrate the village because larger ethnic Macedonian 
villages surrounded the ethnic Albanian village of Ljuboten. Furthermore, the report 
explained, “seeking to avoid conflict with their ethnic Macedonian neighbors, the 
community leaders had negotiated an agreement with the neighboring ethnic Macedonian
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villages and the security forces to keep the NLA out of their village.”116 The report then
quotes Xhenan Aliu, who negotiated the agreement:
We had talks with the army, the police, and the villages of Rastak and 
Ljubance [the Macedonian areas].. .we agreed that there would be no NLA 
in the village, and no army or police.117
Before the violence, then, ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians had been working
together to keep armed combatants out of their area. One can only wonder, however,
how many more vicious attacks a village like Ljuboten could take before they began to
turn to the NLA for protection against the government forces, and the spirit of
collaboration between Macedonians and Albanians would gradually be replaced by
feelings of enmity based in the nationalist rhetoric articulated by the leaders of the
conflict.
A Particular Kind of Solution
Thankfully, just days after the awful incident in Ljuboten, leaders within 
Macedonia signed a political accord that ended the violence. The United States’ special 
envoy James Pardew and the European Union’s Francois Leotard traveled to Macedonia 
and brought the Albanian and Macedonian leaders together at the resort town of Ohrid in 
southern Macedonia to negotiate a settlement. Perhaps having learned lessons regarding 
coercive diplomacy from the earlier operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, the West 
intervened in the conflict in Macedonia before full-scale war developed. The diplomats 
used the threat of NATO actions to pressure the warring parties to negotiate, and, just as 
they had in both Bosnia and Kosovo, they used NATO troops to implement the eventual 
solution. Importantly, though, those NATO forces asked for and received United
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Nations’ approval for their peacekeeping mission. Nevertheless, Pearson notes, “The 
media of the two main ethnic groups portrayed the conflict in starkly ethnic terms; most 
of the Macedonian-language media depicted the negotiations as forfeiting Macedonian 
sovereignty to reward the Albanians.”119 In spite of the complicated roots of the conflict, 
then, the local media contributed to the idea that ethnic tensions served as the source of 
the problem.
At the Ohrid negotiations, Pardew and others did resist partitioning the country 
along ethnic lines because, as Pardew explained, “A lot of people jump to this idea of 
drawing lines somewhere in the Balkans as a solution to these kinds of conflicts. We 
absolutely disagree with that. We have seen this before and it has never worked out. We 
believe that concepts of individual rights and tolerance are the way to deal with these
• • 10C\kinds of minority issues.” In spite of Pardew’s emphasis on individual rights, the
resulting Ohrid Agreement in fact called for greater minority rights. Pearson explains:
The agreement mandates that the country adopt sweeping reforms to 
decentralize the government, increase ethnic minority rights and amend 
discriminatory passages in the constitution. The Framework thus reflects 
Western leaders’ belief that inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia were the 
central cause of the war, rather than a larger pan-Albanian problem 
stemming from the Kosovo conflict and the resulting diaspora of ethnic 
Albanians from the neighboring Serbian province.121
In particular, the agreement required the government to change the Constitution 
so that Macedonian Slavs were no longer the only “constituent people” in the country. 
The agreement also removed explicit constitutional protections for the Orthodox religion. 
Furthermore, Albanian would become the second official language of the country, and 
the state would have to provide higher education in Albanian. In a novel way of ensuring 
minority power in the government, the agreement stipulated that the parliament could not
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pass any new laws without a “double majority vote.” This solution meant that for any 
new legislation to come into effect, half the lawmakers who voted for it would have to 
come from one or more minority groups.122 In spite of Pardew’s words regarding 
individual rights, the resulting Ohrid Agreement focused on rights for the particularly 
ethnic Albanian community.+ As we have seen before, politics based on rights for 
particular groups of people, especially particular ethnic groups, can create significant 
problems in the long run. Nevertheless, because of their belief that simple ethnic tensions 
between Albanians and Macedonians had led to the conflict, the agreement tried to solve 
the conflict by guaranteeing greater rights for the ethnic Albanian minority.
The immediate impact of implementing the provisions of the Ohrid Agreement 
demonstrates the continued difficulties in attempting to solve a complicated and 
multifaceted problem with reference to particular minority rights. For example, since the 
agreement mandated increasing the status of the Albanian language, part of the solution 
involved creating bilingual identification documents, such as drivers’ licenses and vehicle 
registrations. Although the government adopted those requirements, a much larger 
problem arose over the status of passports. While ethnic Albanian leaders have 
demanded that passports be issued in Albanian, Macedonian leaders continue to insist 
that the government should only issue one type of passport, but that the personal 
information inside the passport could be in Albanian. Macedonian and Albanian 
politicians remain unable to agree on a solution for this problem.123
+Although the Albanian minority would eventually gain practical benefits from the Ohrid 
Agreement, it is important to note that the agreement itself presented more nuanced stipulations regarding 
minority rights. It states that in any area where a minority comprises at least 20% of the population, their 
language could be used as an official language. In effect this stipulation allowed Albanian to be used 
officially only after an international census determined that more than 20% of the population was Albanian. 
The nature of that census will be discussed shortly.
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The language issue reflects the deeper problem involving the confusion between 
ethnic identity and citizenship that was discussed in Chapter 3. An American consular 
official explains:
[W]hen filling out a form at the Embassy for a new U.S. passport, an 
ethnic Albanian who was bom in Macedonia and has a Macedonian 
passport, and then who later immigrated to the United States and became 
an American citizen, when faced with the question, ‘What is your 
nationality?’ will not write ‘American,’ even though the form he is filling 
out is for a U.S. passport, or even ‘Macedonian,’ even though his first 
nationality was Macedonian. He will write, (9 times out of 10)
‘Albanian,’ even if he has never set foot in Albania in his life.124
Although the Ohrid Agreement in theory attempted to move Macedonia closer to a
democratic, civil society, it is easy to imagine that by mandating the use of Albanian on
official state documents, the agreement contributed to the confusion between an ethnic
identity and the concept of citizenship.
It is interesting to briefly note the connections between the concept of citizenship,
the nature of a passport (which defines and identifies citizenship), and the modem,
territorially bounded nation-state, which came into being with the transition to territorial
sovereignty. Scholar John Torpey has examined the role of the passport for the modem
state and he explains:
[BJecause nation-states are both territorial and membership organizations, 
they must erect and sustain boundaries between nationals and non­
nationals, both at their physical borders and among people within those 
borders. Boundaries between persons that are rooted in the legal category 
of nationality can only be maintained, it turns out, by documents 
indicating a person’s nationality, for there is simply no other way to know 
this fact about someone.125
Torpey’s analysis first emphasizes the divisive nature of citizenship within a 
country; the very process of defining citizenship creates boundaries and divisions among 
groups of people. At the same time, the concept of citizenship is rooted in a somewhat
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subjective determination, which in fact necessitates the use of a passport. It is easy to 
see, then, why one might confuse ethnicity and citizenship as they both involve an 
element of individual decision. Nevertheless, within our modem system of territorial 
nation-states, the existence of a passport provides an objective method to determine an 
individual’s citizenship. An important hallmark of a functioning democracy then 
involves guaranteeing the same rights for all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity. The 
Ohrid Agreement, however, concentrated instead on the rights due to people as a result of 
their ethnic group.
Another important part of the agreement involved determining the ethnic make-up 
of Macedonia, because implementing many of its provisions depended on such 
considerations. For example, regarding the question of higher education, the agreement 
stipulated, “The principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in 
State universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the 
population of Macedonia until the enrolment reflects equitably the composition of the 
population of Macedonia.”126 Apparently the diplomats who had brokered the agreement 
had not learned from the fiasco of the 1994 census, described in Chapter 3, because they 
stipulated that yet another census should be held, once again under the auspices of the 
international community.
The results, made public at the end of 2003, declared that of the 2,022,547 people 
living in Macedonia in 2002, 64.18 per cent were Macedonian while 25.17 per cent were 
Albanian.127 The country immediately began to debate the results, and Macedonian 
journalist Branko Geroski commented, “Not a living soul in this country believes that the 
published results are the result of a precise statistical calculation and that people did not
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arrive at them through tedious political negotiations, carried out with foreign 
mediation.”128 The Agence France Presse explained that although many had hoped that 
the census would settle a long-standing dispute about the relative sizes of the majority 
and minority communities, both Albanian and Macedonian political leaders had begun to 
take issue with the results. In spite of the controversy, in a joint statement the OSCE, 
NATO, and the U.S. Embassy in Skopje declared their support for the results of the
1 2 9census.
Several weeks after the results had been published, the Chairman of the State 
Census Commission, Zoran Krstevski, resigned because of doubts regarding the
1 TOcredibility of the census results. Journalists also attacked the viability of the results for
a variety of reasons. Igor Ilievski complained that the census included Macedonian
1^1citizens who had been living abroad for many years. Branko Geroski noted, “[M]any 
people take this opportunity to freely ‘change’ their ethnic affiliation to date and to 
identify themselves as members of the privileged ethnic community.”132 Although it 
would be difficult to prove Geroski’s assertion, he certainly refers to a pattern of behavior 
that has occurred time and again in the Balkans, as people manipulated their ethnic 
identity in order to receive practical benefits. Especially since the Ohrid Agreement 
mandated much legislation that could be interpreted as conferring benefits on ethnic 
Albanians, it would be logical for Macedonian Muslims, who were discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 3, or even members of the Roma, community to identify themselves as 
Albanian.
In fact, a similar process had occurred in 1991 when a new ethnic group who 
claimed to be Egyptian suddenly appeared in both Kosovo and Macedonia and demanded
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their own category in the 1991 Yugoslavian census. It seems that prior to 1991, these 
self-described Egyptians had labeled themselves Albanians, because they spoke 
Albanian, practiced the Muslim faith, and lacked a better alternative on the census form. 
Furthermore, prior to the rise to power of Milosevic, the group could in general claim 
more advantages from being Albanian than from declaring themselves Egyptian, Roma, 
or members of any other small minority group. By 1990, however, it was no longer 
advantageous to be Albanian, and so this group began to define, or redraw, an old 
alternative identity. Unsurprisingly, both the Serbian and the Macedonian governments 
supported the identity shift, presumably in order to lower the reported numbers of ethnic 
Albanians.133 The example of the Egyptians of Macedonia and Kosovo again confirms 
the subjective and malleable nature of ethnic identity and suggests the degree to which 
political considerations influence the formulating of an ethnic identity.
In general then, it seems as though the 2002 census, just like the 1994 census, 
failed to solve the problems associated with determining the exact number of each ethnic 
minority. Given the evidence amassed here regarding the subjective nature of ethnic 
identity, an ethnic census seems to be a project perennially doomed to failure. 
Nevertheless, the NATO-backed Ohrid Agreement did end the violence and the worst of 
the human rights abuses. It kept Macedonia from a full-scale civil war, which would 
have undoubtedly involved further polarization of ethnic identities into divisive 
nationalist ideologies. Even though the agreement delineated solutions based on greater 
rights for a particular minority group, some analysts feel hopeful that it will indeed help 
to promote Macedonia’s transition to a full-fledged civil society and functioning 
democracy.134
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A More Universal Kind of Solution
Developing alongside political negotiations such as the Ohrid Agreement, a 
different kind of institution has promised a more universal solution to the nationalist 
problems and human rights violations in the Balkans. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the 
United Nations, with the strong support of the United States, had established an 
International Criminal Trial for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to deal with questions of 
atrocities committed in Bosnia. In 1997 NATO made its first arrest of a pair of Serb 
concentration camp guards. Following those arrests, a steady stream of suspects began to 
make their way to The Hague. In 1999 the ICTY sentenced Goran Jelisic, a man who 
had tortured and executed Muslims and Croats in a Serbian prison camp, to forty years
imprisonment. One year later the court found Croatian General Tihomir Blaskic guilty of
• •  1crimes against humanity and sentenced him to forty-five years of imprisonment.
As reports of further atrocities in Kosovo began to occur with increasing 
frequency, the United Nations broadened the mandate of the ICTY to include the 
province of Kosovo as well. Yugoslavia, however, refused to cooperate with any of the 
Tribunal’s requests for information. In a dramatic demonstration of this policy of non­
cooperation, the border officials refused to allow the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY into 
Kosovo to investigate the Racak massacre that had occurred in January 1999.
International media recorded the unceremonious refusal and broadcast the images around 
the world. One analyst notes that the “dramatic footage contributed to a climate making 
possible the more determined attitude of.. .NATO, leading to the summons of the parties
1 3Ato the Rambouillet Conference.”
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Two months into the NATO campaign, the ICTY indicted Serbian President 
Slobodan Milosevic for actions not only in Kosovo, but also for the role he had played in 
the Bosnian conflict. As was noted earlier, this indictment may have played a role in 
Milosevic’s decision to surrender and end the war with NATO. Nevertheless, Milosevic 
did not escape international justice, and following the election that turned over power in 
Serbia to Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia extradited Milosevic to The Hague in return for 
pledges of international economic aid and assistance. Milosevic thus became the thirty- 
ninth suspect to end up behind bars at The Hague, and he is currently standing trial for 
grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity.137
Regarding the importance of the ICTY, journalist Guy Lesser explains, “During 
the ten years the ICTY has been in existence, it has completed a score of trials that are 
bound to have lasting importance.. .in establishing the specific juridical facts of what 
happened in Yugoslavia between 1991 and 2000... .”138 While Tito had ignored the 
existence of human rights violations that had occurred as a result of the nationalist 
conflicts within Yugoslavia during WWII, as discussed in Chapter 2, the ICTY is 
establishing an objective record of the nature and responsibility for those crimes. Where 
Tito’s policies had contributed to later nationalist violence, perhaps by establishing a 
truthful record of the atrocities, the ICTY will help to break the cycle of nationalist 
violence in the Balkans.
Another part of the breaking of that cycle involves establishing individual 
responsibility for the crimes committed. Journalist Samantha Power explains, 
“Gradually, thanks in part to the Hague’s refusal to go away, Serbia’s population began
241
to face the atrocities carried out in their name. Many even recognized that because the 
UN tribunal was establishing individual responsibility, it could do a great deal to 
rehabilitate Serbia in the eyes of the rest of the world.”139 Where the Ohrid Agreement 
tried to solve the problems in Macedonia by legislating greater rights for an entire group 
of people, based on the idea that the relations between groups of people caused the 
problems in the first place, the ICTY recognizes individual responsibility for perpetrating 
crimes carried in the name of nationalism.
While ideologies based in nationalism always contain an element of subjectivity, 
the ICTY seeks to be objective and pursue justice regardless of the ethnicity or 
nationality of the defendants. The ICTY can claim to objectively prosecute individuals 
for violations of human rights because, following the establishment of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, a large body of international treaties and international law 
has developed to define the nature and extent of universal human rights as well their 
violations. Furthermore, because of its composition as an international body, the tribunal 
can claim greater legitimacy in terms of prosecuting defendants of all different 
ethnicities. A small example of this determination to be as objective as possible 
occurred in the recent trial of a Serbian official. Instead of addressing the nature of the 
accused Serbian man’s actions, a Serbian witness instead launched into an account of his 
own persecution at the hands of Croatian authorities. Journalist Guy Lesser notes that it 
would have been easy for the judge to insist that the witness confine his testimony to his 
knowledge of the defendant. Instead, Judge Wolfgang Schomburg assured the witness 
that his allegations would be investigated, stating, “That’s the fundamental reason why 
the international community decided to set up this Tribunal especially to avoid impunity,
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impunity of people of whatsoever ethnicity or religion or from whatever military
» » 1 4 0group.
In response to the violence that occurred in Macedonia in 2001, ICTY officials 
claimed jurisdiction over that conflict as well. Rather than assuming that ethnic tensions 
led directly to crimes against civilians, such those that occurred at Ljuboten, the ICTY is 
focusing on the actions of specific individuals. Although a Macedonian government 
official publicly shrugged off the possibility of indictment by the ICTY regarding the 
violence in Ljuboten, Human Rights Watch points out, “the very fact that he was 
responding to speculation about an ICTY investigation demonstrates the impact this 
important international investigation can have.”141 Human Rights Watch, a group 
dedicated to the promotion of objective and universal human rights, thus also points to 
the ICTY as an important part of the solution for the nationalist violence in Macedonia. 
Rather than promoting a particularist solution of the kind found within the Ohrid 
Agreement, the ICTY seeks to hold individuals, regardless of their ethnicity or 
nationality, personally responsible for violating universal human rights.
Conclusion
Both Kosovo and Macedonia experienced violence that resulted from militant and 
divisive nationalist ideologies. Both areas, however, have histories that belie 
oversimplified claims that ethnic tensions and hatreds caused the violence and human 
rights abuses. Although diversity of all kinds existed to differentiate groups of people 
from one another, ethnicity served as only one, and probably not even the most 
important, of the determining factors. Religion, economic class, and political ideologies
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all contributed to the formation people’s identities and their establishment into like- 
minded groups. Nevertheless, first in Kosovo and then in Macedonia a particular set of 
circumstances transformed the varied nature of many people’s individual identities into 
polarized, divisive, nationalist ideologies. Poor economic circumstances, leaders’ 
political ambitions and the availability of weapons all contributed to this transition. The 
cycle of repression and human rights abuses helped to encourage the spread of militant 
nationalism and to gamer support for nationalist groups.
In spite of Macedonia’s history of working through civil society to solve ethnic 
tensions, many international mediators persisted in seeing the violence within Macedonia 
as simply the result of ethnic conflict. The resulting Ohrid Agreement reflected this 
belief as it promised concessions and increased rights for the particularly Albanian 
minority group. In contrast, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia is seeking to prosecute specific individuals responsible for committing abuses 
of universal human rights. While nationalism is rooted in a subjective determination, the 
ICTY is using an objective and internationally agreed upon standard of human rights in 
its pursuit of justice. Perhaps with time, the Ohrid Agreement, the ICTY, and continued 
economic investment from the West, will help to bring stability and peace to Macedonia 
and to the region.
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Conclusion
Human Rights, Nationalism, and the World
Since practically the dawn of recorded history visionaries have called for a 
universal understanding of basic human rights. Some, such as the ancient Greek 
philosopher Plato, believed in the existence of natural law. That is to say, Plato felt that a 
higher law transcended the boundaries of human existence, and some truths about justice 
existed outside and independent of human organization, and the nature of particular 
states, their laws, and their rulers. Others, such as the leading figures in many of the 
world’s major religions, came to their universal understanding of human rights because 
of their belief that God intended people to treat each other with compassion, regardless of 
the specific circumstances of individual existence. Balkan native Mother Teresa 
exemplified this tradition as her Catholic faith led her to India, where she worked to 
promote the human rights of the poorest of the poor, regardless of their economic status, 
ethnicity, or even their religion. Still others recognized that practical benefits would 
come from a more universal understanding of human rights, as perhaps Alexander the 
Great did when he changed his policy regarding Greek mercenaries during the battle at 
Miletus.
Following the great devastation of World War n, and the enormous amount of 
suffering and loss of human life that had occurred, a movement developed that would 
specifically recognize the important connection between a universal understanding of 
human rights and practical benefits. In 1948, when the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the preamble recognized 
this essential link between the protection of human rights and international peace, stating,
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“disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind.. ..[I]t is essential, if man is not to be compelled to 
have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human 
rights should be protected by the rule of law.”1 If human rights abuses have often led to 
wars, then protecting human rights can contribute to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Since the establishment of the declaration, an enormous body of 
international law and international treaties has developed that has provided an objective 
definition of these human rights, and made it possible and legitimate for organizations 
dedicated to promoting human rights to involve themselves in the fight against human 
rights abuses wherever they may occur. In particular, in recent years a number of 
international tribunals have developed to hold individual perpetrators of grave violations 
of human rights responsible for their crimes before an objective court of law.
While human rights have increasingly been defined objectively, ideologies of 
nationalism, which are based in the concepts of ethnic or national identity, always contain 
an element of subjectivity. Although elements of language, religion, culture, family 
history, place of residence, citizenship within a nation-state, and economic status may all 
contribute to the formation of an ethnic identity, by its very nature the concept of 
identity-formation involves individual determination. While those who promote human 
rights emphasize the aspects of human existence that make all people somehow the same, 
the process of forming an ethnic or national identity necessarily focuses on the particular 
elements that differentiate one individual from another. The philosophical tension 
between that which binds humanity together simply by virtue of our humanness, and that 
which differentiates us from one another, is a fundamental aspect of all human existence.
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The important question then becomes, why is it that in some places at some times the 
normal differences between people become translated into militant ideologies that 
sanction and even encourage massive human rights violations?
In an attempt to answer this question regarding specific occurrences of human 
rights abuses, such as those that have occurred in the Balkans, many have pointed to the 
existence of “ancient ethnic hatreds,” as the reason why groups of people commit 
atrocities against one another. The evidence from the history of the Balkans, however, 
does not support this argument, in large part because of the subjective nature of ethnic 
identity. Since people are free to identify themselves, or redefine themselves, inhabitants 
of the Balkans have frequently changed identities based on political agendas or power 
struggles. Furthermore, the evidence that does exist regarding the nature of identity 
formation throughout the course of Balkan history suggests that other factors, such as 
economic status, religion, tribal or clan loyalties, gender, and political orientation have 
played an equal, if not greater, role in defining people’s identities. Of course, these 
factors might all contribute to the formation of a particular ethnic identity, but therein lies 
the problem: ethnic identity is subjective, and it is therefore up to the individual to 
determine which particular factors will contribute to the definition of a particular identity. 
Finally, evidence regarding relations between different groups of people in the Balkans, 
whether those groups are made up of different religions, ethnicities, or economic classes, 
suggests that these groups tolerated each other and cooperated with each other, just as 
much as they fought with one another.
If “ancient ethnic hatreds” did not cause the serious human rights violations, the 
question remains as to what did. It seems that in the course of Balkan history, the very
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subjective nature of ethnic identity has allowed individual politicians to manipulate and 
even create exclusive ideologies of nationalism, rooted in the concept of an ethnic or a 
national identity. Often these politicians were really pursuing their own agendas and 
power-struggles that had little or nothing to do with the nationalist ideologies they 
proclaimed. Nevertheless, through symbols and propaganda, and often by creating a 
sense of fear through state-controlled media, these leaders placed a heavy emphasis on 
those aspects of ethnic identity that divide people from one another, and forced an 
exclusive understanding of a particular ethnic identity that negated a universal conception 
of humanity. By refusing to see “others” as humans equally deserving of the same basic 
human rights, these politicians set the stage for serious violations of human rights. In 
addition, those individual leaders usually organized and actively supported the 
commission of those abuses. It should also be noted that alongside these power-hungry 
and manipulative politicians, poor economic conditions contributed to the problems, as 
the lack of stability and insufficient basic standards of living helped create feelings of 
hopelessness and desperation.
While the history of the Balkans provides ample evidence to support the reality of 
the pattern of militant nationalist ideologies created by politicians leading to massive 
human rights abuses, other parts of the world have also suffered from similar sets of 
circumstances. In 1994, in just under three months Hutu extremists killed 800,000 Tutsi 
and Hutu moderates in the African country of Rwanda. Just as they had in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, the international media and many international politicians articulated the 
argument of “ancient ethnic hatreds” to explain the violence. For example, in an 
interview with African studies professor Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, National Public
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Radio interviewer Daniel Zwerdling asked, “Why are things in Africa so bad? Why is
tribal violence so deep?” As the interview continued, Zwerdling refused to give up the
“ancient ethnic hatreds” argument even as Ntalaja attempted to disprove it, responding:
Ntalaja: Most of it has been exacerbated by politicians hungry for more 
power.
Zwerdling:.. .Well, of course, politicians can exacerbate what tensions 
already exist. I mean, you’re not arguing, are you, that these tribal 
hatreds were not already there before modem politicians came along?
Ntalaja: I’m saying that the ethnic groups do have prejudices and people 
do tend to feel they may be different from other groups. But it’s not 
enough to make a person pick up a knife or a gun and kill somebody else.
It is when politicians come and excite passion and try to threaten people -  
make people believe that they are being threatened by other groups....
Zwerdling: Of course, in most of these battlegrounds, though, there is 
ancient ethnic hatred and something that surprises me actually is that 
you’re blaming modem, contemporary African politicians for this.. ..3
In spite of Zwerdling’s disbelief, the evidence suggests that, just as they had in the
former Yugoslavia, extremist politicians used propaganda to incite hatred in the people.
For example, the Hutu radio station, Mille Collines, not only named specific Tutsi as
targets, but also repeatedly referred to those Tutsi as less-than-human “cockroaches.” In
addition, much evidence suggests that before the onset of the genocide, the Hutu and
Tutsi had intermingled and even, in many instances, intermarried.4 A recent Human
Rights Watch report concurs with the assessment that “ancient ethnic hatreds” were not
to blame and agrees with Ntalaja’s assessment regarding the reasons for the violence:
The Rwandan genocide did not have to occur, even given the intensity of 
anti-Tutsi feeling among Hutu in Rwanda. Governmental incitement 
provided the deadly spark.5
The man who perhaps tried the hardest to prevent the atrocities, former UN Lieutenant
General Romeo Dallaire, recently gave a speech regarding the tragic events of 1994, in
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which he explicitly rejected the particularist mentality that emphasized the differences 
between people. He referred to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s statement that the 
new millennium would be the “millennium of humanity.” He continued, “This is where 
humanity will move into an era where the differences don't count. Where every human 
will be considered as an equal to other humans.”6
In conclusion, then, differences between individuals and groups of people will 
always exist; they are a normal and essential part of human nature. Nevertheless, since 
an expression of individual identity, particularly an ethnic identity, emphasizes the 
particular aspects that differentiate people, it will always be in tension with a universal 
understanding of humanity that seeks to view all people as fundamentally the same.
While that tension presents serious challenges, it is important to understand that 
differences in and of themselves do not necessarily lead to human rights violations. 
Legislation and international organizations that attempt to guard against such abuses of 
human rights by focusing on that which divides people, such as the Minorities Treaties of 
the interwar years, or the 2001 Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia, are bound to fall short in 
some ways because they do not address the real root of the problems. Instead, 
organizations such as the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recognize the 
important role that individuals play in instigating violence, and seek to combat that 
violence by holding those individual people accountable for their actions. Most 
importantly, those interested in promoting international human rights should seek to do 
so in a way that emphasizes the universality of humanity, as opposed to the particularities 
of individual identity, and focus on all people’s equal deservingness of the same basic 
human rights.
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NOTES
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as quoted in Lauren, International 
Human Rights, 2nd ed., 305.
2Daniel Zwerdling, as quoted in Power, A Problem from Hell, 355.
3Daniel Zwerdling and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja as quoted in ibid., 356.
4Power, A Problem from Hell, 330, 334.
5Human Rights Watch, “Playing the ‘Communal Card:’ Communal Violence and 
Human Rights,” as accessed from http://www.hrw. or g/r eport s/1995/communal/ on April 
21,2004.
6Romeo Dallaire, “Acceptance Speech,” given on the occasion of the Inaugural 
Aegis Award at Westminster Central Hall in London on 22 January 2002, as accessed 
from http://www.aegis.tv/award/pages/speeches.html on April 21, 2004.
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